Note: Descriptions are shown in the official language in which they were submitted.
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AN ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEM
FIELD OF THE DISCLOSED SUBJECT MATTER
The present disclosed subject matter is concerned with defense systems and
more specifically with active protection systems.
= 5 BACKGROUND OF THE DISCLOSED SUBJECT MATTER
An active protection system is related to protection systems which actively
prevent sensor-based or other incoming threats from acquiring and/or
destroying a
target. The active protection system can protect soldiers, vehicles,
buildings, military
base and other platforms from large variety of threats.
Electronic countermeasures that alter the electromagnetic, acoustic or other
signature(s) of a target thereby altering the tracking and sensing behavior of
an
incoming threat (e.g., a guided missile) are designated soft kill measures.
Measures that physically counterattack an incoming threat thereby
destroying/altering its payload/warhead in such a way that the intended effect
on the
target is severely impeded are designated hard kill measures. The hard kill
measures
generally refer to measures taken in the so-called "end-game" shortly before a
warhead/missile hits its target. The hard kill measure in general physically
affects the
incoming warhead/missile by means of either blast and/or fragment action. The
active
protection system, using a hard kill measure, is operated by detecting the
incoming
threat and killing it before it hits the target. The detection of the coining
threats can be
based on radar detection systems that provide information related to the
incoming
threat.
Different types of hard kill interception systems are known in the art. The
killing
interception of one type interception systems can occur at a far distance from
the target,
for example, between 10 to 100 meter. The killing interception of another type
of
interception system can occur close to the target's wall, for example, at a
distance of
between 1 to 5 meter. Each type of the hard killing interception systems has
benefits
and limitations regarding the cultural damage, the impact on the target, the
protection
threats level, the cost, the killing probability, reliability, weight and
more.
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SUMMARY OF THE DISCLOSED SUBJECT MATTER
The presently disclosed subject matter, in accordance with one aspect,
provides
an active protection system for protecting a platform from an incoming threat.
The
active protection system comprises:
a. a detection system configured for providing an output data associated
with an
incoming threat;
b. a first countermeasure arrangement mountable on the platform and
configured to
intercept an incoming threat at a far interception point;
c. a second countermeasure arrangement mountable on the platform and
configured
i a to intercept an incoming threat at a near interception point: and
d. a controlling unit, in communication with the detection system and with
the first
and second countermeasure arrangements, configured for receiving said output
data and selecting a preferred countermeasure arrangement from said first and
second countermeasure arrangements, with which the incoming threat is to be
intercepted.
The existence of two types of countermeasure arrangements, i.e., the first and
the second countermeasure arrangements, within one active protection system
allows
this system to intercept a much wider variety of types of threats as opposed
to the case,
where only one of these countermeasure arrangements is used in an active
protection
system. The first countermeasure arrangement constitutes a first layer of
active
protection, and the second countermeasure arrangement constitutes a second
layer of
active protection. The combination of these two layers of active protection
against an
incoming threat within one active protection system allows obtaining much more
accurate interception results, a reduced collateral damage, multi hit
capability, high
reliability, and reduced costs. The costs can be saved, for example, when
instead of
using an expensive countermeasure against a small threat, a much cheaper
countermeasure is chosen and used.
The active protection system of the presently disclosed subject matter can
provide protection in a wide variety of combat scenarios such as: urban
warfare, open
terrain warfare, and rural areas.
It should be indicated that if the threat is of the kind that produces a new
threat
while being intercepted (e.g., shrapnel), this new threat is considered to be
different
from the original threat.
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The term 'platform' re fers hereinafter to an object to be protected from a
potential threat, and can be, for example, one of the following: a ground
vehicle, a
lightweight vehicle, an armored personal carrier, a tank, an airplane, a
helicopter, an
unmanned aerial vehicle, and a war ship.
