Note : Les descriptions sont présentées dans la langue officielle dans laquelle elles ont été soumises.
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ENCRYPTION TECHNIQUES
RELATED APPLICATIONS
[0001] This claims priority to each of the following applications: U.S. Pat.
App. No.
15/042,862, filed on February 12, 2016; U.S. Pat. App. No. 15/042,916, filed
on February 12,
2016; U.S. Pat. App. No. 15/099,524, filed on April 14, 2016; U.S. Pat. App.
No. 15/098,720,
filed on April 14, 2016; U.S. Pat. App. No. 15/099,542, filed on April 14,
2016; U.S. Pat. App.
No. 15/098,684, filed on April 14, 2016; and U.S. Pat. App. No. 15/179,447,
filed on June 10,
2016, where each is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.
TECHNICAL FIELD
[0002] This application relates to portable encryption, and more specifically
to methods
and systems for securing documents for distribution over a network.
BACKGROUND
[0003] Enterprise networks can contain valuable information that forms an
increasingly
attractive target for malicious actors. Useful techniques for securing
endpoints in a network
against malicious activity are described by way of example in commonly-owned
U.S. Pat. App.
No. 14/263,955, filed on April 28, 2014, U.S. App. No. 14/485,759, filed on
September 14,
2014, and U.S. Pat. App. No. 15/042,862 filed on February 12, 2016, each of
which is hereby
incorporated by reference in its entirety.
[0004] There remains a need for improved endpoint security using encryption to
prevent
data leakage and other negative consequences for compromised endpoints.
SUMMARY
[0005] A portable encryption format wraps encrypted files in a self-executing
container
that facilitates transparent, identity-based decryption for properly
authenticated users while also
providing local password access to wrapped files when identity-based
decryption is not
available.
[0006] A computer program product for creating portable encrypted content
comprising
non-transitory computer executable code embodied in a computer-readable medium
that, when
executing on an endpoint, may perform the steps of receiving a selection of a
file for encryption
from a user, requesting a token uniquely identifying a recipient of the file
from a remote identity
and access management system to which the recipient can authenticate using
authentication
credentials, receiving the token, transmitting the token to a remote key
server, requesting a
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cryptographic key associated with the token from the remote key server, the
cryptographic key
including an encryption key and a decryption key, receiving the cryptographic
key from the
remote key server, receiving a password from the user for local decryption of
the file, encrypting
the file with the encryption key to create an encrypted file, encrypting the
decryption key to
create an object that can be decrypted using the password to recover the
decryption key, and
combining the encrypted file, the object containing the decryption key,
application logic
providing a user interface and decryption logic for accessing the file to
provide a portable
encrypted data object, where the user interface provides a first mode of
accessing the file by
supplying the password to locally decrypt the decryption key and a second mode
of accessing
the file by retrieving the decryption key from the remote key server.
[0007] A method for creating portable encrypted content may include receiving
a
selection of a file for encryption from a user, requesting a token uniquely
identifying a recipient
of the file from a first computing environment to which the recipient can
authenticate using
authentication credentials, receiving the token, transmitting the token to a
remote key server,
requesting a cryptographic key associated with the token from the remote key
server, the
cryptographic key including an encryption key and a decryption key, receiving
the cryptographic
key from the remote key server, receiving a password from the user for local
decryption of the
file, encrypting the file with the encryption key to create an encrypted file,
encrypting the
decryption key to create an object that can be decrypted using the password to
recover the
decryption key, and combining the encrypted file, the object containing the
decryption key, and
application logic providing a user interface for accessing the file into a
portable encrypted data
object, where the user interface provides a first mode of accessing the file
by supplying the
password to locally decrypt the decryption key and a second mode of accessing
the file by
retrieving the decryption key from the remote key server.
[0008] Implementations may include one or more of the following features. The
user
interface of the portable encrypted data object may transparently decrypt the
file when the
recipient has authenticated to the first computing environment with the
authentication
credentials. The user interface may include logic to remotely retrieve the
token from the first
computing environment using the authentication credentials and transmit the
token to the remote
key server to retrieve the decryption key. The user interface may provide a
third mode of
accessing the file by receiving the authentication credentials in the user
interface and applying
the authentication credentials to retrieve the token. The method may include
the step of, or the
computer program product may further comprise code that performs the step of,
transparently
decrypting the file for the recipient when the recipient is authenticated to
the first computing
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environment. The user interface may provide a fourth mode of accessing the
file by providing
the decryption key through the user interface. The user interface may provide
a fifth mode of
accessing the file by providing user credentials for the remote key server.
The computing
environment may include an endpoint. The computing environment may include a
remote
identity and access management system. The cryptographic key may be a
symmetric key and
encryption key may be the same as the decryption key. The portable encrypted
data object may
include a hypertext markup language file containing encryption and decryption
logic. The
method may include the step of, or the computer program product may further
comprise code
that performs the step of, revoking access to the file contained in the
portable encrypted data
object by causing the remote key server to remove an association of the
recipient with the token.
[0009] An endpoint may include an interface to a data network, a memory
storing a file,
and a processor configured to create a portable encrypted data object
containing the file for
secure distribution over the data network by performing the steps of receiving
a selection of a
file for encryption from a user, requesting a token uniquely identifying a
recipient of the file
from a first computing environment to which the recipient can authenticate
using authentication
credentials, receiving the token, transmitting the token to a remote key
server, and requesting a
cryptographic key associated with the token from the remote key server, where
the
cryptographic includes an encryption key and a decryption key. The processor
may also perform
the steps of receiving the cryptographic key from the remote key server,
receiving a password
from the user for local decryption of the file, encrypting the file with the
encryption key to
create an encrypted file, encrypting the decryption key to create an object
that can be decrypted
using the password to recover the decryption key, and combining the encrypted
file, the object
containing the decryption key, and application logic providing a user
interface for accessing the
file into a portable encrypted data object, where the user interface provides
a first mode of
accessing the file by supplying the password to locally decrypt the decryption
key and a second
mode of accessing the file by retrieving the decryption key from the remote
key server. In an
aspect, the processor may be configured to automatically create the portable
encrypted data
object in response to a selection of the file by the user for communication to
the recipient.
[0010] Rules are applied at a network perimeter to outbound network
communications
that contain file attachments. The rules may, in a variety of circumstances,
require wrapping of
an outbound file from the endpoint in a portable encrypted container. The
network perimeter
may be enforced locally at the endpoint, or at any network device between the
endpoint and a
recipient.
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[0011] A computer program product for securing network traffic comprising
computer
executable code embodied in a non-transitory computer readable medium that,
when executing
on one or more computing devices, may perform the steps of receiving an
electronic mail
message from a sender for transmittal to a recipient, the electronic mail
message including an
attachment containing at least one file, removing the attachment from the
electronic mail
message, wrapping the attachment into a portable encrypted container that
contains an encrypted
instance of the file, an encrypted instance of a decryption key to decrypt the
file, and program
code providing a user interface that supports a first mode of decryption using
remote resources
and authentication credentials for the recipient and a second mode of
decryption based on local
receipt of a password for decrypting the decryption key, attaching the
portable encrypted
container to the electronic mail message, and transmitting the electronic mail
message and the
portable encrypted container to an electronic mail gateway for communication
to the recipient.
[0012] A method for securing outbound network traffic may include receiving a
communication from a sender for communication to a recipient, where the
communication
includes a file coupled to the communication as an attachment, removing the
attachment from
the communication, wrapping the attachment into a portable encrypted container
that contains an
encrypted instance of the file, an encrypted instance of a decryption key to
decrypt the file, and
program code providing a user interface that supports a first mode of
decryption using remote
resources and authentication credentials for the recipient and a second mode
of decryption based
on local receipt of a password for decrypting the decryption key, attaching
the portable
encrypted container to the communication, and transmitting the communication
and the portable
encrypted container to the recipient.
[0013] Implementations may include one or more of the following features. The
communication may be an electronic mail message, a text message, or a file
upload to a remote
resource. The remote resource may include at least one of a social networking
platform, a web
folder, a file transfer protocol server, a remote file directory, and a file
drop box. The file may
include at least one of a word processing document, a spreadsheet, an image, a
video, a
presentation document, and a portable document format document. The method may
include
encrypting the file with an encryption key from a remote key server. The
method may include
associating the decryption key with the recipient at the remote key server.
Wrapping the
attachment may include conditionally wrapping the attachment according to a
security protocol
applicable to the sender. The security protocol may specify automatic wrapping
of all outbound
attachments from the sender. The security protocol may specify automatic
wrapping of
predetermined file types from the sender. The security protocol may specify
automatic wrapping
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of files from predetermined origins. Wrapping the attachment may include
receiving a user input
of the password for local decryption of the file. Wrapping the attachment may
include
automatically creating the password for local decryption of the file. The
method may include
communicating the password to the recipient through a second communication
medium. The
second communication medium may be different from a first communication medium
bearing
the communication and the attachment. Receiving the communication may include
receiving the
communication by at least one of an endpoint firewall for the sender, an
enterprise gateway, and
an electronic mail server.
[0014] A network device may include a first interface for receiving
communications, a
second interface for sending communications over a data network, a memory, and
a processor
configured by computer executable code stored in the memory to secure network
communications by performing the steps of receiving a communication from a
sender through
the first interface for communication to a recipient, the communication
including a file coupled
to the communication as an attachment, removing the attachment from the
communication,
wrapping the attachment into a portable encrypted container that contains an
encrypted instance
of the file, an encrypted instance of a decryption key to decrypt the file,
and program code
providing a user interface that supports a first mode of decryption using
remote resources and
authentication credentials for the recipient and a second mode of decryption
based on local
receipt of a password for decrypting the decryption key, attaching the
portable encrypted
container to the communication, and transmitting the communication and the
portable encrypted
container to the recipient through the second interface. The network device
may include at least
one of an endpoint, a client device operated by the sender, an enterprise
gateway, and an
electronic mail server.
[0015] An endpoint encrypts local files with a key to protect file contents.
If the endpoint
or processes on the endpoint becomes exposed to potentially harmful locations
or resources, the
key can be revoked to prevent access to encrypted files on the endpoint. In
order to facilitate
continued operation of the endpoint, files that are currently open can be
encrypted with a second
key so that the corresponding data is isolated from the other encrypted files
while remaining
accessible to current users.
[0016] A computer program product comprising computer executable code embodied
in
a non-transitory computer readable medium that, when executing on an endpoint,
may perform
the steps of providing a first key to a process executing on the endpoint, the
first key providing
access to a plurality of files on the endpoint, detecting a potential security
compromise to the
endpoint, providing a second key to the process different than the first key,
encrypting a first one
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of the plurality of files that is open by the process with the second key,
storing the first one of
the plurality of files after encryption with the second key, revoking the
first key from the process
to prevent access to other ones of the plurality of files by the process,
initiating a remediation of
the potential security compromise, and, if the potential security compromise
is resolved,
returning the first key to the process and transcribing the first one of the
plurality of files for
access using the first key.
[0017] A method may include providing a first key to a process executing on an
endpoint, the first key providing access to a plurality of files on the
endpoint, detecting a
potential security compromise to the endpoint, providing a second key to the
process different
than the first key, encrypting a first one of the plurality of files that is
open by the process with
the second key, revoking the first key from the process to prevent access to
other ones of the
plurality of files by the process, and, if the potential security compromise
is resolved, returning
the first key to the process and transcribing the first one of the plurality
of files for access using
the first key.
[0018] Implementations may include one or more of the following features.
Revoking
the first key may include physically removing the first key from the endpoint.
Returning the first
key to the process may include recovering the first key from a remote key
management system.
The method may include, or the computer program product may further comprise
code that
performs the step of, if the potential security compromise is resolved,
deleting the second key
and saving the first one of the plurality of files. Detecting the potential
security compromise to
the endpoint may include identifying a compromised state on the endpoint.
Identifying the
compromised state may include identifying malicious software based on at least
one of static
analysis and behavioral analysis. Detecting the potential security compromise
may include
detecting an exposure of the process to an unknown data source. The method may
include
initiating a remediation of the potential security compromise. The method may
include storing
the first one of the plurality of files after encryption with the second key
and before initiating the
remediation.
[0019] A system may include an endpoint, a first memory on the endpoint
storing a first
key, a second memory on the endpoint storing a plurality of files encrypted by
the first key, a
process executing on a processor on the endpoint, the process using the first
key to access a first
one of the plurality of files, and a security agent executing on the
processor, the security agent
configured to detect a potential security compromise to the endpoint. The
processor may be
configured to respond to the potential security compromise by encrypting the
first one of the
plurality of files with a second key different from the first key, providing
access by the process
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to the second key, and revoking the first key from the process to prevent
access by the process to
other ones of the plurality of files. The processor may be further configured
to initiate a
remediation of the potential security compromise, and to respond to a
successful remediation of
the potential security compromise by returning the first key to the process
for access to the
plurality of files.
[0020] On an endpoint that encrypts local files to protect against data
leakage and other
harmful malware events, newly detected files are dynamically encrypted when
they are detected
as long as the endpoint is not compromised. If a compromised state is
detected, the newly
detected file will not be added to the encrypted files until the endpoint can
be remediated and the
compromised state resolved.
[0021] A computer program product comprising computer executable code embodied
in
a non-transitory computer readable medium that, when executing on one or more
computing
devices, may perform the steps of encrypting a plurality of files on an
endpoint with a key to
provide a plurality of encrypted files, monitoring a security state of the
endpoint, providing the
key to a process executing on the endpoint whenever the security state of the
endpoint is not
compromised and revoking the key from the process whenever the security state
of the endpoint
is compromised, detecting an access to a new file other than one of the
plurality of encrypted
files by the process, if the security state of the endpoint is not
compromised, encrypting the new
file with the key immediately upon access by the process to add the new file
to the plurality of
encrypted files, and, if the security state of the endpoint is compromised,
revoking the key from
the process to prevent access by the process to the plurality of encrypted
files and initiating a
remediation of the endpoint.
[0022] Implementations may include one or more of the following features. The
computer program product may further comprise code that performs the step of,
if the endpoint
is severely compromised, physically removing the key from the endpoint. The
computer
program product may further comprise code that performs the step of, if the
endpoint is
successfully remediated, recovering the key to the endpoint from a remote key
management
system.
[0023] A method may include encrypting a plurality of files on an endpoint
with a key to
provide a plurality of encrypted files, monitoring a security state of the
endpoint, providing the
key to a process executing on the endpoint whenever the security state of the
endpoint is not
compromised and revoking the key from the process whenever the security state
of the endpoint
is compromised, detecting an access to a new file other than one of the
plurality of encrypted
files by the process, and, if the security state of the endpoint is not
compromised, encrypting the
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new file with the key immediately upon access by the process to add the new
file to the plurality
of encrypted files.
[0024] Implementations may include one or more of the following features.