The term 'threat' refers hereinafter to any known type of an object that can
be
dangerous for the platform, and can be, for example, one of the following: an
explosively formed penetrator (EFP), an explosive-driven fragment, a bullet,
an
indirect ammunition and botnblet; an anti-tank missile, a non-guided missile
or rocket; a
guided missile or rocket; a self-guided and maneuvering missile or rocket; a
heat
seeking missile or rocket; a radar lock missile or rocket; a laser guided
missile or rocket;
a short range missile or rocket; a shoulder missile or rocket; an RPG (Rocket
Propelled
Grenade); and a TOW (Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided missile).
The term 'residual impact' refers hereinafter to an impact of fragmented parts
of
threat which are created as a result of an interception of an incoming threat.
The term 'collateral damage' refers to a situation in which an incidental
damage of something that is different from the original target occurs. For
example, a
collateral damage can be caused to civilian property and non-combatant
casualties when
an active protection system intercepts an incoming threat.
The first countermeasure arrangement can be configured to countermeasure two
or more incoming threats at the same time. The controlling unit can be further
configured for analyzing at least the output data to determine the type of the
incoming
threat; and selecting the preferred countermeasure arrangement at least based
on the
determined type of the incoming threat.
The controlling unit can be further configured for analyzing at least the
output
data for detecting launch of the incoming threat and tracking the incoming
threat.
The cont rolling unit can be furthe r configured to base the s election of the
preferred countermeasure arrangement on at least one of the following: the
distance of
the incoming threat from the platform; the expected residual impact of the
determined
type of the incoming threat if intercepted; the caliber of the determined type
of the
incoming threat; the weight of the determined type of the incoming threat: and
the
effectiveness of each of the first and second countermeasure arrangements
against the
determined type of the incoming threat.
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The first countermeasure arrangement can be selected for incoming threats
having an expected residual impact that is greater than the expected residual
impact for
which the second countermeasure arrangement is selected.
The controlling unit can be further configured for instructing the preferred
countermeasure arrangement to intercept the incoming threat.
The first and second countermeasure arrangements can be hard kill systems,
both mountable, optionally separately, on the platform.
The detection system can comprise a radar system at least for tracking the
incoming threat.
The detection system can further comprise a radio frequency (RF) system
operative at least prior to the operation of the radar system for at least one
of the
following: detecting launch of the incoming threat and determining the type of
the
incoming threat.
The controlling unit can be configured for initiating the operation of the
radar
system following the launch detection of the incoming threat.
The RF system can be configured for detecting launch of the incoming threat by
identifying an electromagnetic pulse associated with the engine ignition of
the incoming
threat.
The detection system can alternatively comprise an IR system which can be
configured to replace the RF system, and to perform all the above operation,
respectively.
The first countermeasure system can be configured for losing its capability to
cause collateral damage after the far interception point.
The first countermeasure system can comprise an array of barrels, each
configured to accommodate a plurality of countermeasures.
The countermeasures can be projectiles configured for dramatically losing
kinetic energy after the far interception point.
The far interception point can be located farther than the near interception
point,
with respect to the platform.
The far interception point can be located at a distance of between about 2
meter
to about 100 meter from the platform.
The second countermeasure arrangement can comprise a linear array of
countermeasures configured for intercepting the incoming threat.
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The countertneasures can be configured to be directed and launched in a plane
substantially perpendicular to the line of flight of the incoming threat.
The countermeasures can be configured to be directed and launched in the
vertically downward direction.
The second countermeasure arrangement can comprise an optical system,
controllable by the controlling unit; the optical system being configured for:
generating
an optical zone; detecting passage of the incoming threat through the optical
zone,
thereby triggering the interception of the incoming threat by at least one
countermeasure
selected from the linear array of countermeasures and corresponding to the
near
interception point.
The near interception point can be located in close proximity to the
platform's
wall for reducing the collateral damage.
The near interception point can be located at a distance of between about 0.1
meter to about 10 meter from the platform.
The active protection system can further comprise a passive armor mounted on
the walls of the platform.
The controlling unit can be configured for instructing the preferred
countermeasure arrangement to intercept the incoming threat, while keeping the
non-
selected countermeasure arrangement inoperative against the same threat.