Monitoring
the security state may include monitoring the security state with static
analysis or with
behavioral analysis. Monitoring the security state may include monitoring an
exposure of the
process to an unknown data source or monitoring the security state of the
process executing on
the endpoint. The method may include revoking the key from the endpoint if the
endpoint
becomes severely compromised. Revoking the key may include physically removing
the key
from the endpoint. The method may include returning the key to the endpoint if
the endpoint is
remediated. Returning the key may include recovering the key from a remote key
management
system. The key may be a symmetric key. Providing the key to the process may
include
decrypting files with the key with a file system filter coupled between the
process and a file
system of the endpoint. Providing the key to the process may include
decrypting files with the
key at a mount point coupled between the process and a file system of the
endpoint. Monitoring
the security state of the endpoint may include remotely monitoring a heartbeat
of the endpoint.
Monitoring the security state of the endpoint may include monitoring network
traffic originating
from the endpoint at a gateway for an enterprise network that includes the
endpoint.
[0025] A system may include an endpoint, a first memory on the endpoint
storing a key,
a second memory on the endpoint storing a plurality of files encrypted by the
key, a process
executing on a processor on the endpoint, and a security agent executing on
the processor. The
security agent may be configured to monitor a security state of the endpoint
and to detect a
potential security compromise of the endpoint. The processor may be configured
to detect an
access to a new file other than one of the plurality of files, and if the
security state of the
endpoint is not compromised, to encrypt the new file with the key immediately
upon access by
the process to add the new file to the plurality of files encrypted by the
key. The system may
further include a remote management facility configured to remotely monitor
the security state
of the endpoint based on a heartbeat received from the endpoint. The system
may also include an
enterprise gateway configured to remotely monitor the security state of the
endpoint based on
network traffic.
[0026] An extension to a file system on an endpoint supports transparent,
process-level
control over encryption and decryption of files. At the same time an integrity
monitor evaluates
a security state of a process on the endpoint to detect when the process is
compromised or
otherwise exposed to potentially unsafe content. The extension to the file
system can receive
security status information from the integrity monitor and responsively apply
rules for whether
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to allow or prohibit access to encrypted files within the file system on a
process-by-process
basis.
[0027] In an aspect, a computer program product for securing an endpoint
against
malicious activity includes computer-executable code embodied in a non-
transitory computer
readable medium that, when executing on the endpoint performs the steps of
encrypting a
plurality of files on an endpoint to prevent unauthorized access to the
plurality of files, receiving
a request to access one of the files from a process executing on the endpoint,
decrypting the one
of the files for the process, monitoring a security state of the process, and
if the security state
becomes a compromised state, maintaining access to any open ones of the
plurality of files
(including the one of the plurality of files), prohibiting access to other
ones of the plurality of
files, and initiating a remediation of the process by facilitating a restart
of the process. If the
remediation is successful, access by the process to the plurality of files may
be restored.
[0028] In another aspect, a method includes encrypting a plurality of files on
an endpoint
to prevent unauthorized access to the plurality of files, receiving a request
to access one of the
files from a process executing on the endpoint, decrypting the one of the
files for the process,
monitoring a security state of the process, and, if the security state becomes
a compromised
state, prohibiting access to one or more of the plurality of files.
[0029] Implementations may include one or more of the following features. If
the
security state becomes a compromised state, the method may include maintaining
access to one
or more other ones of the plurality of files that are open when the security
state becomes the
compromised state. The method may include initiating a remediation of the
process in response
to the compromised state. Monitoring the security state of the process may
include detecting the
compromised state based on at least one of a behavior of the process, a
behavior of an associated
process, and a behavior of the endpoint. Monitoring the security state of the
process may include
monitoring network traffic associated with the process. Monitoring the
security state of the
process may include adding an application identifier to the network traffic
originating from the
process, where the application identifier explicitly identifies an application
associated with the
process. Monitoring the security state of the process may also include
monitoring network traffic
from the process at a gateway between the endpoint and a data network based on
the application
identifier. Monitoring the security state of the process may include
generating a log of network
requests by logging network requests and applications making the network
requests. Monitoring
the security state of the process may include storing an application
identifier in the log of
network requests, where the application identifier explicitly identifies an
application associated
with a source process for a network request. Monitoring the security state of
the process may
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also include monitoring network requests from the application at a gateway
between the
endpoint and a data network based on the application identifier. Monitoring
the security state of
the process may include monitoring observable behaviors for the process
including one or more
of file behavior by the process, persistence behavior by the process, inter-
process
communications to or from the process, and direct exploit detections.
Monitoring the security
state of the process may include locally monitoring the process with a file
scanner that performs
static analysis on at least one of a first file that the process launches from
and one or more
second files that gets loaded into the process. Initiating a remediation of
the compromised state
may include facilitating a restart of the process. The method may include
providing a
notification to a user in a display of the endpoint, the notification
indicating a required
remediation step for the process to resolve the compromised state, and the
notification informing
the user that an application associated with the process cannot access
additional files until the
user completes the required remediation step. Receiving a request to access
one of the files from
the process may include receiving the request at a file system filter for a
file system that
manages the plurality of files. Decrypting the one of the files for the
process may include
accessing a cryptographic key for the plurality of files with the file system
filter and applying
the cryptographic key to decrypt the one of the files. The file system filter
may be configured to
respond to an indication of compromise for the endpoint by deleting key
material stored on the
endpoint and used by the file system filter to decrypt the plurality of files.
The file system filter
may operate transparently to a computing environment for the process.
Receiving a request to
access one of the files from the process may include receiving the request at
a mount point for a
file system that manages the plurality of files.
[0030] In an aspect, a system includes an endpoint, a first memory on the
endpoint
storing a plurality of files that are encrypted to prevent unauthorized
access, a second memory
on the endpoint storing key material for decrypting the plurality of files, a
process executing on
the endpoint, and a file system on the endpoint configured to manage access to
the plurality of
files by the process. The file system may be configured to respond to a
request from the process
for one of the files by conditionally decrypting the one of the files based on
a security state of
the process.
[0031] Implementations may include one or more of the following features. The
system
may include a gateway coupled in a communicating relationship with the
endpoint, where the
gateway is configured to monitor the security state of the process based on
network traffic or
other behavioral observations for the process. The system may include a threat
management
facility coupled in a communicating relationship with the endpoint, where the
threat
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management facility is configured to remotely monitor the security state of
the process based on
indications of compromise received from the endpoint. The first memory and the
second
memory may be separate physical memories. The file system may be configured to
conditionally
decrypt the one of the files using an extension to an operating system of the
endpoint including
at least one of a file system filter and a mount point.
[0032] In an aspect, a computer program product for securing an endpoint
against
exposure to unsafe or unknown content includes computer-executable code
embodied in a non-
transitory computer readable medium that, when executing on the endpoint
performs the steps of
encrypting a plurality of files on an endpoint to prevent unauthorized access
to the plurality of
files, monitoring an exposure state of a process on the endpoint to
potentially unsafe content by
applying a plurality of behavioral rules to determine whether the exposure
state of the process is
either exposed or secure, where (1) the process is initially identified as
secure, (2) the process is
identified as exposed when the process opens a network connection to a Uniform
Resource
Locator that is not internal to an enterprise network of the endpoint and that
has a reputation that
is poor, (3) the process is identified as exposed when the process opens a
first file that is
identified as exposed, and (4) the process is identified as exposed when
another exposed process
opens a handle to the process. The computer program product may also include
computer-
executable code that performs the step of restricting access by the process to
the plurality of files
when the process is exposed by controlling access to the plurality of files
through a file system
filter that conditionally decrypts one or more of the plurality of files for
the process according to
the exposure state of the process.
[0033] Implementations may include one or more of the following features. The
reputation of the Uniform Resource Locator may be obtained from a remote
threat management
facility. The file system filter may conditionally decrypt one or more of the
plurality of files
using a cryptographic key, where the file system filter is configured to
respond to an indication
of compromise for the endpoint by deleting the cryptographic key on the
endpoint. Restricting
access by the process to the plurality of files may include maintaining access
to any of the
plurality of files that have been opened by the process before the process
became exposed, and
preventing access to other ones of the plurality of files.
[0034] In an aspect, a method includes encrypting a plurality of files on an
endpoint to
prevent unauthorized access to the plurality of files, monitoring an exposure
state of a process
on the endpoint to potentially unsafe content by applying a plurality of
behavioral rules to
determine whether the exposure state of the process is either exposed or
secure, where the
process is initially identified as secure and the process is identified as
exposed based on contact
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with content other than the plurality of files, and restricting access by the
process to the plurality
of files when the process is exposed.
[0035] Implementations may include one or more of the following features. The
method
may include identifying the process as exposed according to the plurality of
behavioral rules,
where (1) the process is identified as exposed when the process opens a
network connection to a
Uniform Resource Locator that is not internal to an enterprise network of the
endpoint and that
has a reputation that is poor, (2) the process is identified as exposed when
the process opens a
first file that is identified as exposed, and (3) the process is identified as
exposed when another
exposed process opens a handle to the process. The method may further include
identifying the
first file as exposed when at least one of the following conditions is met:
(1) the first file is not
one of the plurality of files, (2) the first file is saved by a second process
that is identified as
exposed, and (3) a source of the first file has a low reputation. The first
file may be identified as
exposed based upon a scan of the first file. The reputation for the Uniform
Resource Locator
may be obtained from a remote threat management facility. Restricting access
by the process to
the plurality of files may include controlling access through an extension to
a file system for the
endpoint, where the extension conditionally decrypts one or more of the
plurality of files for the
process according to the exposure state of the process. The extension may
conditionally decrypt
one or more of the plurality of files using a cryptographic key, where the
extension is configured
to respond to an indication of compromise for the endpoint by deleting the
cryptographic key on
the endpoint. The extension may include at least one of a mount point for the
file system and a
file system filter for the file system. Restricting access by the process to
the plurality of files
may include maintaining access to any of the plurality of files that have been
opened by the
process before the process became exposed, and preventing access to other ones
of the plurality
of files. The method may include monitoring a security state of the process
and restricting access
by the process to the plurality of files when the security state is
compromised. Monitoring the
security state may include remotely monitoring the security state at a threat
management facility
or locally monitoring the security state with a malware file scanner. The
method may include
initiating a remediation of the process when the process is exposed, the
remediation including
facilitating a restart of the process. If the remediation is successful, the
method may include
restoring access to all of the plurality of files by the process. The method
may include providing
a notification to a user in a display of the endpoint, the notification
indicating a required
remediation step for the process to resolve the exposure state, and the
notification informing the
user that an application associated with the process cannot access additional
files until the user
completes the required remediation step.
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[0036] In an aspect, a system includes an endpoint, a first memory on the
endpoint
storing a plurality of files encrypted to prevent unauthorized access, a
process executing on the
endpoint, and a file system on the endpoint configured to manage access to the
plurality of files
by the process, the file system including an extension configured to monitor
an exposure state of
the process and to restrict access to the one of the files based on the
exposure state of the process
by conditionally decrypting the one of the files based on the exposure state.
The system may
also include an integrity monitor configured to evaluate the exposure state by
applying a
plurality of behavioral rules to determine whether the exposure state of the
process is either
exposed or secure, where the process is initially identified as secure and the
process is identified
as exposed based on contact with content other than the plurality of files.
The system may
further include a remediation component configured to remediate the process
from the exposed
state to the secure state for unrestricted access to the plurality of files.
[0037] Implementations may include one or more of the following features. The
integrity
monitor may be further configured to identify the process as exposed according
to the plurality
of behavioral rules, where (1) the process is identified as exposed when the
process opens a
network connection to a Uniform Resource Locator that is not internal to an
enterprise network
of the endpoint and that has a reputation that is poor, (2) the process is
identified as exposed
when the process opens a first file that is identified as exposed, and (3) the
process is identified
as exposed when another exposed process opens a handle to the process. The
extension to the
file system may include at least one of a mount point and a file system
filter. The extension to
the file system may maintain access to any of the plurality of files that have
been opened by the
process before the process became exposed, and prevent access to other ones of
the plurality of
files.
[0038] A file system extension for an endpoint may control access to files by
selectively
decrypting files under certain conditions. Where a pattern of access to the
files suggests
malicious and/or automated file access activity, the file system extension may
limit the rate of
file access by regulating the rate at which decryption is provided to
requesting processes.
[0039] In an aspect, a computer program product for throttling access to
encrypted files
in response to potentially malicious activity may comprise computer executable
code embodied
in a non-transitory computer readable medium that, when executing on one or
more computing
devices, performs the steps of encrypting a plurality of files on an endpoint
to provide a plurality
of encrypted files that can be decrypted with a key, and providing a file
system for accessing the
plurality of files with one or more processes executing on the endpoint, where
the file system
includes a file system extension that applies the key to decrypt a requested
one of the files in
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response to a request from one of the one or more processes for the requested
one of the files.
The code may also perform the steps of monitoring access to the plurality of
files by the one or
more processes for a potential indication of compromise, and limiting a rate
of access to the
plurality of files by the file system extension when a pattern of access to
the files indicates
potentially malicious automated file access. The code may further that perform
the step of
presenting an interactive user interface element in a display on the endpoint
requesting a
confirmation that a human user initiated an activity causing the pattern of
access. In an aspect,
the pattern of access to the files may include a communication of one or more
of the plurality of
files to a location remote from the endpoint.
[0040] In another aspect, a method includes encrypting a plurality of files on
an endpoint
to provide a plurality of encrypted files that can be decrypted with a key,
and providing a file
system for accessing the plurality of files with one or more processes
executing on the endpoint,
where the file system includes a file system extension that applies the key to
decrypt a requested
one of the files in response to a request from one of the one or more
processes for the requested
one of the files. The method may also include monitoring access to the
plurality of files by the
one or more processes for a potential indication of compromise, and, when an
indication of
compromise is detecting, limiting a rate of access to the plurality of files
by the file system
extension.
[0041] Implementations may include one or more of the following features. The
indication of compromise may include a pattern of access to the files
indicating potentially
malicious automated file access. The indication of compromise may include
access to a number
of files beyond a predetermined threshold within a predetermined time
interval. The
predetermined threshold may specify a type of file. The type of file may
include an application
type associated with one or more of the number of files. The type of file may
include a file
system extension associated with one or more of the number of files. The
predetermined
threshold may specify a number of types of files. The predetermined threshold
may specify an
application requesting the number of files. The predetermined threshold may
specify an attribute
of the number of files. The attribute may include a business use or a
sensitivity of a document.
The method may further include presenting a notification in a display on the
endpoint about the
indication of compromise. The method may further include presenting an
interactive user
interface element in a display on the endpoint requesting a confirmation that
a human user
initiated an activity causing the indication of compromise. The method may
further include
adjusting at least one of the predetermined threshold and the predetermined
time interval
according to a pattern of file access. The indication of compromise may be
based on a rule for
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detecting automated behavior. The indication of compromise may be based on a
detection of a
removable storage drive coupled to the endpoint. The method may further
include providing an
exception to the indication of compromise for a trusted process.
[0042] In an aspect, a system includes an endpoint, a first memory on the
endpoint
storing a key, a second memory on the endpoint storing a plurality of files
that can be decrypted
by the key, and a file system for accessing the plurality of files. The file
system may include a
file system extension that applies the key to decrypt a requested one of the
plurality of files in
response to a request from a process executing on the endpoint. The system may
also include a
processor configured to monitor the endpoint for an indication of compromise,
and to limit a rate
of access to the plurality of files by the file system extension in response
to the indication of
compromise.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES
[0043] The foregoing and other objects, features and advantages of the
devices, systems,
and methods described herein will be apparent from the following description
of particular
embodiments thereof, as illustrated in the accompanying drawings. The drawings
are not
necessarily to scale, emphasis instead being placed upon illustrating the
principles of the
devices, systems, and methods described herein.
[0044] Fig. 1 illustrates an environment for threat management.
[0045] Fig. 2 illustrates a computer system.
[0046] Fig. 3 illustrates a threat management system.
[0047] Fig. 4 illustrates a system for behavioral tracking, coloring, and
generation of
indications of compromise (I0Cs).
[0048] Fig. 5 illustrates a system for encryption management.
[0049] Fig. 6 illustrates a threat management system using heartbeats.
[0050] Fig. 7 shows an architecture for endpoint protection in an enterprise
network
security system.
[0051] Fig. 8 shows a method for securing an endpoint.
[0052] Fig. 9 shows a method for securing an endpoint.
[0053] Fig. 10 shows a system for creating portable encrypted content.
[0054] Fig. 11 illustrates a process for unwrapping portable encrypted
content.
[0055] Fig. 12 illustrates a process for unwrapping portable encrypted
content.
[0056] Fig. 13 illustrates a process for unwrapping portable encrypted
content.
[0057] Fig. 14 illustrates a process for unwrapping portable encrypted
content.
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[0058] Fig. 15 shows a flowchart of a process for creating portable encrypted
content.
[0059] Fig. 16 illustrates a method for enhancing perimeter security for
outbound
content.
[0060] Fig. 17 shows a method for intermediate encryption of potentially
exposed
content.
[0061] Fig. 18 shows a method for just-in-time encryption of data.
[0062] Fig. 19 shows a method for key throttling to mitigate unauthorized file
access.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0063] Embodiments will now be described with reference to the accompanying
figures,
in which preferred embodiments are shown. The foregoing may, however, be
embodied in many
different forms and should not be construed as limited to the illustrated
embodiments set forth
herein.
[0064] All documents mentioned herein are hereby incorporated by reference in
their
entirety. References to items in the singular should be understood to include
items in the plural,
and vice versa, unless explicitly stated otherwise or clear from the context.
Grammatical
conjunctions are intended to express any and all disjunctive and conjunctive
combinations of
conjoined clauses, sentences, words, and the like, unless otherwise stated or
clear from the
context. Thus, the term "or" should generally be understood to mean "and/or"
and so forth.
[0065] Recitation of ranges of values herein are not intended to be limiting,
referring
instead individually to any and all values falling within the range, unless
otherwise indicated
herein, and each separate value within such a range is incorporated into the
specification as if it
were individually recited herein. The words "about," "approximately," or the
like, when
accompanying a numerical value, are to be construed as indicating a deviation
as would be
appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art to operate satisfactorily for
an intended purpose.
Ranges of values and/or numeric values are provided herein as examples only,
and do not
constitute a limitation on the scope of the described embodiments. The use of
any and all
examples, or exemplary language ("e.g.," "such as," or the like) provided
herein, is intended
merely to better illuminate the embodiments and does not pose a limitation on
the scope of the
embodiments or the claims. No language in the specification should be
construed as indicating
any unclaimed element as essential to the practice of the embodiments.
[0066] In the following description, it is understood that terms such as
"first," "second,"
"third," "above," "below," and the like, are words of convenience and are not
to be construed as
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implying a chronological order or otherwise limiting any corresponding element
unless
expressly state otherwise.
[0067] Fig. 1 illustrates an environment for threat management. Specifically,
Fig.1
depicts a block diagram of a threat management system providing protection to
an enterprise
against a plurality of threats ¨ a context in which the following techniques
may usefully be
deployed. One aspect relates to corporate policy management and implementation
through a
unified threat management facility 100. As will be explained in more detail
below, a threat
management facility 100 may be used to protect computer assets from many
threats, both
computer-generated threats and user-generated threats. The threat management
facility 100 may
be multi-dimensional in that it may be designed to protect corporate assets
from a variety of
threats and it may be adapted to learn about threats in one dimension (e.g.
worm detection) and
apply the knowledge in another dimension (e.g. spam detection). Policy
management is one of
the dimensions for which the threat management facility can provide a control
capability. A
corporation or other entity may institute a policy that prevents certain
people (e.g. employees,
groups of employees, types of employees, guest of the corporation, etc.) from
accessing certain
types of computer programs. For example, the corporation may elect to prevent
its accounting
department from using a particular version of an instant messaging service or
all such services.
In this example, the policy management facility 112 may be used to update the
policies of all
corporate computing assets with a proper policy control facility or it may
update a select few. By
using the threat management facility 100 to facilitate the setting, updating
and control of such
policies the corporation only needs to be concerned with keeping the threat
management facility
100 up to date on such policies. The threat management facility 100 can take
care of updating all
of the other corporate computing assets.
[0068] It should be understood that the threat management facility 100 may
provide
multiple services, and policy management may be offered as one of the
services. We will now
turn to a description of certain capabilities and components of the threat
management system
100.
[0069] Over recent years, malware has become a major problem across the
Internet 154.
From both a technical perspective and a user perspective, the categorization
of a specific threat
type, whether as virus, worm, spam, phishing exploration, spyware, adware, or
the like, is
becoming reduced in significance. The threat, no matter how it is categorized,
may need to be
stopped at various points of a networked computing environment, such as one of
an enterprise
facility 102, including at one or more laptops, desktops, servers, gateways,
communication
ports, handheld or mobile devices, firewalls, and the like. Similarly, there
may be less and less
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benefit to the user in having different solutions for known and unknown
threats. As such, a
consolidated threat management facility 100 may need to apply a similar set of
technologies and
capabilities for all threats. In certain embodiments, the threat management
facility 100 may
provide a single agent on the desktop, and a single scan of any suspect file.
This approach may
eliminate the inevitable overlaps and gaps in protection caused by treating
viruses and spyware
as separate problems, while simultaneously simplifying administration and
minimizing desktop
load. As the number and range of types of threats has increased, so may have
the level of
connectivity available to all IT users. This may have led to a rapid increase
in the speed at which
threats may move. Today, an unprotected PC connected to the Internet 154 may
be infected
quickly (perhaps within 10 minutes) which may require acceleration for the
delivery of threat
protection. Where once monthly updates may have been sufficient, the threat
management
facility 100 may automatically and seamlessly update its product set against
spam and virus
threats quickly, for instance, every five minutes, every minute, continuously,
or the like.
Analysis and testing may be increasingly automated, and also may be performed
more
frequently; for instance, it may be completed in 15 minutes, and may do so
without
compromising quality. The threat management facility 100 may also extend
techniques that may
have been developed for virus and malware protection, and provide them to
enterprise facility
102 network administrators to better control their environments. In addition
to stopping
malicious code, the threat management facility 100 may provide policy
management that may be
able to control legitimate applications, such as VoIP, instant messaging, peer-
to-peer file-
sharing, and the like, that may undermine productivity and network performance
within the
enterprise facility 102.
[0070] The threat management facility 100 may provide an enterprise facility
102
protection from computer-based malware, including viruses, spyware, adware,
Trojans,
intrusion, spam, policy abuse, uncontrolled access, and the like, where the
enterprise facility 102
may be any entity with a networked computer-based infrastructure. In an
embodiment, Fig. 1
may depict a block diagram of the threat management facility 100 providing
protection to an
enterprise against a plurality of threats. The enterprise facility 102 may be
corporate,
commercial, educational, governmental, or the like, and the enterprise
facility's 102 computer
network may be distributed amongst a plurality of facilities, and in a
plurality of geographical
locations, and may include administration 134, a firewall 138A, an appliance
140A, server
142A, network devices 148A¨B, clients 144A¨D, such as protected by computer
security
facilities 152, and the like. It will be understood that any reference herein
to client facilities may
include the clients 144A¨D shown in Fig. 1 and vice-versa. The threat
management facility 100
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may include a plurality of functions, such as security management facility
122, policy
management facility 112, update facility 120, definitions facility 114,
network access rules
facility 124, remedial action facility 128, detection techniques facility 130,
testing facility 118,
threat research facility 132, and the like. In embodiments, the threat
protection provided by the
threat management facility 100 may extend beyond the network boundaries of the
enterprise
facility 102 to include clients 144D (or client facilities) that have moved
into network
connectivity not directly associated or controlled by the enterprise facility
102. Threats to client
facilities may come from a plurality of sources, such as from network threats
104, physical
proximity threats 110, secondary location threats 108, and the like. Clients
144A¨D may be
protected from threats even when the client 144A¨D is not located in
association with the
enterprise 102, such as when a client 144E¨F moves in and out of the
enterprise facility 102, for
example when interfacing with an unprotected server 142C through the Internet
154, when a
client 144F is moving into a secondary location threat 108 such as interfacing
with components
140B, 142B, 148C, 148D that are not protected, and the like. In embodiments,
the threat
management facility 100 may provide an enterprise facility 102 protection from
a plurality of
threats to multiplatform computer resources in a plurality of locations and
network
configurations, with an integrated system approach. It should be understood
that an enterprise
model is applicable to organizations and users of any size or type. For
example, an enterprise
may be or may include a group or association of endpoints, networks, users,
and the like within
or outside of one or more protected locations. It should be understood that an
enterprise may
include one or more offices or business locations, or one or more homes, where
each location, or
portions of each location, or a collection of locations may be treated as a
client facility.
[0071] In embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may be provided as a
stand-
alone solution. In other embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may
be integrated into
a third-party product. An application programming interface (e.g. a source
code interface) may
be provided such that the threat management facility 100 may be integrated.
For instance, the
threat management facility 100 may be stand-alone in that it provides direct
threat protection to
an enterprise or computer resource, where protection is subscribed to directly
100. Alternatively,
the threat management facility 100 may offer protection indirectly, through a
third-party
product, where an enterprise may subscribe to services through the third-party
product, and
threat protection to the enterprise may be provided by the threat management
facility 100
through the third-party product.
[0072] The security management facility 122 may include a plurality of
elements that
provide protection from malware to enterprise facility 102 computer resources,
including
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endpoint security and control, email security and control, web security and
control, reputation-
based filtering, control of unauthorized users, control of guest and non-
compliant computers,
and the like. The security management facility 122 may be a software
application that may
provide malicious code and malicious application protection to a client
facility computing
resource. The security management facility 122 may have the ability to scan
the client facility
files for malicious code, remove or quarantine certain applications and files,
prevent certain
actions, perform remedial actions and perform other security measures. In
embodiments,
scanning the client facility may include scanning some or all of the files
stored to the client
facility on a periodic basis, scanning an application when the application is
executed, scanning
files as the files are transmitted to or from the client facility, or the
like. The scanning of the
applications and files may be performed to detect known malicious code or
known unwanted
applications. In an embodiment, new malicious code and unwanted applications
may be
continually developed and distributed, and updates to the known code database
may be provided
on a periodic basis, on a demand basis, on an alert basis, or the like.
[0073] The security management facility 122 may provide email security and
control,
where security management may help to eliminate spam, viruses, spyware and
phishing, control
of email content, and the like. The security management facility's 122 email
security and control
may protect against inbound and outbound threats, protect email
infrastructure, prevent data
leakage, provide spam filtering, and the like. In an embodiment, security
management facility
122 may provide for web security and control, where security management may
help to detect or
block viruses, spyware, malware, unwanted applications, help control web
browsing, and the
like, which may provide comprehensive web access control enabling safe,
productive web
browsing. Web security and control may provide Internet use policies,
reporting on suspect
devices, security and content filtering, active monitoring of network traffic,
URI filtering, and
the like. In an embodiment, the security management facility 122 may provide
for network
access control, which may provide control over network connections. Network
control may stop
unauthorized, guest, or non-compliant systems from accessing networks, and may
control
network traffic that may not be bypassed from the client level. In addition,
network access
control may control access to virtual private networks (VPN), where VPNs may
be a
communications network tunneled through another network, establishing a
logical connection
acting as a virtual network. In embodiments, a VPN may be treated in the same
manner as a
physical network.
[0074] The security management facility 122 may provide host intrusion
prevention
through behavioral based protection, which may guard against unknown threats
by analyzing
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behavior before software code executes. Behavioral based protection may
monitor code when it
runs and intervene if the code is deemed to be suspicious or malicious.
Advantages of behavioral
based protection over runtime protection may include code being prevented from
running.
Whereas runtime protection may only interrupt code that has already partly
executed, behavioral
protection can identify malicious code at the gateway or on the file servers
and delete the code
before it can reach endpoint computers and the like.
[0075] The security management facility 122 may provide reputation filtering,
which
may target or identify sources of known malware. For instance, reputation
filtering may include
lists of URIs of known sources of malware or known suspicious IP addresses, or
domains, say
for spam, that when detected may invoke an action by the threat management
facility 100, such
as dropping them immediately. By dropping the source before any interaction
can initiate,
potential threat sources may be thwarted before any exchange of data can be
made.
[0076] In embodiments, information may be sent from the enterprise back to a
third
party, a vendor, or the like, which may lead to improved performance of the
threat management
facility 100. For example, the types, times, and number of virus interactions
that a client
experiences may provide useful information for the preventions of future virus
threats. This type
of feedback may be useful for any aspect of threat detection. Feedback of
information may also
be associated with behaviors of individuals within the enterprise, such as
being associated with
most common violations of policy, network access, unauthorized application
loading,
unauthorized external device use, and the like. In embodiments, this type of
information
feedback may enable the evaluation or profiling of client actions that are
violations of policy that
may provide a predictive model for the improvement of enterprise policies.
[0077] The security management facility 122 may support overall security of
the
enterprise facility 102 network or set of enterprise facility 102 networks,
e.g., by providing
updates of malicious code information to the enterprise facility 102 network
and associated
client facilities. The updates may include a planned update, an update in
reaction to a threat
notice, an update in reaction to a request for an update, an update based on a
search of known
malicious code information, or the like. The administration facility 134 may
provide control
over the security management facility 122 when updates are performed. The
updates may be
automatically transmitted without an administration facility's 134 direct
control, manually
transmitted by the administration facility 134, or otherwise distributed. The
security
management facility 122 may manage the receipt of malicious code descriptions
from a
provider, distribution of the malicious code descriptions to enterprise
facility 102 networks,
distribution of the malicious code descriptions to client facilities, and so
forth.