The presently disclosed subject matter, in accordance with another aspect,
provides a platform having an active protection system as detailed above.
The presently disclosed subject matter, in accordance with another aspect,
provides a method for actively protecting of a platform from an incoming
threat. The
method comprises:
a. providing a mountable first countermeasure arrangement configured to
intercept
the incoming threat at a far interception point, and a mountable second
countermeasure arrangement configured to intercept the incoming threat at a
near
interception point;
b. obtaining an output data from a detection system, at least for detecting
the
incoming threat;
c. selecting by a controlling unit a preferred countermeasure arrangement
from the
first and second countermeasure arrangements, at least based on the output
data;
and
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d. instructing
the preferred countermeasure arrangement to intercept the incoming
threat.
The method can further comprise a step of mounting the first and second
countermeasure arrangements on the platform.
The method can further comprise steps of: analyzing by the controlling unit at
least the output data to determine the type of the incoming threat; and
performing the
step of selecting the preferred countermeasure arrangement at least based on
the
determined type of the incoming threat.
The method can further comprise a step of analyzing by the controlling unit at
to least the output data at least for tracking the incoming threat.
The method can further comprise a step of basing the selection of the
preferred
countermeasure arrangement on at least one of the following: the distance of
the
incoming threat from the platform; the expected residual impact of the
determined type
of the incoming threat if intercepted; the caliber of the determined type of
the incoming
threat; the weight of the determined type of the incoming threat; and the
effectiveness of
each of the first and second countermeasure arrangements against the
determined type
of the incoming threat.
The step of selecting the first countermeasure arrangement can be based on
incoming threats having an expected residual impact that is greater than the
expected
residual impact for which the second countermeasure arrangement is selected.
The method can further comprise a step of providing the dete ction system
having a radar system at least for tracking the incoming threat.
The detection system can further comprise a radio frequency (RF) system
operative at least prior to the operation of the radar system for performing
at least one of
the following steps: detecting launch of the incoming threat and determining
the type of
the incoming threat.
The method can further comprise a step of initiating the operation of the
radar
system following the launch detection of the incoming threat.
The method can further comprise a step of identifying an electromagnetic pulse
associated with the engine ignition of the incoming threat, thereby detecting
launch of
the incoming threat.
The method can further comprise a step of determining at least one of the near
interception point and far interception point by the controlling unit.
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The second countermeasure arrangement can comprise an optical system,
controllable by the controlling unit; and the method can further comprise
steps of:
generating an optical zone by the optical system: detecting passage of the
incoming
threat through the optical zone, thereby triggering the interception of the
incoming
threat by at least one countermeasure selected from a linear array of
countermeasures
and corresponding to the near interception point.
The method can further comprise a step of mounting a passive armor on the
walls of the platform.
The method can further comprise a step of instructing, by the controlling
unit,
the preferred countermeasure arrangement to intercept the incoming threat,
while
keeping the non-selected countermeasure arrangement inoperative against the
same
threat.
The presently disclosed subject matter, in accordance with another aspect,
provides a system for detecting an incoming threat. comprising:
a. a radio frequency
(RF) system configured for providing an output data being
associated with the incoming threat, being used for at least one of the
following: detecting launch of the incoming threat and determining the type
of the incoming threat;
b. a radar system configured for providing an output data associated with
the
incoming threat, being used at least for tracking the incoming threat after
the
detection of its launch; and
c. a controlling unit configured for controlling the operation of the RF
system
and the radar system.
The controlling unit can be configured for: receiving, from said RF system,
said
output data; and analyzing the output data from said RF system for at least
one of the
following: detecting launch of the incoming threat and determining the type of
the
incoming threat.
The analysis of the output data from said RF system can include application of
pattern recognition techniques.
The output data from the RF system comprises data can be related to
electromagnetic pulse associated with the engine ignition of the incoming
threat.
The analysis of the output data from said RF system can further comprise
performance of spectral analysis of the electromagnetic pulse.