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[0078] The threat management facility 100 may provide a policy management
facility
112 that may be able to block non-malicious applications, such as VoIP,
instant messaging,
peer-to-peer file-sharing, and the like, that may undermine productivity and
network
performance within the enterprise facility 102. The policy management facility
112 may be a set
of rules or policies that may indicate enterprise facility 102 access
permissions for the client
facility, such as access permissions associated with the network,
applications, external computer
devices, and the like. The policy management facility 112 may include a
database, a text file, a
combination of databases and text files, or the like. In an embodiment, a
policy database may be
a block list, a black list, an allowed list, a white list, or the like that
may provide a list of
enterprise facility 102 external network locations/applications that may or
may not be accessed
by the client facility. The policy management facility 112 may include rules
that may be
interpreted with respect to an enterprise facility 102 network access request
to determine if the
request should be allowed. The rules may provide a generic rule for the type
of access that may
be granted. The rules may be related to the policies of an enterprise facility
102 for access rights
for the enterprise facility's 102 client facility. For example, there may be a
rule that does not
permit access to sporting websites. When a website is requested by the client
facility, a security
facility may access the rules within a policy facility to determine if the
requested access is
related to a sporting website. In an embodiment, the security facility may
analyze the requested
website to determine if the website matches with any of the policy facility
rules.
[0079] The policy management facility 112 may be similar to the security
management
facility 122 but with the addition of enterprise facility 102 wide access
rules and policies that
may be distributed to maintain control of client facility access to enterprise
facility 102 network
resources. The policies may be defined for application type, subset of
application capabilities,
organization hierarchy, computer facility type, user type, network location,
time of day,
connection type, or the like. Policies may be maintained by the administration
facility 134,
through the threat management facility 100, in association with a third party,
or the like. For
example, a policy may restrict IM activity to only support personnel for
communicating with
customers. This may allow communication for departments requiring access, but
may maintain
the network bandwidth for other activities by restricting the use of IM to
only the personnel that
need access to instant messaging (IM) in support of the enterprise facility
102. In an
embodiment, the policy management facility 112 may be a stand-alone
application, may be part
of the network server facility 142, may be part of the enterprise facility 102
network, may be
part of the client facility, or the like.
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[0080] The threat management facility 100 may provide configuration
management,
which may be similar to policy management, but may specifically examine the
configuration set
of applications, operating systems, hardware, and the like, and manage changes
to their
configurations. Assessment of a configuration may be made against a standard
configuration
policy, detection of configuration changes, remediation of improper
configuration, application of
new configurations, and the like. An enterprise may keep a set of standard
configuration rules
and policies which may represent the desired state of the device. For example,
a client firewall
may be running and installed, but in the disabled state, where remediation may
be to enable the
firewall. In another example, the enterprise may set a rule that disallows the
use of USB disks,
and sends a configuration change to all clients, which turns off USB drive
access via a registry.
[0081] The threat management facility 100 may also provide for the removal of
applications that potentially interfere with the operation of the threat
management facility 100,
such as competitor products that may also be attempting similar threat
management functions.
The removal of such products may be initiated automatically whenever such
products are
detected. In the case where such applications are services are provided
indirectly through a third-
party product, the application may be suspended until action is taken to
remove or disable the
third-party product's protection facility.
[0082] Threat management against a quickly evolving malware environment may
require
timely updates, and thus an update management facility 120 may be provided by
the threat
management facility 100. In addition, a policy management facility 112 may
also require update
management (e.g., as provided by the update facility 120 herein described).
The update
management for the security facility 122 and policy management facility 112
may be provided
directly by the threat management facility 100, such as by a hosted system or
in conjunction
with the administration facility 134. In embodiments, the threat management
facility 100 may
provide for patch management, where a patch may be an update to an operating
system, an
application, a system tool, or the like, where one of the reasons for the
patch is to reduce
vulnerability to threats.
[0083] The security facility 122 and policy management facility 112 may push
information to the enterprise facility 102 network and/or client facility. The
enterprise facility
102 network and/or client facility may also or instead pull information from
the security facility
122 and policy management facility 112 network server facilities 142, or there
may be a
combination of pushing and pulling of information between the security
facility 122 and the
policy management facility 112 network servers 142, enterprise facility 102
network, and client
facilities, or the like. For example, the enterprise facility 102 network
and/or client facility may
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pull information from the security facility 122 and policy management facility
112 network
server facility 142 may request the information using the security facility
122 and policy
management facility 112 update module; the request may be based on a certain
time period, by a
certain time, by a date, on demand, or the like. In another example, the
security facility 122 and
policy management facility 112 network servers 142 may push the information to
the enterprise
facility's 102 network and/or client facility by providing notification that
there are updates
available for download and then transmitting the information. The combination
of the security
management 122 network server facility 142 and security update module may
function
substantially the same as the policy management facility 112 network server
and policy update
module by providing information to the enterprise facility 102 network and the
client facility in
a push or pull method. In an embodiment, the policy management facility 112
and the security
facility 122 management update modules may work in concert to provide
information to the
enterprise facility's 102 network and/or client facility for control of
application execution. In an
embodiment, the policy update module and security update module may be
combined into a
single update module.
[0084] As threats are identified and characterized, the threat management
facility 100
may create definition updates that may be used to allow the threat management
facility 100 to
detect and remediate the latest malicious software, unwanted applications,
configuration and
policy changes, and the like. The threat definition facility 114 may contain
threat identification
updates, also referred to as definition files. A definition file may be a
virus identity file that may
include definitions of known or potential malicious code. The virus identity
(IDE) definition
files may provide information that may identify malicious code within files,
applications, or the
like. The definition files may be accessed by security management facility 122
when scanning
files or applications within the client facility for the determination of
malicious code that may be
within the file or application. The definition files may contain a number of
commands,
definitions, or instructions, to be parsed and acted upon, or the like. In
embodiments, the client
facility may be updated with new definition files periodically to provide the
client facility with
the most recent malicious code definitions; the updating may be performed on a
set time period,
may be updated on demand from the client facility, may be updated on demand
from the
network, may be updated on a received malicious code alert, or the like. In an
embodiment, the
client facility may request an update to the definition files from an update
facility 120 within the
network, may request updated definition files from a computing facility
external to the network,
updated definition files may be provided to the client facility 114 from
within the network,
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definition files may be provided to the client facility from an external
computing facility from an
external network, or the like.
[0085] A definition management facility 114 may provide timely updates of
definition
files information to the network, client facilities, and the like. New and
altered malicious code
and malicious applications may be continually created and distributed to
networks worldwide.
The definition files that maintain the definitions of the malicious code and
malicious application
information for the protection of the networks and client facilities may need
continual updating
to provide continual defense of the network and client facility from the
malicious code and
malicious applications. The definition files management may provide for
automatic and manual
methods of updating the definition files. In embodiments, the network may
receive definition
files and distribute the definition files to the network client facilities,
the client facilities may
receive the definition files directly, or the network and client facilities
may both receive the
definition files, or the like. In an embodiment, the definition files may be
updated on a fixed
periodic basis, on demand by the network and/or the client facility, as a
result of an alert of a
new malicious code or malicious application, or the like. In an embodiment,
the definition files
may be released as a supplemental file to an existing definition files to
provide for rapid
updating of the definition files.
[0086] In a similar manner, the security management facility 122 may be used
to scan an
outgoing file and verify that the outgoing file is permitted to be transmitted
per the enterprise
facility 102 rules and policies. By checking outgoing files, the security
management facility 122
may be able discover malicious code infected files that were not detected as
incoming files as a
result of the client facility having been updated with either new definition
files or policy
management facility 112 information. The definition files may discover the
malicious code
infected file by having received updates of developing malicious code from the
administration
facility 134, updates from a definition files provider, or the like. The
policy management facility
112 may discover the malicious code infected file by having received new
updates from the
administration facility 134, from a rules provider, or the like.
[0087] The threat management facility 100 may provide controlled access to the
enterprise facility 102 networks. For instance, a manager of the enterprise
facility 102 may want
to restrict access to certain applications, networks, files, printers,
servers, databases, or the like.
In addition, the manager of the enterprise facility 102 may want to restrict
user access based on
certain criteria, such as the user's location, usage history, need to know,
job position, connection
type, time of day, method of authentication, client-system configuration, or
the like. Network
access rules may be developed for the enterprise facility 102, or pre-packaged
by a supplier, and
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managed by the threat management facility 100 in conjunction with the
administration facility
134.
[0088] A network access rules facility 124 may be responsible for determining
if a client
facility application should be granted access to a requested network location.
The network
location may be on the same network as the facility or may be on another
network. In an
embodiment, the network access rules facility 124 may verify access rights for
client facilities
from within the network or may verify access rights of computer facilities
from external
networks. When network access for a client facility is denied, the network
access rules facility
124 may send an information file to the client facility containing. For
example, the information
sent by the network access rules facility 124 may be a data file. The data
file may contain a
number of commands, definitions, instructions, or the like to be parsed and
acted upon through
the remedial action facility 128, or the like. The information sent by the
network access facility
rules facility 124 may be a command or command file that the remedial action
facility 128 may
access and take action upon.
[0089] The network access rules facility 124 may include databases such as a
block list,
a black list, an allowed list, a white list, an unacceptable network site
database, an acceptable
network site database, a network site reputation database, or the like of
network access locations
that may or may not be accessed by the client facility. Additionally, the
network access rules
facility 124 may incorporate rule evaluation; the rule evaluation may parse
network access
requests and apply the parsed information to network access rules. The network
access rule
facility 124 may have a generic set of rules that may be in support of an
enterprise facility's 102
network access policies, such as denying access to certain types of websites,
controlling instant
messenger accesses, or the like. Rule evaluation may include regular
expression rule evaluation,
or other rule evaluation method for interpreting the network access request
and comparing the
interpretation to the established rules for network access. In an embodiment,
the network access
rules facility 124 may receive a rules evaluation request from the network
access control and
may return the rules evaluation to the network access control.
[0090] Similar to the threat definitions facility 114, the network access rule
facility 124
may provide updated rules and policies to the enterprise facility 102. The
network access rules
facility 124 may be maintained by the network administration facility 134,
using network access
rules facility 124 management. In an embodiment, the network administration
facility 134 may
be able to maintain a set of access rules manually by adding rules, changing
rules, deleting rules,
or the like. Additionally, the administration facility 134 may retrieve
predefined rule sets from a
remote provider of a set of rules to be applied to an entire enterprise
facility 102. The network
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administration facility 134 may be able to modify the predefined rules as
needed for a particular
enterprise facility 102 using the network access rules management facility
124.
[0091] When a threat or policy violation is detected by the threat management
facility
100, the threat management facility 100 may perform or initiate a remedial
action facility 128.
Remedial action may take a plurality of forms, such as terminating or
modifying an ongoing
process or interaction, sending a warning to a client or administration
facility 134 of an ongoing
process or interaction, executing a program or application to remediate
against a threat or
violation, record interactions for subsequent evaluation, or the like.
Remedial action may be
associated with an application that responds to information that a client
facility network access
request has been denied. In an embodiment, when the data file is received,
remedial action may
parse the data file, interpret the various aspects of the data file, and act
on the parsed data file
information to determine actions to be taken on an application requesting
access to a denied
network location. In an embodiment, when the data file is received, remedial
action may access
the threat definitions to parse the data file and determine an action to be
taken on an application
requesting access to a denied network location. In an embodiment, the
information received
from the facility may be a command or a command file. The remedial action
facility may carry
out any commands that are received or parsed from a data file from the
facility without
performing any interpretation of the commands. In an embodiment, the remedial
action facility
may interact with the received information and may perform various actions on
a client
requesting access to a denied network location. The action may be one or more
of continuing to
block all requests to a denied network location, a malicious code scan on the
application, a
malicious code scan on the client facility, quarantine of the application,
terminating the
application, isolation of the application, isolation of the client facility to
a location within the
network that restricts network access, blocking a network access port from a
client facility,
reporting the application to an administration facility 134, or the like.
[0092] Remedial action may be provided as a result of a detection of a threat
or
violation. The detection techniques facility 130 may include monitoring the
enterprise facility
102 network or endpoint devices, such as by monitoring streaming data through
the gateway,
across the network, through routers and hubs, and the like. The detection
techniques facility 130
may include monitoring activity and stored files on computing facilities, such
as on server
facilities 142, desktop computers, laptop computers, other mobile computing
devices, and the
like. Detection techniques, such as scanning a computer's stored files, may
provide the
capability of checking files for stored threats, either in the active or
passive state. Detection
techniques, such as streaming file management, may provide the capability of
checking files
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received at the network, gateway facility, client facility, and the like. This
may provide the
capability of not allowing a streaming file or portions of the streaming file
containing malicious
code from entering the client facility, gateway facility, or network. In an
embodiment, the
streaming file may be broken into blocks of information, and a plurality of
virus identities may
be used to check each of the blocks of information for malicious code. In an
embodiment, any
blocks that are not determined to be clear of malicious code may not be
delivered to the client
facility, gateway facility, or network.
[0093] Verifying that the threat management facility 100 is detecting threats
and
violations to established policy, may require the ability to test the system,
either at the system
level or for a particular computing component. The testing facility 118 may
allow the
administration facility 134 to coordinate the testing of the security
configurations of client
facility computing facilities on a network. The administration facility 134
may be able to send
test files to a set of client facility computing facilities to test the
ability of the client facility to
determine acceptability of the test file. After the test file has been
transmitted, a recording
facility may record the actions taken by the client facility in reaction to
the test file. The
recording facility may aggregate the testing information from the client
facility and report the
testing information to the administration facility 134. The administration
facility 134 may be
able to determine the level of preparedness of the client facility computing
facilities by the
reported information. Remedial action may be taken for any of the client
facility computing
facilities as determined by the administration facility 134; remedial action
may be taken by the
administration facility 134 or by the user of the client facility.
[0094] The threat research facility 132 may provide a continuously ongoing
effort to
maintain the threat protection capabilities of the threat management facility
100 in light of
continuous generation of new or evolved forms of malware. Threat research may
include
researchers and analysts working on known and emerging malware, such as
viruses, rootkits a
spyware, as well as other computer threats such as phishing, spam, scams, and
the like. In
embodiments, through threat research, the threat management facility 100 may
be able to
provide swift, global responses to the latest threats.
[0095] The threat management facility 100 may provide threat protection to the
enterprise facility 102, where the enterprise facility 102 may include a
plurality of networked
components, such as client facility, server facility 142, administration
facility 134, firewall 138,
gateway, hubs and routers 148, threat management appliance 140, desktop users,
mobile users,
and the like. In embodiments, it may be the endpoint computer security
facility 152, located on a
computer's desktop, which may provide threat protection to a user, and
associated enterprise
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facility 102. In embodiments, the term endpoint may refer to a computer system
that may source
data, receive data, evaluate data, buffer data, or the like (such as a user's
desktop computer as an
endpoint computer), a firewall as a data evaluation endpoint computer system,
a laptop as a
mobile endpoint computer, a personal digital assistant or tablet as a hand-
held endpoint
computer, a mobile phone as an endpoint computer, or the like. In embodiments,
endpoint may
refer to a source or destination for data, including such components where the
destination is
characterized by an evaluation point for data, and where the data may be sent
to a subsequent
destination after evaluation. The endpoint computer security facility 152 may
be an application
loaded onto the computer platform or computer support component, where the
application may
accommodate the plurality of computer platforms and/or functional requirements
of the
component. For instance, a client facility computer may be one of a plurality
of computer
platforms, such as Windows, Macintosh, Linux, and the like, where the endpoint
computer
security facility 152 may be adapted to the specific platform, while
maintaining a uniform
product and product services across platforms. Additionally, components may
have different
functions to serve within the enterprise facility's 102 networked computer-
based infrastructure.
For instance, computer support components provided as hubs and routers 148,
server facility
142, firewalls 138, and the like, may require unique security application
software to protect their
portion of the system infrastructure, while providing an element in an
integrated threat
management system that extends out beyond the threat management facility 100
to incorporate
all computer resources under its protection.
[0096] The enterprise facility 102 may include a plurality of client facility
computing
platforms on which the endpoint computer security facility 152 is adapted. A
client facility
computing platform may be a computer system that is able to access a service
on another
computer, such as a server facility 142, via a network. This client facility
server facility 142
model may apply to a plurality of networked applications, such as a client
facility connecting to
an enterprise facility 102 application server facility 142, a web browser
client facility connecting
to a web server facility 142, an e-mail client facility retrieving e-mail from
an Internet 154
service provider's mail storage servers 142, and the like. In embodiments,
traditional large client
facility applications may be switched to websites, which may increase the
browser's role as a
client facility. Clients 144 may be classified as a function of the extent to
which they perform
their own processing. For instance, client facilities are sometimes classified
as a fat client
facility or thin client facility. The fat client facility, also known as a
thick client facility or rich
client facility, may be a client facility that performs the bulk of data
processing operations itself,
and does not necessarily rely on the server facility 142. The fat client
facility may be most
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common in the form of a personal computer, where the personal computer may
operate
independent of any server facility 142. Programming environments for fat
clients 144 may
include CURT, Delphi, Droplets, Java, win32, X11, and the like. Thin clients
144 may offer
minimal processing capabilities, for instance, the thin client facility may
primarily provide a
graphical user interface provided by an application server facility 142, which
may perform the
bulk of any required data processing. Programming environments for thin
clients 144 may
include JavaScript/AJAX, ASP, JSP, Ruby on Rails, Python's Django, PHP, and
the like. The
client facility may also be a mix of the two, such as processing data locally,
but relying on a
server facility 142 for data storage. As a result, this hybrid client facility
may provide benefits
from both the fat client facility type, such as multimedia support and high
performance, and the
thin client facility type, such as high manageability and flexibility. In
embodiments, the threat
management facility 100, and associated endpoint computer security facility
152, may provide
seamless threat protection to the plurality of clients 144, and client
facility types, across the
enterprise facility 102.
[0097] The enterprise facility 102 may include a plurality of server
facilities 142, such as
application servers, communications servers, file servers, database servers,
proxy servers, mail
servers, fax servers, game servers, web servers, and the like. A server
facility 142, which may
also be referred to as a server facility 142 application, server facility 142
operating system,
server facility 142 computer, or the like, may be an application program or
operating system that
accepts client facility connections in order to service requests from clients
144. The server
facility 142 application may run on the same computer as the client facility
using it, or the server
facility 142 and the client facility may be running on different computers and
communicating
across the network. Server facility 142 applications may be divided among
server facility 142
computers, with the dividing depending upon the workload. For instance, under
light load
conditions all server facility 142 applications may run on a single computer
and under heavy
load conditions a single server facility 142 application may run on multiple
computers. In
embodiments, the threat management facility 100 may provide threat protection
to server
facilities 142 within the enterprise facility 102 as load conditions and
application changes are
made.
[0098] A server facility 142 may also be an appliance facility 140, where the
appliance
facility 140 provides specific services onto the network. Though the appliance
facility 140 is a
server facility 142 computer, that may be loaded with a server facility 142
operating system and
server facility 142 application, the enterprise facility 102 user may not need
to configure it, as
the configuration may have been performed by a third party. In an embodiment,
an enterprise
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facility 102 appliance may be a server facility 142 appliance that has been
configured and
adapted for use with the threat management facility 100, and located within
the facilities of the
enterprise facility 102. The enterprise facility's 102 threat management
appliance may enable
the enterprise facility 102 to administer an on-site local managed threat
protection configuration,
where the administration facility 134 may access the threat resources through
an interface, such
as a web portal. In an alternate embodiment, the enterprise facility 102 may
be managed
remotely from a third party, vendor, or the like, without an appliance
facility 140 located within
the enterprise facility 102. In this instance, the appliance functionality may
be a shared hardware
product between pluralities of enterprises 102. In embodiments, the appliance
facility 140 may
be located at the enterprise facility 102, where the enterprise facility 102
maintains a degree of
control. In embodiments, a hosted service may be provided, where the appliance
140 may still
be an on-site black box to the enterprise facility 102, physically placed
there because of
infrastructure requirements, but managed by a third party, vendor, or the
like.
[0099] Simple server facility 142 appliances may also be utilized across the
enterprise
facility's 102 network infrastructure, such as switches, routers, wireless
routers, hubs and
routers, gateways, print servers, net modems, and the like. These simple
server facility
appliances may not require configuration by the enterprise facility 102, but
may require
protection from threats via an endpoint computer security facility 152. These
appliances may
provide interconnection services within the enterprise facility 102 network,
and therefore may
advance the spread of a threat if not properly protected.
[00100] A client facility may be protected from threats from within the
enterprise
facility 102 network using a personal firewall, which may be a hardware
firewall, software
firewall, or combination of these, that controls network traffic to and from a
client. The personal
firewall may permit or deny communications based on a security policy.
Personal firewalls may
be designed for use by end-users, which may result in protection for only the
computer on which
it's installed. Personal firewalls may be able to control network traffic by
providing prompts
each time a connection is attempted and adapting security policy accordingly.
Personal firewalls
may also provide some level of intrusion detection, which may allow the
software to terminate
or block connectivity where it suspects an intrusion is being attempted. Other
features that may
be provided by a personal firewall may include alerts about outgoing
connection attempts,
control of program access to networks, hiding the client from port scans by
not responding to
unsolicited network traffic, monitoring of applications that may be listening
for incoming
connections, monitoring and regulation of incoming and outgoing network
traffic, prevention of
unwanted network traffic from installed applications, reporting applications
that make
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connection attempts, reporting destination servers with which applications may
be attempting
communications, and the like. In embodiments, the personal firewall may be
provided by the
threat management facility 100.
[00101] Another important component that may be protected by an endpoint
computer
security facility 152 is a network firewall facility 138, which may be a
hardware or software
device that may be configured to permit, deny, or proxy data through a
computer network that
has different levels of trust in its source of data. For instance, an internal
enterprise facility 102
network may have a high level of trust, because the source of all data has
been sourced from
within the enterprise facility 102. An example of a low level of trust is the
Internet 154, because
the source of data may be unknown. A zone with an intermediate trust level,
situated between
the Internet 154 and a trusted internal network, may be referred to as a
"perimeter network."
Since firewall facilities 138 represent boundaries between threat levels, the
endpoint computer
security facility 152 associated with the firewall facility 138 may provide
resources that may
control the flow of threats at this enterprise facility 102 network entry
point. Firewall facilities
138, and associated endpoint computer security facility 152, may also be
associated with a
network node that may be equipped for interfacing between networks that use
different
protocols. In embodiments, the endpoint computer security facility 152 may
provide threat
protection in a plurality of network infrastructure locations, such as at the
enterprise facility 102
network entry point, i.e. the firewall facility 138 or gateway; at the server
facility 142; at
distribution points within the network, i.e. the hubs and routers 148; at the
desktop of client
facility computers; and the like. In embodiments, the most effective location
for threat detection
may be at the user's computer desktop endpoint computer security facility 152.
[00102] The interface between the threat management facility 100 and the
enterprise
facility 102, and through the appliance facility 140 to embedded endpoint
computer security
facilities, may include a set of tools that may be the same for all enterprise
implementations, but
allow each enterprise to implement different controls. In embodiments, these
controls may
include both automatic actions and managed actions. Automatic actions may
include downloads
of the endpoint computer security facility 152 to components of the enterprise
facility 102,
downloads of updates to existing endpoint computer security facilities of the
enterprise facility
102, uploaded network interaction requests from enterprise facility 102
components to the threat
management facility 100, and the like. In embodiments, automatic interactions
between the
enterprise facility 102 and the threat management facility 100 may be
configured by the threat
management facility 100 and an administration facility 134 in the enterprise
facility 102. The
administration facility 134 may configure policy rules that determine
interactions, such as
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developing rules for accessing applications, as in who is authorized and when
applications may
be used; establishing rules for ethical behavior and activities; rules
governing the use of
entertainment software such as games, or personal use software such as IM and
VoIP; rules for
determining access to enterprise facility 102 computing resources, including
authentication,
levels of access, risk assessment, and usage history tracking; rules for when
an action is not
allowed, such as whether an action is completely deigned or just modified in
its execution; and
the like. The administration facility 134 may also establish license
management, which in turn
may further determine interactions associated with a licensed application. In
embodiments,
interactions between the threat management facility 100 and the enterprise
facility 102 may
provide threat protection to the enterprise facility 102 by managing the flow
of network data into
and out of the enterprise facility 102 through automatic actions that may be
configured by the
threat management facility 100 or the administration facility 134.
[00103] Client facilities within the enterprise facility 102 may be connected
to the
enterprise facility 102 network by way of wired network facilities 148A or
wireless network
facilities 148B. Client facilities connected to the enterprise facility 102
network via a wired
facility 148A or wireless facility 148B may receive similar protection, as
both connection types
are ultimately connected to the same enterprise facility 102 network, with the
same endpoint
computer security facility 152, and the same threat protected enterprise
facility 102
environment. Mobile wireless facility clients 144B¨F, because of their ability
to connect to any
wireless 148B,D network access point, may connect to the Internet 154 outside
the enterprise
facility 102, and therefore outside the threat-protected environment of the
enterprise facility 102.
In this instance the mobile client facility (e.g., the clients 144 B¨F), if
not for the presence of the
endpoint computer security facility 152 may experience a malware attack or
perform actions
counter to enterprise facility 102 established policies. In addition, there
may be a plurality of
ways for the threat management facility 100 to protect the out-of-enterprise
facility 102 mobile
client facility (e.g., the clients 144 D¨F) that has an embedded endpoint
computer security
facility 152, such as by providing URI filtering in personal routers, using a
web appliance as a
DNS proxy, or the like. Mobile client facilities that are components of the
enterprise facility 102
but temporarily outside connectivity with the enterprise facility 102 network
may be provided
with the same threat protection and policy control as client facilities inside
the enterprise facility
102. In addition, mobile the client facilities may receive the same
interactions to and from the
threat management facility 100 as client facilities inside the enterprise
facility 102, where the
mobile client facilities may be considered a virtual extension of the
enterprise facility 102,
receiving all the same services via their embedded endpoint computer security
facility 152.
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[00104] Interactions between the threat management facility 100 and the
components of
the enterprise facility 102, including mobile client facility extensions of
the enterprise facility
102, may ultimately be connected through the Internet 154. Threat management
facility 100
downloads and upgrades to the enterprise facility 102 may be passed from the
firewalled
networks of the threat management facility 100 through to the endpoint
computer security
facility 152 equipped components of the enterprise facility 102. In turn the
endpoint computer
security facility 152 components of the enterprise facility 102 may upload
policy and access
requests back across the Internet 154 and through to the threat management
facility 100. The
Internet 154 however, is also the path through which threats may be
transmitted from their
source. These network threats 104 may include threats from a plurality of
sources, including
without limitation, websites, e-mail, IM, VoIP, application software, and the
like. These threats
may attempt to attack a mobile enterprise client facility (e.g., the clients
144B¨F) equipped with
an endpoint computer security facility 152, but in embodiments, as long as the
mobile client
facility is embedded with an endpoint computer security facility 152, as
described above, threats
may have no better success than if the mobile client facility were inside the
enterprise facility
102.
[00105] However, if the mobile client facility were to attempt to connect into
an
unprotected connection point, such as at a secondary location 108 that is not
a part of the
enterprise facility 102, the mobile client facility may be required to request
network interactions
through the threat management facility 100, where contacting the threat
management facility
100 may be performed prior to any other network action. In embodiments, the
client facility's
144 endpoint computer security facility 152 may manage actions in unprotected
network
environments such as when the client facility (e.g., client 144F) is in a
secondary location 108 or
connecting wirelessly to a non-enterprise facility 102 wireless Internet
connection, where the
endpoint computer security facility 152 may dictate what actions are allowed,
blocked,
modified, or the like. For instance, if the client facility's 144 endpoint
computer security facility
152 is unable to establish a secured connection to the threat management
facility 100, the
endpoint computer security facility 152 may inform the user of such, and
recommend that the
connection not be made. In the instance when the user chooses to connect
despite the
recommendation, the endpoint computer security facility 152 may perform
specific actions
during or after the unprotected connection is made, including running scans
during the
connection period, running scans after the connection is terminated, storing
interactions for
subsequent threat and policy evaluation, contacting the threat management
facility 100 upon first
instance of a secured connection for further actions and or scanning,
restricting access to
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network and local resources, or the like. In embodiments, the endpoint
computer security facility
152 may perform specific actions to remediate possible threat incursions or
policy violations
during or after the unprotected connection.
[00106] The secondary location 108 may have no endpoint computer security
facilities
152 as apart of its computer components, such as its firewalls 138B, servers
142B, clients
144G, hubs and routers 148C¨D, and the like. As a result, the computer
components of the
secondary location 108 may be open to threat attacks, and become potential
sources of threats,
as well as any mobile enterprise facility clients 144B¨F that may be connected
to the secondary
location's 108 network. In this instance, these computer components may now
unknowingly
spread a threat to other components connected to the network.
[00107] Some threats may not come directly from the Internet 154, such as from
non-
enterprise facility controlled mobile devices that are physically brought into
the enterprise
facility 102 and connected to the enterprise facility 102 client facilities.
The connection may be
made from direct connection with the enterprise facility's 102 client
facility, such as through a
USB port, or in physical proximity with the enterprise facility's 102 client
facility such that a
wireless facility connection can be established, such as through a Bluetooth
connection. These
physical proximity threats 110 may be another mobile computing device, a
portable memory
storage device, a mobile communications device, or the like, such as CDs and
DVDs, memory
sticks, flash drives, external hard drives, cell phones, PDAs, MP3 players,
digital cameras,
point-to-point devices, digital picture frames, digital pens, navigation
devices, tablets,
appliances, and the like. A physical proximity threat 110 may have been
previously infiltrated
by network threats while connected to an unprotected network connection
outside the enterprise
facility 102, and when connected to the enterprise facility 102 client
facility, pose a threat.