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The RF system can further be configured for tracking the incoming threat.
The radar system can further be configured for detecting the type of the
incoming threat.
The presently disclosed subject matter, in accordance with another aspect,
provides a
method for detecting an incoming threat, comprising:
d.
providing a detection system comprising: a radar system; a radio frequency
(RF)
system; and a controlling unit configured for controlling the operation of the
RF
system and the radar system;
e. receiving from said RF system, in said controlling unit, an output
data being
associated with the incoming threat;
f.
analyzing, by said controlling unit, said output data from the RF system for
at least
one of the following: detecting launch of the incoming threat by the RF system
and
determining the type of the incoming threat;
g. receiving from said radar system, in said controlling unit, an
output data being
associated with the incoming threat; and
h.
analyzing, by said controlling unit, said output data from the radar system
for
tracking the incoming threat.
The step of analyzing the output data from said RF system can comprise a step
of applying
pattern recognition techniques.
The output data from the RF system can comprise data related to
electromagnetic pulse
associated with the engine ignition of the incoming threat.
The step of analyzing the output data from said RF system can further comprise
performing spectral analysis of the electromagnetic pulse.
The method can further comprise a step of analyzing, by said controlling unit,
said output
data from the RF system for tracking the incoming threat.
The method can further comprise a step of analyzing, by said controlling unit,
said output
data from the radar system for determining the type of the incoming threat.
In one aspect, there is provided A system for detecting an incoming threat,
comprising:
a. a radio frequency (RF) system configured for receiving an RF signal
generated by an
electromagnetic pulse associated with engine ignition of the incoming threat
and
providing an output data being associated with the RF signal, being used for
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detecting launch of the incoming threat and determining the type of the
incoming
threat;
b. a radar system configured for providing an output data associated with
the incoming
threat, being used at least for tracking the incoming threat after the
detection of its
launch and the determination of its type; and
c. a controlling unit configured for controlling the operation of the RF
system and the
radar system, wherein the controlling unit is configured for receiving and
analyzing
the output data from the RF system for detecting launch of the incoming threat
and
determining the type of the incoming threat at least prior to initiating the
operation of
the radar system.
In another aspect, there is provided a method for detecting an incoming
threat,
comprising:
a. providing a detection system comprising: a radar system; a radio
frequency (RF)
system; and a controlling unit configured for controlling the operation of the
RF
system and the radar system;
b. receiving by said RF system an RF signal generated by an electromagnetic
pulse
associated with engine ignition of the incoming threat;
c. receiving from said RF system, in said controlling unit, an output data
being
associated with the RF signal, and being used for detecting launch of the
incoming
threat and determining the type of the incoming threat;
d. analyzing, by said controlling unit, said output data from the RF system
for at least
one of the following: detecting launch of the incoming threat and determining
the
type of the incoming threat;
e. initiating, by said controlling unit, operation of the radar system
after the detection of
launch of the incoming threat and determination of the type of the incoming
threat;
f. receiving from said radar system, in said controlling unit, an output
data being
associated with the incoming threat; and
g. analyzing, by said controlling unit, said output data from the radar
system for
tracking the incoming threat.
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BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
In order to understand the disclosed subject matter and to see how it may be
carried out in
practice, embodiments will now be described, by way of non-limiting examples
only, with
reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:
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Fig. lA is a schematic illustration of one known in the art active protection
system mounted on an armored personnel carrier;
Fig. IB is a schematic illustration of another known in the art active
protection
system mounted on an armored personnel carrier;
Fig. 2 is a schematic illustration of an active protection system mounted on
an
armored personnel carrier, according to one example of the presently disclosed
subject
matter;
Figs. 3A and 3B are schematic illustration of a first countermeasure
arrangement
used in the active protection system of Fig. 2, according to one example of
the presently
disclosed subject matter;
Fig. 3C is a schematic illustration of a second countermeasure arrangement
used
in the active protection system of Fig. 2, according to one example of the
presently
disclosed subject matter;
Fig. 4 is a schematic representation of the main components of the active
Is protection system of Fig. 2; and
Fig. 5 is a schematic block diagram of a method according to which the active
protection system of Fig. 2 is operated, according to one example of the
presently
disclosed subject matter.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS
Attention is first directed to Figs. IA and 1B of the drawings which
schematically illustrates two examples of platforms in form of armored
personnel
carriers 10 and 20, each having a known in the art countermeasure arrangement
mounted thereto.
The armored personnel carrier 10 of Fig. IA has a countermeasure arrangement
12 which is configured to intercept an incoming threat at a near interception
point, i.e.,
at a location which is proximal to the walls of the armored personnel carrier
10. The
countermeasure arrangement 12 is related to the "on the wall" countermeasure
arrangements which intercept the incoming threat as close as possible to the
walls of the
armored personnel carrier. The principle behind the operation of the "on the
wall"
countermeasure arrangements is that as close to the platfonn the interception
is
performed, the collateral damage that is caused to the platform's surrounding
is reduced.
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One example of the countermeasure arrangement 12 is the 'Iron Curtain' system
available by
Artis, LLC.
The countermeasure arrangement 12 can be used in short range combat scenarios,
e.g.,
urban scenarios, and against incoming threat such as ATGM, EFP, Long rods and
Tandem.
Differently from the armored personnel carrier 10, the armored personnel
carrier 20 of
Fig. 1B includes another type a countermeasure arrangement 22 which is
configured to intercept
an incoming threat at a far interception point, i.e., at a location which is
not proximal to the walls
of the armored personnel carrier 20. The countermeasure arrangement 22 is
related to the "long
distance" type of countermeasure arrangements which intercept the incoming
threat in the air, at
a distance which is not proximal to the armored personnel carrier 20. The
countermeasure
arrangement 22 can be suitable for use in combat scenarios such as open field
warfare. The
countermeasure arrangement 22 has an ability to encounter and intercept a
large variety of
threats, such as small and large missiles, and other types of serious threats.
It is known that the
collateral damage that can be caused by the countermeasure arrangement 22 is
greater than the
collateral damage that can be caused by the countermeasure arrangement 12. One
example of the
countermeasure arrangement 22 is the "fire wall" system available by Metal
Storm Limited,
Brisbane (AU).
Attention is now directed to Figs. 2 and 3, which schematically illustrate an
active
protection system 100 mounted on a platform in form of an armored personnel
carrier 102, in
accordance with one example of the presently disclosed subject matter. The
active protection
system 100 is configured for actively protecting the armored personnel carrier
102 from an
incoming threat 105 which is launched from a launcher 104 towards the armored
personnel
carrier 102.
The active protection system 100 comprises a detection system 110 constituted
by a radar
system 150 and an RF system 160, a first countermeasure arrangement 120
constituting a first
protective layer, a second countermeasure arrangement 130 constituting a
second protective
layer, and a controlling unit 140 (shown in Fig. 4) which operatively controls
the operation of the
active protection system 100. The first countermeasure arrangement 120 and the
second
countermeasure arrangement 130 are two external arrangements which are mounted
on the
armored personnel carrier 102 for
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providing an active protection thereto, as detailed below. The detection
system 110 is
operatively connected to the controlling unit 140, and the first and the
second
countermeasure arrangements 120 and 130 are also operatively connected to the
controlling unit 140.
In general, the active protection system 100 is capable of detecting,
identifying
and tracking the incoming threat 105, and in response, selecting which of the
first and
the second countermeasure arrangements 120 and 130 is more suitable for
intersecting
the incoming threat 105, and afterwards, launching at least one countermeasure
(e.g., a
projectile, a bullet) from the selected countermeasure arrangements 120 and
130 toward
the incoming threat 105. The countermeasure is configured for killing the
incoming
threat by directly hitting or discharging it.