Because of their mobile nature, physical proximity threats 110 may infiltrate
computing
resources in any location, such as being physically brought into the
enterprise facility 102 site,
connected to an enterprise facility 102 client facility while that client
facility is mobile, plugged
into an unprotected client facility at a secondary location 108, and the like.
A mobile device,
once connected to an unprotected computer resource, may become a physical
proximity threat
110. In embodiments, the endpoint computer security facility 152 may provide
enterprise facility
102 computing resources with threat protection against physical proximity
threats 110, for
instance, through scanning the device prior to allowing data transfers,
through security
validation certificates, through establishing a safe zone within the
enterprise facility 102
computing resource to transfer data into for evaluation, and the like.
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[00108] Having provided an overall context for threat detection, the
description now
turns to a brief discussion of an example of a computer system that may be
used for any of the
entities and facilities described above.
[00109] Fig. 2 illustrates a computer system. In general, the computer system
200 may
include a computing device 210 connected to a network 202, e.g., through an
external device
204. The computing device 210 may be or include any type of network endpoint
or endpoints as
described herein, e.g., with reference to Fig. 1 above. For example, the
computing device 210
may include a desktop computer workstation. The computing device 210 may also
or instead be
any suitable device that has processes and communicates over a network 202,
including without
limitation a laptop computer, a desktop computer, a personal digital
assistant, a tablet, a mobile
phone, a television, a set top box, a wearable computer (e.g., watch, jewelry,
or clothing), a
home device (e.g., a thermostat or a home appliance controller), just as some
examples. The
computing device 210 may also or instead include a server, or it may be
disposed on a server.
[00110] The computing device 210 may be used for any of the entities described
in the
threat management environment described above with reference to Fig. 1. For
example, the
computing device 210 may be a server, a client an enterprise facility, a
threat management
facility, or any of the other facilities or computing devices described
therein. In certain aspects,
the computing device 210 may be implemented using hardware (e.g., in a desktop
computer),
software (e.g., in a virtual machine or the like), or a combination of
software and hardware, and
the computing device 210 may be a standalone device, a device integrated into
another entity or
device, a platform distributed across multiple entities, or a virtualized
device executing in a
virtualization environment.
[00111] The network 202 may include any network described above, e.g., data
network(s) or internetwork(s) suitable for communicating data and control
information among
participants in the computer system 200. This may include public networks such
as the Internet,
private networks, and telecommunications networks such as the Public Switched
Telephone
Network or cellular networks using third generation cellular technology (e.g.,
3G or IMT-2000),
fourth generation cellular technology (e.g., 4G, LTE. MT-Advanced, E-UTRA,
etc.) or WiMax-
Advanced (IEEE 802.16m)) and/or other technologies, as well as any of a
variety of corporate
area, metropolitan area, campus or other local area networks or enterprise
networks, along with
any switches, routers, hubs, gateways, and the like that might be used to
carry data among
participants in the computer system 200. The network 202 may also include a
combination of
data networks, and need not be limited to a strictly public or private
network.
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[00112] The external device 204 may be any computer or other remote resource
that
connects to the computing device 210 through the network 202. This may include
threat
management resources such as any of those contemplated above, gateways or
other network
devices, remote servers or the like containing content requested by the
computing device 210, a
network storage device or resource, a device hosting malicious content, or any
other resource or
device that might connect to the computing device 210 through the network 202.
[00113] The computing device 210 may include a processor 212, a memory 214, a
network interface 216, a data store 218, and one or more input/output devices
220. The
computing device 210 may further include or be in communication with
peripherals 222 and
other external input/output devices 224.
[00114] The processor 212 may be any as described herein, and in general be
capable of
processing instructions for execution within the computing device 210 or
computer system 200.
The processor 212 may include a single-threaded processor or a multi-threaded
processor. The
processor 212 may be capable of processing instructions stored in the memory
214 or on the
data store 218.
[00115] The memory 214 may store information within the computing device 210
or
computer system 200. The memory 214 may include any volatile or non-volatile
memory or
other computer-readable medium, including without limitation a Random Access
Memory
(RAM), a flash memory, a Read Only Memory (ROM), a Programmable Read-only
Memory
(PROM), an Erasable PROM (EPROM), registers, and so forth. The memory 214 may
store
program instructions, program data, executables, and other software and data
useful for
controlling operation of the computing device 200 and configuring the
computing device 200 to
perform functions for a user. The memory 214 may include a number of different
stages and
types for different aspects of operation of the computing device 210. For
example, a processor
may include on-board memory and/or cache for faster access to certain data or
instructions, and
a separate, main memory or the like may be included to expand memory capacity
as desired.
[00116] The memory 214 may, in general, include a non-volatile computer
readable
medium containing computer code that, when executed by the computing device
200 creates an
execution environment for a computer program in question, e.g., code that
constitutes processor
firmware, a protocol stack, a database management system, an operating system,
or a
combination of the foregoing, and/or code that performs some or all of the
steps set forth in the
various flow charts and other algorithmic descriptions set forth herein. While
a single memory
214 is depicted, it will be understood that any number of memories may be
usefully incorporated
into the computing device 210. For example, a first memory may provide non-
volatile storage
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such as a disk drive for permanent or long-term storage of files and code even
when the
computing device 210 is powered down. A second memory such as a random access
memory
may provide volatile (but higher speed) memory for storing instructions and
data for executing
processes. A third memory may be used to improve performance by providing even
higher speed
memory physically adjacent to the processor 212 for registers, caching and so
forth.
[00117] The network interface 216 may include any hardware and/or software for
connecting the computing device 210 in a communicating relationship with other
resources
through the network 202. This may include remote resources accessible through
the Internet, as
well as local resources available using short range communications protocols
using, e.g.,
physical connections (e.g., Ethernet), radio frequency communications (e.g.,
WiFi), optical
communications, (e.g., fiber optics, infrared, or the like), ultrasonic
communications, or any
combination of these or other media that might be used to carry data between
the computing
device 210 and other devices. The network interface 216 may, for example,
include a router, a
modem, a network card, an infrared transceiver, a radio frequency (RF)
transceiver, a near field
communications interface, a radio-frequency identification (RFID) tag reader,
or any other data
reading or writing resource or the like.
[00118] More generally, the network interface 216 may include any combination
of
hardware and software suitable for coupling the components of the computing
device 210 to
other computing or communications resources. By way of example and not
limitation, this may
include electronics for a wired or wireless Ethernet connection operating
according to the IEEE
802.11 standard (or any variation thereof), or any other short or long range
wireless networking
components or the like. This may include hardware for short range data
communications such as
Bluetooth or an infrared transceiver, which may be used to couple to other
local devices, or to
connect to a local area network or the like that is in turn coupled to a data
network 202 such as
the Internet. This may also or instead include hardware/software for a WiMax
connection or a
cellular network connection (using, e.g., CDMA, GSM, LTE, or any other
suitable protocol or
combination of protocols). The network interface 216 may be included as part
of the
input/output devices 220 or vice-versa.
[00119] The data store 218 may be any internal memory store providing a
computer-
readable medium such as a disk drive, an optical drive, a magnetic drive, a
flash drive, or other
device capable of providing mass storage for the computing device 210. The
data store 218 may
store computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules, and
other data for the
computing device 210 or computer system 200 in a non-volatile form for
subsequent retrieval
and use. For example, the data store 218 may store without limitation one or
more of the
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operating system, application programs, program data, databases, files, and
other program
modules or other software objects and the like.
[00120] The input/output interface 220 may support input from and output to
other
devices that might couple to the computing device 210. This may, for example,
include serial
ports (e.g., RS-232 ports), universal serial bus (USB) ports, optical ports,
Ethernet ports,
telephone ports, audio jacks, component audio/video inputs, HDMI ports, and so
forth, any of
which might be used to form wired connections to other local devices. This may
also or instead
include an infrared interface, RF interface, magnetic card reader, or other
input/output system
for coupling in a communicating relationship with other local devices. It will
be understood that,
while the network interface 216 for network communications is described
separately from the
input/output interface 220 for local device communications, these two
interfaces may be the
same, or may share functionality, such as where a USB port is used to attach
to a WiFi
accessory, or where an Ethernet connection is used to couple to a local
network attached storage.
[00121] A peripheral 222 may include any device used to provide information to
or
receive information from the computing device 200. This may include human
input/output (I/O)
devices such as a keyboard, a mouse, a mouse pad, a track ball, a joystick, a
microphone, a foot
pedal, a camera, a touch screen, a scanner, or other device that might be
employed by the user
230 to provide input to the computing device 210. This may also or instead
include a display, a
speaker, a printer, a projector, a headset or any other audiovisual device for
presenting
information to a user. The peripheral 222 may also or instead include a
digital signal processing
device, an actuator, or other device to support control or communication to
other devices or
components. Other I/O devices suitable for use as a peripheral 222 include
haptic devices, three-
dimensional rendering systems, augmented-reality displays, magnetic card
readers, and so forth.
In one aspect, the peripheral 222 may serve as the network interface 216, such
as with a USB
device configured to provide communications via short range (e.g., BlueTooth,
WiFi, Infrared,
RF, or the like) or long range (e.g., cellular data or WiMax) communications
protocols. In
another aspect, the peripheral 222 may provide a device to augment operation
of the computing
device 210, such as a global positioning system (GPS) device, a security
dongle, or the like. In
another aspect, the peripheral may be a storage device such as a flash card,
USB drive, or other
solid state device, or an optical drive, a magnetic drive, a disk drive, or
other device or
combination of devices suitable for bulk storage. More generally, any device
or combination of
devices suitable for use with the computing device 200 may be used as a
peripheral 222 as
contemplated herein.
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[00122] Other hardware 226 may be incorporated into the computing device 200
such as
a co-processor, a digital signal processing system, a math co-processor, a
graphics engine, a
video driver, and so forth. The other hardware 226 may also or instead include
expanded
input/output ports, extra memory, additional drives (e.g., a DVD drive or
other accessory), and
so forth.
[00123] A bus 232 or combination of busses may serve as an electromechanical
platform for interconnecting components of the computing device 200 such as
the processor
212, memory 214, network interface 216, other hardware 226, data store 218,
and input/output
interface. As shown in the figure, each of the components of the computing
device 210 may be
interconnected using a system bus 232 or other communication mechanism for
communicating
information.
[00124] Methods and systems described herein can be realized using the
processor 212
of the computer system 200 to execute one or more sequences of instructions
contained in the
memory 214 to perform predetermined tasks. In embodiments, the computing
device 200 may
be deployed as a number of parallel processors synchronized to execute code
together for
improved performance, or the computing device 200 may be realized in a
virtualized
environment where software on a hypervisor or other virtualization management
facility
emulates components of the computing device 200 as appropriate to reproduce
some or all of the
functions of a hardware instantiation of the computing device 200.
[00125] Fig. 3 illustrates a threat management system according to some
implementations. In general, the system 300 may include an endpoint 302, a
firewall 304, a
server 306 and a threat management facility 308 coupled to one another
directly or indirectly
through a data network 305, all as generally described above. Each of the
entities depicted in
Fig. 3 may, for example, be implemented on one or more computing devices such
as the
computing device described above with reference to Fig.2. A number of systems
may be
distributed across these various components to support threat detection, such
as a coloring
system 310, a key management system 312 and a heartbeat system 314 (or
otherwise an
endpoint health system), each of which may include software components
executing on any of
the foregoing system components, and each of which may communicate with the
threat
management facility 308 and an endpoint threat detection agent 320 executing
on the endpoint
302 to support improved threat detection and remediation.
[00126] The coloring system 310 may be used to label or 'color' software
objects for
improved tracking and detection of potentially harmful activity. The coloring
system 310 may,
for example, label files, executables, processes, network communications, data
sources and so
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forth with any suitable label. A variety of techniques may be used to select
static and/or dynamic
labels for any of these various software objects, and to manage the mechanics
of applying and
propagating coloring information as appropriate. For example, a process may
inherit a color
from an application that launches the process. Similarly a file may inherit a
color from a process
when it is created or opened by a process, and/or a process may inherit a
color from a file that
the process has opened. More generally, any type of labeling, as well as rules
for propagating,
inheriting, changing, or otherwise manipulating such labels, may be used by
the coloring system
310 as contemplated herein. A suitable coloring system is described in greater
detail below with
reference to Fig. 4.
[00127] The key management system 312 may support management of keys for the
endpoint 302 in order to selectively permit or prevent access to content on
the endpoint 302 on a
file-specific basis, a process-specific basis, an application-specific basis,
a user-specific basis, or
any other suitable basis in order to prevent data leakage, and in order to
support more fine-
grained and immediate control over access to content on the endpoint 302 when
a security
compromise is detected. Thus for example, if a particular process executing on
the endpoint is
compromised, or potentially compromised or otherwise under suspicion, access
by that process
may be blocked (e.g., with access to keys revoked) in order to prevent, e.g.,
data leakage or
other malicious activity. A suitable key management system useful in this
context is described in
greater detail below with reference to Fig. 5.
[00128] The heartbeat system 314 may be used to provide periodic or aperiodic
information from the endpoint 302 or other system components about system
health, security,
status, and so forth. The heartbeat system 314 or otherwise an endpoint health
system may thus
in general include a health status report system for the endpoint 302, such as
through the use of a
heartbeat system or the like. A heartbeat may be encrypted or plaintext, or
some combination of
these, and may be communicated unidirectionally (e.g., from the endpoint 308
to the threat
management facility 308) or bidirectionally (e.g., between the endpoint 302
and the server 306,
or any other pair of system components) on any useful schedule. A suitable
heartbeat system
that can be used as part of the endpoint health system is described in greater
detail below with
reference to Fig. 6.
[00129] In general, these various monitoring and management systems may
cooperate
to provide improved threat detection and response. For example, the coloring
system 310 may
be used to evaluate when a particular process is potentially opening
inappropriate files, and a
potential threat may be confirmed based on an interrupted heartbeat from the
heartbeat system
314. The key management system 312 may then be deployed to revoke access by
the process to
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certain resources (e.g., keys or file) so that no further files can be opened,
deleted or otherwise
modified. More generally, the cooperation of these systems enables a wide
variety of reactive
measures that can improve detection and remediation of potential threats to an
endpoint.
[00130] Fig. 4 illustrates a system for behavioral tracking, coloring, and
generation of
indications of compromise (I0Cs). In general, the system 400 may include a
number of entities
participating in a threat management process such as any of the entities and
threat management
processes described herein. The threat management process may for example
employ techniques
such as behavioral tracking, encryption, endpoint recording, reputation-based
threat detection,
behavioral-based threat detection, signature-based threat detection, and
combinations of the
foregoing, or any other suitable techniques for detecting threats to endpoints
in an enterprise.