The first countermeasure arrangement 120 is a hard kill arrangement related to
the "long distance" type of countermeasure arrangements, such as the
arrangement of
Fig. 1B, and is configured to intercept the incoming threat 105 at a far
interception point
114. The far interception point can be calculated by the controlling unit 140,
and can be
located at a distance of between about 2 meter to about 100 meter from the
armored
personnel carrier 130.
A detailed example of the first countermeasure arrangement 120 is presented in
Figs. 3A and 3B. In particular, Fig. 3A illustrates a disassembled position of
the first
countermeasure arrangement 120, and Fig. 3B illustrates the first
countermeasure
arrangement 120 in operation. As shown in these figures, the first
countermeasure
arrangement 120 has an array of barrels 125, each configured to accommodate
multiple
countermeasures in form of projectiles 127 which can be directed along a path
122
during interception. According to a specific example, the projectiles 127 can
be
configured for dramatically losing kinetic energy after the far interception
point 114.
The second countermeasure arrangement 130 is a hard kill arrangement related
to the "on the wall" type of countermeasure arrangements, such as the
arrangement of
Fig. 1A, and is configured to intercept the incoming threat 105 at a near
interception
point 115. The far interception point 114 is usually located farther than the
near
interception point 115, with respect to the armored personnel carrier 102. The
near
interception point 115 is located in close proximity to the wall of the
armored personnel
carrier 102 for reducing the collateral damage. The near interception point is
located at a
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distance of between about 0.1 meter to about 10 meter from the armored
personnel
carrier 102.
A detailed example of the second countermeasure arrangement 130 is presented
in Fig. 3C.The second countermeasure arrangement 130 comprises four linear
arrays of
countermeasure launchers 135, disposed at the surrounding of the armored
personnel
carrier 130. Each countermeasure launcher 135 is configured for accommodating
at
least one countermeasure in form of a bullet or a linear shaped charge that
intercepts the
incoming threat 105 in the near interception point 115. According to one
example, the
countermeasures can be directed and launched in the substantially vertically
downward
direction along a path 132, as shown in Fig. 3C. According to another example,
the
countermeasures can be directed and launched in the substantially downward
direction
along a path 133, as shown in Fig. 2.
According to other examples, the second countermeasure arrangement 130 is
configured to direct and launch the countermeasures in a plane substantially
perpendicular to the line of flight of the incoming threat.
The second countermeasure arrangement 130 fitrther comprises a triggering
optical system 138, controllable by the controlling unit 140 and configured
for:
generating an optical zone 134; detecting passage of the incoming threat
through the
optical zone, thereby triggering the interception of the incoming threat 105
by at least
one countermeasure selected from the linear array of countermeasures 135 and
corresponding to the near interception point.
The detection system 110 is responsible for providing to the controlling unit
140
real-time information in form of an output data (e.g., threat's location,
threat's direction,
threat's speed, threat's altitude, threat's angle) related to the incoming
threat 105 during
its way towards the armored personnel carrier 102. The output data is received
from the
radar system 150 and the RF system 160, and processed by the controlling unit
140,
while each of this system is responsible for the following:
The RF system 160 is responsible for providing an output data according to
which the launch of the incoming threat 105 can be detected. The detection of
the
incoming threat 105 is performed by the controlling unit 140 which identifies
a n
electromagnetic RF pulse associated with the engine ignition of the incoming
threat
105. The RF system 160 is additionally responsible for providing an output
data
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according to which the type of the incoming threat 105 can be initially
determined by
the controlling unit 140 according to the above electromagnetic RF pulse.
In case of detection of the incoming threat 105, the controlling unit 140
initiates
the operation of the radar system 150 which provides an output data useful for
tracking
the incoming threat 105. In addition, according to a specific example, the
output data
received from the RF system 160 can also be useful for tracking the incoming
threat
105.
During the tracking of the incoming threat by the radar system 150, the
controlling unit 140 constantly receives the output data from the detection
system 110
and repeatedly analyzes this data. By analyzing the output data, the
controlling unit 140
determines the type and the properties of the incoming threat 105, and
accordingly
selects a preferred countermeasure arrangement from the first and second
countermeasure arrangements 120 and 130, with which the incoming threat is to
be
intercepted. In addition, following the selection of the preferred
countermeasure
arrangement, the controlling unit 140 determines the exact location of the
respective far
interception point 114 or the near interception point 115.