[00131] In general, the system 400 may include a number of endpoints 402, 412
and a
threat management facility 404 in an enterprise 410, such as any of the
enterprises described
herein. An external analysis facility 406 may analyze threat data and provide
rules and the like
for use by the threat management facility 404 and endpoints 402, 412 in
managing threats to the
enterprise 410. The threat management facility 404 may reside in locally
(e.g., a part of,
embedded within, or locally coupled to the endpoint 402), a virtual appliance
(e.g., which could
be run by a protected set of systems on their own network systems), a private
cloud, a public
cloud, and so forth. The analysis facility 406 may store locally-derived
threat information. The
analysis facility 406 may also or instead receive threat information from a
third party source 416
such as MITRE Corporation or any other public, private, educational or other
organization that
gathers information on network threats and provides analysis and threat
detection information
for use by others. Each of these components may be configured with suitable
programming to
participate in the various threat detection and management techniques
contemplated herein. The
threat management facility 404 may monitor any stream of data from an endpoint
402
exclusively, or use the full context of intelligence from the stream of all
protected endpoints 402,
412 or some combination of these.
[00132] The endpoint 402 may be any of the endpoints described herein, or any
other
device or network asset that might join or participate in the enterprise 410
or otherwise operate
on an enterprise network. This may, for example, include a server, a client
such as a desktop
computer or a mobile computing device (e.g., a laptop computer, a wearable
device, a tablet, and
the like), a cellular phone, a smart phone, or other computing device suitable
for participating in
the enterprise 410.
[00133] In general, the endpoint 402 may include any number of computing
objects
such as an object 418 labeled with a descriptor 420. While the term object has
a number of
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specific meanings in the art, and in particular in object-oriented
programming, it will be
understood that the term 'object' as used herein is intended to be
significantly broader, and may
include any data, process, file or combination of these including without
limitation any process,
application, executable, script, dynamic linked library, file, data, database,
data source, data
structure, function, resource locator (e.g., uniform resource locator (URL) or
other uniform
resource identifier (URI)), or the like that might be manipulated by one of
the computing
devices described herein.
[00134] An object 418 may also or instead include a remote resource, such as a
resource
identified in a URL. That is, while the objects 418 in Fig. 4 are depicted as
residing on the
endpoint 402, an object 418 may also reside elsewhere in the system 400, while
still being
labeled with a descriptor 420 and tracked by the monitor 421 of the endpoint
402. The object
418 may be an item that is performing an action or causing an event, or the
object 418 may be an
item that is receiving the action or result of an event (i.e., the item in the
system 400 being acted
upon).
[00135] Where the object 418 is data or includes data, the object 418 may be
encrypted
or otherwise protected, or the object 418 may be unencrypted or otherwise
unprotected. The
object 418 may be a process or other computing object that performs an action,
which may
include a single event or a collection or sequence of events taken by a
process. The object 418
may also or instead include an item such as a file or lines of code that are
executable to perform
such actions. The object 418 may also or instead include a computing component
upon which an
action is taken, e.g., a system setting (e.g., a registry key or the like), a
data file, a URL, or the
like. The object 418 may exhibit a behavior such as an interaction with
another object or
component of the system 400.
[00136] In one aspect, objects 418 may be described in terms of persistence.
The object
418 may, for example, be a part of a process, and remain persistent as long as
that process is
alive. The object 418 may instead be persistent across an endpoint 402 and
remain persistent as
long as an endpoint 402 is active or alive. The object 418 may instead be a
global object having
persistence outside of an endpoint 418, such as a URL or a data store. In
other words, the object
418 may be a persistent object with persistence outside of the endpoint.
[00137] Although many if not most objects 418 will typically be benign objects
forming
a part of a normal, operating endpoint, an object 418 may contain software
associated with an
advanced persistent threat (APT) or other malware that resides partially or
entirely on the
endpoint 402. The associated software may have reached the endpoint 402 in a
variety of ways,
and may have been placed manually or automatically on the endpoint 402 by a
malicious source.
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It will be understood that the associated software may take any number of
forms and have any
number of components. For example, the associated software may include an
executable file that
can execute independently, or the associated software may be a macro, plug-in,
or the like that
executes within another application. Similarly, the associated software may
manifest as one or
more processes or threads executing on the endpoint 402. Further, the
associated software may
install from a file on the endpoint 402 (or a file remote from the endpoint
402), and the
associated software may create one or more files such as data files or the
like while executing.
Associated software should be understood to generally include all such files
and processes
except where a specific file or process is more specifically noted.
[00138] A threat such as an APT may also take the form of an attack where no
altered
or additional software is directly added or modified on the endpoint 402.
Instead, an adversary
may reuse existing software on the system 400 to perform the attacks. It is
for this reason that
simply scanning for associated software may be insufficient for the detection
of APTs and it
may be preferable to detect APTs based on the behavior of the software and
associated objects
418 that are used by, for, and with that software.
[00139] An object coloring system 414 may apply descriptors 420 to objects 418
on the
endpoint 402. This may be performed continuously by a background process on
the endpoint
402, or it may occur whenever an object 418 is involved in an action, such as
when a process
makes a call to an application programming interface (API) or takes some other
action, or when
a URL is used to initiate a network request, or when a read or a write is
performed on data in a
file. This may also or instead include a combination of these approaches as
well as other
approaches, such as by pre-labeling a file or application when it is moved to
the endpoint 402, or
when the endpoint 402 is started up or instantiated. In general, the object
coloring system 414
may add, remove or change a color at any location and at any moment that can
be practicably
instrumented on a computer system.
[00140] As noted above, the term 'object' as used herein is intended to
include a wide
range of computing objects and as such, the manner in which particular objects
418 are labeled
or 'colored' with descriptors 420 may vary significantly. Any object 418 that
is performing an
action may be colored at the time of and/or with a label corresponding to the
action, or likewise
any object 418 that is the target of the action may be colored at the time
that it is used and/or
with a label corresponding to a process or the like using the object 418.
Furthermore, the
operating system runtime representation of the object 418 may be colored, or
the persistent
object outside of the operating system may be colored (as is the case for a
File Handle or File
Object within the operating system or the actual file as stored in a file
system), such as within an
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encryption header or other header applied to the file, or as part of a
directory attribute or any
other persistent location within the file or file system. A former coloring
may be ephemerally
tracked while the operating system maintains the representation and the latter
may persist long
after any reboots of the same operating system and likewise have meaning when
read or used by
other endpoints 402. For processes, each file handle may be supplemented with
a pointer or
other mechanism for locating a descriptor 420 for a particular object 420 that
is a process. More
specifically, each object 418 may be colored in any manner suitable for
appending information
to that object 418 so that the corresponding descriptor 420 can be retrieved
and, where
appropriate, updated.
[00141] The coloring system 414 may apply any suitable rules for adding and
changing
descriptors 420 for objects 418. For example, when a process with a certain
descriptor accesses
data with a different descriptor, the descriptor for the process may be
updated to correspond to
the data, or the descriptor for the data may be updated to correspond to the
process, or some
combination of these. Any action by or upon an object 418 may trigger a
coloring rule so that
descriptors 420 can be revised at any relevant time(s) during processing.
[00142] In one aspect, colors will not explicitly indicate a compromised
security state or
other good/bad types of distinctions (although they may be adapted to this
use). Instead, colors
may record some known information or understanding about an object 418, such
as a source, a
purpose, and so forth. In this context, colors will not be used to label
actual or potential security
compromises, but to identify inconsistencies among interacting objects 418,
and to restrict or
control access and use accordingly. For example, where an endpoint uses file-
system-based
encryption as described herein, a process that is colored as exposed to
external resources (e.g.,
the Internet) may be prohibited from accessing cleartext data for protected
files. Colors can also
be used in other contexts such as intrusion prevention, routing rules, and
detection of odd or
questionable behavior.
[00143] In one aspect, colors may be implemented as flags associated with
objects 418
that provide a short hand cache of potentially relevant information. While
this information could
also be obtained for an object 418 through a careful inspection of related
activity logs or other
data recording activities, the use of a cache of flags for coloring
information makes the coloring
information directly available and immediately actionable, as distinguished
from post hoc
forensic activities that are otherwise supported by data logging.
[00144] In one aspect, colors as contemplated herein may fall into two
different
categories: static colors and dynamic colors. Static colors may be explicitly
applied based on,
e.g., a controlling application. For example, a static color may specify a
status of an application
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or data, or an associated type of application (e.g., productivity, mail
client, messaging, browser,
word processing, financial, spreadsheet, etc.). In this context, a process
will generally inherit
static colors from a source executable, and will permit inferences for
appropriate behavior and
related processes. Dynamic colors may be assigned based on direct observation
of executing
processes, and may not be inherited or transferred among processes (although
the presence of a
dynamic color may be used to draw another coloring inference upon interaction
with another
process). Thus, the inheritance of colors may depend in part upon the type of
color that is
applied, or upon explicit inheritance rules provided for a particular color.
[00145] A descriptor 420 may take a variety of forms, and may in general
include any
information selected for relevance to threat detection. This may, for example,
be a simple
categorization of data or processes such as trusted or untrusted. For example,
in one embodiment
described herein, data and processes are labeled as either 'IN' (e.g.,
trusted) or 'OUT' (e.g.,
untrusted). The specific content of the label is unimportant, and this may be
a binary flag, text
string, encrypted data or other human-readable and/or machine-readable
identifier, provided that
the descriptor 420 can facilitate discrimination among labeled files ¨ in this
example, between
trusted objects 418 and untrusted objects 418 so that, e.g., trusted data can
be selectively
decrypted or encrypted for use with trusted processes. Similarly, data may be
labeled as
corporate data or private data, with similar type-dependent processing
provided. For example,
private data may be encrypted with a key exclusively controlled by the data
owner, while
corporate data may be encrypted using a remotely managed key ring for an
enterprise operated
by the corporation.
[00146] In another aspect, the descriptor 420 may provide a multi-tiered or
hierarchical
description of the object 418 including any information useful for
characterizing the object 418
in a threat management context. For example, in one useful configuration the
descriptor 420
may include a type or category, static threat detection attributes, and an
explicit identification.
The type or category for the object 418 may be any category or the like that
characterizes a
general nature or use of the object 418 as inferred from behavior and other
characteristics. This
may, for example, include categories such as 'game,'
financial,"application,"electronic mail,'
'image,' video,"browser,"antivirus,' and so forth. The category may be more
granular, or
may include hierarchical categories such as 'application:spreadsheet,'
'application:word_processing; and so forth. Such colors may be directly
inferred from a single
action, a sequence of actions, or a combination of actions and other colors,
including, e.g., colors
of processes and files related to a particular action, or other objects 418
that provide context for
a particular action or group of actions. One or more colors may also or
instead be explicitly
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provided by a user or a process, or otherwise automatically or manually
attributed to computer
objects as contemplated herein.
[00147] The static threat detection attributes may be any readily
ascertainable
characteristics of the object 418 useful in threat detection. This may, for
example, include an
antivirus signature, a hash, a file size, file privileges, a process user, a
path or directory,
declarations of permissions, an access (e.g., a resource access, or an API
access), and so forth.
Static threat detection attributes may also include attributes that are
derived by or supplied from
other sources. For example, static threat detection attributes may include a
reputation for an
object 418, which may be expressed in any suitable or useful level of
granularity such as with
discrete categories (trusted/untrusted/unknown) or with a numerical score or
other quantitative
indicator. The explicit identification may, in general, be what an object 418
calls itself, e.g., a
file name or process name.
[00148] Some actions may transfer colors from a subject of the action to the
target of
the action. For example, when a process creates sub-processes, the sub-
processes may inherit the
colors of its parent(s). By way of another example, when a process is
initially loaded from an
executable, it may inherit the color(s) stored in the file system for or with
the executable.
[00149] In general, the descriptor 420 may be provided in any suitable format.
The
descriptor 420 may for example be formed as a vector of binary flags or other
attributes that
form the 'color' or description of an object 418. The descriptor 420 may also,
where appropriate,
include scalar quantities for certain properties. For example, it may be
relevant how many times
a system file was accessed, how many file handles a process has open, how many
times a remote
resource was requested or how long a remote resource is connected, and this
information may be
suitably included in the descriptor 420 for use in coloring objects with the
coloring system 414
and applying rules for IOC detection by the IOC monitor 421.
[00150] An indication of compromise (IOC) monitor 421 may be provided to
instrument the endpoint 402 so that any observable actions by or involving
various objects 418
can be detected. As with the coloring system 414, it will be understood that
the types of
observable actions will vary significantly, and the manner in which the
endpoint 402 is
instrumented to detect such actions will depend on the particular type of
object 418. For
example, for files or the like, an API for a file system may be used to detect
reads, writes, and
other access (e.g., open, read, write, move, copy, delete, etc.), and may be
configured to report to
or otherwise initiate monitoring of the action taken with the file through the
file system. As
another example, kernel objects may be instrumented at the corresponding
object handle or in
some other manner. As a further example, a kernel driver may be used for
intercepting a process
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startup. While a wide variety of objects are contemplated herein, one of
ordinary skill in the art
may create suitable instrumentation for any computing object so that it may be
monitored by the
IOC monitor 421.
[00151] It will be noted that suitable instrumentation may be used for a
variety of
functions and circumstances. For example, instrumentation may usefully track
requests for
network access or other actions back to a particular application or process,
or data payloads back
to a particular file or data location. One of ordinary skill in the art can
readily implement
suitable traces and/or logging for any such information that might be useful
in a particular IOC
monitoring operation.
[00152] In general, the IOC monitor 421 applies rules to determine when there
is an
IOC 422 suitable for reporting to a threat management facility 404. It will be
understood that an
endpoint 402 may, in suitable circumstances and with appropriate information,
take immediate
local action to remediate a threat. However, the monitor 421 may
advantageously accumulate a
sequence of actions, and still more advantageously may identify
inconsistencies or unexpected
behavior within a group of actions with improved sensitivity by comparing
descriptors 420 for
various objects 418 involved in relevant actions and events. In this manner,
rules may be applied
based upon the descriptors 420 that better discriminate malicious activity
while reducing the
quantity and frequency of information that must be communicated to a remote
threat
management facility 404. At the same time, all of the relevant information
provided by the
descriptors 420 can be sent in an IOC 422 when communicating a potential issue
to the threat
management facility 404. For example, during the course of execution, a
specific process (as
evidenced by its observed actions) may be assigned color descriptors
indicating that it is a
browser process. Further, the specific process may be assigned an attribute
indicating that it has
exposed itself to external URLs or other external data. Subsequently, the same
process may be
observed to be taking an action suitable for an internal or system process,
such as opening up
shared memory to another process that has coloring descriptions indicating
that it is a system
process. When this last action is observed, an inconsistency in the various
color descriptors
between the subject of the action¨the externally exposed browser process¨and
the target of
the action may result in a well-defined IOC, which may be directly processed
with immediate
local action taken. The IOC may also or instead be reported externally as
appropriate.