According to different examples of the presently disclosed subject matter, the
selection of the preferred countermeasure arrangement can be based on at least
one of
the following criteria:
- the distance of the incoming threat 105 from the armored personnel carrier
102.
For example, if the incoming threat is too close to the armored personnel
carrier
102 to be intercepted by the first countermeasure arrangement 120, the second
countermeasure arrangement 130 can be preferred;
- the expected
residual impact of the determined type of the incoming threat if
intercepted. For example, if the expected residual impact is high, the first
countermeasure arrangement 120 can be preferred, since its far interception
point 114 is farther from the armored personnel carrier 102 than the near
interception point 115 of the second countermeasure arrangement 130. In
general, the first countermeasure arrangement 120 is selected for incoming
threats having an expected residual impact that is greater than the expected
residual impact for which the second countermeasure arrangement 130 is
selected;
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- the caliber of the determined type of the incoming threat. For example,
if the
caliber of the incoming threat is large, the first countermeasure arrangement
120
can be preferred since it can encounter more serious threats than the second
countermeasure arrangement 130;
- the weight of the determined type of the incoming threat. For example, if
the
weight of the incoming threat is large, the first countermeasure arrangement
120
can be preferred since it can encounter more heavy threats than the second
countermeasure arrangement 130; and
- the effectiveness of each of the first and second countermeasure
arrangements
against the determined type of the incoming threat. For example, if the
incoming
threat is an RPG, the second countermeasure arrangement 130 can be preferred.
Following the selection of the preferred countermeasure arrangement and the
determination of the interception point, the controlling unit instructs the
preferred
countermeasure arrangement to intercept the incoming threat 105. It should be
noted
that the controlling unit 140 is configured for instructing the preferred
countermeasure
arrangement to intercept the incoming threat 105, while keeping the non-
selected
countermeasure arrangement inoperative against the same threat.
It should be indicated that the armored personnel carrier 102 can also include
a
passive armor mounted on its walls for providing an additional passive
protection from
the incoming threat or its shrapnel.
The controlling unit 140 is a computerized system with at least one processor
and a memory which stores the software that is executable by the processor to
control
the operation of the active protection system 100,
Reference is now made to Fig. 5 which schematically illustrates a block
diagram
of a method for actively protecting a platform from an incoming threat, in
accordance
with one example of the presently disclosed subject matter.
The method 200 begins with step 210 which includes providing a mountable
first countermeasure arrangement configured to intercept the incoming threat
at a far
interception point, and a mountable second countermeasure arrangement
configured to
intercept the incoming threat at a near interception point. This step can
further include a
step of mounting the first and second countermeasure arrangements on the
platform.
Step 220 includes obtaining an output data from a detection system, at least
for
detecting the incoming threat.
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Step 230 includes analyzing by the controlling unit at least the output data
at
least for tracking the incoming threat.
Step 240 includes selecting by a controlling unit a preferred countermeasure
arrangement from the first and second countermeasure arrangements, at least
based on
the output data.
Step 250 includes instructing the preferred countermeasure arrangement to
intercept the incoming threat.
According to other examples, the active protection system 100 can further
include a soft kill countermeasure arrangement (e.g., a laser system)
operatively
connected to the controlling unit 140. This arrangement is configured for
confusing the
targeting mechanism of the incoming threat, and thereby causing it to miss its
target,
i.e., the platform. If the soft kill countermeasure arrangement fails to
intersect the
incoming threat, the controlling unit will instruct the preferred hard kill
countermeasure
arrangement to intersect the incoming threat.
According to other examples, the detection system 110 can further include
other
detection means such as, an electro-optical system or an IR system. In
addition, the
detection system 110 can further include its own controller which analyses at
least a
part of the output data and transfers it the controlling unit 140.
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