[00153] Thus, an endpoint 402 in an enterprise 410 may be instrumented with a
coloring
system 414 and monitor 421 to better detect potentially malicious activity
using descriptors 420
that have been selected for relevance to threat detection along with a
corresponding set of rules
developed for the particular descriptors 420 that are being used to label or
color various objects
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418. By way of example, the object 418 may be a web browser that starts off
being colored as a
'browser' and an `internet facing' application. Based on this descriptor 420,
a range of behaviors
or actions may be considered normal, such as accessing remote network
resources. However, if
an object 418 colored with this descriptor 420 attempted to elevate privileges
for a process, or to
access a registry or system files, then this inconsistency in action may
trigger a rule violation
and result in an IOC 422.
[00154] In general, any action or series of actions that cumulatively invoke a
particular
reporting or action rule may be combined into an IOC 422 and communicated to
the threat
management facility 404. For example, an IOC 422 may include a malicious or
strange
behavior, or an indication of a malicious or strange behavior. The IOC 422 may
be a normalized
IOC that expresses one or more actions in a platform independent manner. That
is, the IOC 422
may express a malicious behavior or suspected malicious behavior without
reference to
platform-specific information such as details of an operating system (e.g.,
i0S, MacOS,
Windows, Android, Linux, and so forth), hardware, applications, naming
conventions, and so
forth. Thus, a normalized IOC may be suitable for identifying a particular
threat across multiple
platforms, and may include platform independent processes, actions, or
behaviors, or may
express such process, actions, or behaviors in a platform independent manner.
The normalized
IOC may be generated from the IOC 422, e.g., it may be a converted version of
the IOC 422
suitable for use with multiple platforms, or it may simply be any IOC 422 that
has been created
in a platform independent form. Process colorization (i.e., using the coloring
system 414) as
described herein may be used to create a normalized IOC.
[00155] In general, a threat management facility 404 for the enterprise 410
may include
an IOC collector 426 that receives the IOC 422 from the endpoint 402 and
determines an
appropriate action. This may include any suitable remedial action, or where
one or more IOCs
422 are inconclusive, continued monitoring or increased monitoring as
appropriate.
[00156] The threat management facility 404 may provide a variety of threat
management or monitoring tools 424, any of which may be deployed in response
to IOCs 422
collected by the IOC collector 426. These tools 424 may include without
limitation a scanning
engine, whitelisting/blacklisting, reputation analysis, web filtering, an
emulator, protection
architecture, live protection, runtime detection, APT detection, network
antivirus products, IOC
detection, access logs, a heartbeat, a sandbox or quarantine system, and so
forth.
[00157] The analysis facility 406 may provide a remote processing resource for
analyzing malicious activities and creating rules 434 suitable for detecting
IOCs 422 based on
objects 420 and descriptors 420. It is generally contemplated that suitable
attributes of certain
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descriptors 418 and one or more rules 434 may be developed together so that
objects 418 can be
appropriately labeled with descriptors 420 that permit invocation of rules 434
and creation of
IOCs 422 at appropriate times. The analysis facility 406 may include a variety
of analysis tools
428 including, without limitation, tools for regular expression,
whitelisting/blacklisting, crowd
sourcing, identifiers, and so forth. The analysis tools 428 may also or
instead include
information and tools such as URL look-ups, genotypes, identities, file look-
up, reputations, and
so forth. The analysis facility 406 may also provide numerous related
functions such as an
interface for receiving information on new, unknown files or processes, and
for testing of such
code or content in a sandbox on the analysis facility 406.
[00158] The analysis facility 406 may also or instead include a compromise
detector
430, where the compromise detector 430 is configured to receive new threat
information for
analysis and creation of new rules and descriptors as appropriate, as well as
corresponding
remedial actions. The compromise detector 430 may include any tools described
herein or
otherwise known in the art for detecting compromises or evaluating new threats
in an enterprise
410.
[00159] In general, a rule 434 may be manually created with corresponding
human-
readable semantics, e.g., where a process is labeled as a browser process or
other category or
type that can be interpreted by a human. It should, however, be appreciated
that the compromise
detector 430 may also be configured to automatically generate descriptors 420
and rules 434
suitable for distribution to a threat management facility 404 and an endpoint
402. In this latter
mode, the meaning of a particular descriptor 420 may not have a readily
expressible human-
readable meaning. Thus, it will be understood that attributes selected for
relevance to threat
detection may include conventional attributes, as well as attributes without
conventional labels
or meaning except in the context of a particular, computer-generated rule for
threat detection.
[00160] In general, the analysis facility 406 may be within an enterprise 410,
or the
analysis facility 406 may be external to the enterprise 410 and administered,
for example, by a
trusted third party. Further, a third-party source 416 may provide additional
threat data 438 or
analyses for use by the analysis facility 406 and the threat management
facility 404. The third-
party resource 416 may be a data resource that provides threat data 438 and
analyses, where the
threat data 438 is any data that is useful in detecting, monitoring, or
analyzing threats. For
example, the threat data 438 may include a database of threats, signatures,
and the like. By way
of example, the third-party resource 416 may be a resource provided by The
MITRE
Corporation.
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[00161] The system 400 may include a reputation engine 440 storing a plurality
of
reputations 442. The reputation engine 440 may include a reputation management
system for the
generation, analysis, identification, editing, storing, etc., of reputations
442. The reputation
engine 440 may include reputation-based filtering, which may be similar to the
reputation
filtering discussed above with reference to Fig. 1. The reputation engine 440
may be located on
the threat management facility 404 or the endpoint 402 as shown in Fig. 4, or
the reputation
engine 440 may be located elsewhere in the system 400. The reputation engine
440 may receive
an IOC 422 or a stream of IOCs 422, and may generate or utilize reputations
442 for the IOCs
422. The reputation engine 440 may also or instead receive actions, behaviors,
events,
interactions, and so forth, and may generate or utilize reputations 442 for
any of the foregoing.
The reputation engine 440 may generate or revise a reputation 442 based on
behaviors, actions,
events, interactions, IOCs 422, other reputations 442, a history of events,
data, rules, state of
encryption, colors, and so forth. The reputation engine 440 may utilize a
third-party resource,
e.g., for the third-party resource's reputation data.
[00162] The reputations 442 may include reputations for any of the objects 418
as
described herein. In general, the reputations 442 may relate to the
trustworthiness of the objects
418 or an attribute thereof (e.g., the source of the object 418, a behavior of
the object 418,
another object interacting with the object 418, and so forth). The reputations
442 may include
lists of known sources of malware or known suspicious objects 418. The
reputations 442 may
also or instead include lists of known safe or trusted resources or objects
418. The reputations
442 may be stored in a reputations database included on the reputation engine
440 or located
elsewhere in the system 400. The reputations 442 may be expressed in any
suitable or useful
level of granularity such as with discrete categories (e.g., trusted,
untrusted, unknown,
malicious, safe, etc.) or with a numerical score or other quantitative
indicator. The reputations
442 may also be scaled.
[00163] In general, in the system 400 of Fig. 4, a malicious activity on the
endpoint 402
may be detected by the IOC monitor 421, and a corresponding IOC 422 may be
transmitted to
the threat management facility 404 for remedial action as appropriate. The
threat management
facility 404 may further communicate one or more IOCs 422 to the analysis
facility 406 for
additional analyses and/or resolution of inconclusive results. Other details
and variations are
provided below. While the use of coloring and IOCs as contemplated herein can
improve threat
detection and remediation in a number of ways, the system 400 can be further
improved with
granular control over access to endpoint data using an encryption system. A
system for key-
based management of processes and files on an endpoint is now discussed in
greater detail.
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[00164] Fig. 5 illustrates a system for encryption management. Generally, the
system
500 may include endpoints 502, an administration host 504, and a threat
management facility
506, which may include policy manager 508 and key manager 510. The system 500
may provide
for the management of users 512, policies 514, keys 516 (e.g., disposed on key
rings 518), and
endpoints 502 (e.g., from the administration host 504). The system 500 may
utilize various
storage and processing resources, which may be local, remote, virtual,
disposed in a cloud, or
the like.
[00165] The endpoints 502 may be any of the endpoints as described herein,
e.g., with
reference to the other figures. The endpoints 502 may also or instead include
other end user
devices and other devices to be managed. The endpoints 502 may include a web
browser for use
by the users 512, with supporting cryptographic functions implemented using
cryptographic
libraries in the web browser. The endpoints 502 may communicate with the other
components of
the system 500 using any suitable communication interface, which may include
Secure Socket
Layer (SSL) encryption, Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS), and so
forth for
additional security.
[00166] The endpoints 502 may include objects as described herein. For
example, the
endpoints 502 may include processes 520 and files 522. The processes 520 may
be labeled (e.g.,
by a coloring system using descriptors as described above) in such a manner
that the process is
'IN,' where the process 520 is in compliance with policies 514 administered
for the endpoint
502 from a remote threat management facility 506, or the process is 'OUT,'
where the process
520 is out of compliance with a policy (or a number of policies) in the
policies 514 for an
enterprise. This may provide IN processes 520A and OUT processes 520B as shown
in Fig. 5.
The files 522 may be similarly labeled by a coloring system with descriptors
that identify each
file 522 as IN, where the file 522 complies with the policies 514 and is
accordingly encrypted
using, e.g., a remotely managed key ring 518, or the file is OUT, where the
file 522 does not
conform to the policies 514 and is accordingly not encrypted using the
remotely managed key
ring 518. This may provide IN files 522A and OUT files 522B as shown in Fig.
5. One skilled in
the art will recognize that other objects of the endpoint 502 or other
components of the system
500 may be labeled in a similar manner where they are either IN or OUT. By
coloring objects in
this manner and basing key access on the corresponding color, the "IN"
software objects may
operate in a protected environment that objectively appears to be in
compliance with the policies
514. Other files and processes may still be used on the endpoint 502, but they
will operate in an
"OUT" or unprotected environment that cannot obtain access to any of the "IN"
content or
functionality.
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[00167] In an implementation, the system 500 may include determining whether
an
endpoint 502 is IN or OUT or whether a component of the endpoint 502 is IN or
OUT, which
may be based upon a set of rules (e.g., the rules outlined herein) or policies
such as the policies
514 described herein. In some aspects, if the entire endpoint 502 is OUT ¨
that is, out of
compliance with one or more policies 514, the endpoint 502 will not have key
access or access
to any protected content. Conversely, if the endpoint 502 is IN, the endpoint
502 may have
access to protected content. Thus in one aspect, the notion of IN/OUT may be
applied at an
endpoint level, and data protection may be a consequence of endpoint
protection. Endpoint
protection may also or instead be applied at a more granular level, e.g., by
determining whether
executables, processes 520, files 522, etc., on the endpoint 502 are IN or
OUT, which may be
based upon rules or policies 514 as described herein.
[00168] The administration host 504 may include a web browser, which may
include a
cryptography library 524 and a web user interface (e.g., HTML, JavaScript,
etc.). An
administrator may utilize the web user interface to administer a key
management system and
perform administrative functions such as creating and distributing keys 516,
establishing
security policies, creating key hierarchies and rules, and so forth. The
endpoint 502 may also
include a cryptographic library 524 implementing cryptographic protocols for
using key material
in the key ring 518 to encrypt and decrypt data as needed.
[00169] The threat management facility 506 may include any of the threat
management
facilities or similar systems described herein. In general, the threat
management facility 506 may
include a policy manager 508 and key manager 510. Alternatively, one or more
of the policy
manager 508 and key manager 510 may be located elsewhere on a network.
[00170] The policy manager 508 may implement one or more policies 514, and
maintain, distribute, and monitor the policies for devices in an enterprise.
The policies 514 may
include any policies 514 relating to secure operation of endpoints 502 in an
enterprise. This may,
for example, include hardware configuration policies, software configuration
policies,
communication policies, update policies, or any other policies relating to,
e.g., the configuration
of an endpoint 502, communications by an endpoint 502, software executing on
an endpoint 502
and so forth. Policies 514 may include usage criteria based on, e.g.,
signatures, indications of
compromise, reputation, user identity, and so forth. With respect to the key
management system
contemplated herein, the policies 514 may include a cryptographic protocol
design, key servers,
user procedures, and other relevant protocols, or these cryptographic
protocols may be provided
elsewhere for use by the policy manager 508. The policies 514 may also include
any rules for
compliance including those mentioned above or any other suitable rules or
algorithms that can
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be applied to determine whether objects and components are 'IN' or 'OUT' as
contemplated
herein.
[00171] The key manager 510 may be part of the threat management facility 506,
or it
may be remotely managed elsewhere, e.g., in a remote cloud resource or the
like. The key
manager 510 may also or instead be disposed on the administration host 504 and
one or more
endpoints 502 in a manner independent of the threat management facility 506.
In this manner, all
cryptographic operations may be isolated from the threat management facility
506 and instead
may be performed by a web browser or the like executing on the administration
host 504 or an
endpoint 502. The key manager 510 may manage the keys 516, including managing
the
generation, exchange, storage, use, and replacement of keys 516. The key
manager 510 may
include a key ring 518, where the keys 516 are disposed on the key ring 518
using one root key
526. The key manager 510 may also or instead include a variety of key
management and other
secure processes, including without limitation, administrator registration,
establishing trust to
endpoints 502, key distribution to endpoints 502, policy deployment, endpoint
status reporting,
and local key backup.
[00172] The users 512 may have full access to encrypted data. Alternatively,
the users
512 may have limited access to encrypted data, or no access to encrypted data.
Access may be
limited to users 512 using endpoints 502 that are deemed 'IN' by the system,
as well as to
processes 520 that are IN, as further described herein.
[00173] The keys 516 may include cryptographic keys in a cryptosystem, i.e.,
decryption keys. In one aspect, the keys 516 may be disposed on one key ring
518 using one
root key 526. In general, the keys 516 may be created and managed using, e.g.,
symmetric key
technology, asymmetric key technology, or any other key technology or
combination of key
technologies suitable for securing data in an enterprise including, for
example the Data
Encryption Standard (DES), Triple DES, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC), and so forth. The cryptosystem may also or instead include
any suitable
public key infrastructure or the like supporting the distribution and use of
keys for encryption,
digital signatures, and so forth.
[00174] The key ring 518 may facilitate simplified management of the system
500. For
example, by reducing the data protection system down to a single key ring 518,
the system can
eliminate or reduce the overhead for management of keys 516. In one aspect,
all of the data on a
key ring 518 is protected by one root key 526. By reducing the data protection
system down to a
single key ring 518 protected by one root key 526, all privileged users 512 on
uncompromised
platforms can have access to all protected data. In this embodiment, data is
either 'IN' (i.e.,
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encrypted), or it's 'OUT' (i.e., not encrypted). In one aspect, the default
system does not include
any additional level of granularity of access control.
[00175] The cryptography library 524 may be disposed on the administration
host 504
as shown in Fig. 5. The cryptography library 524 may also be disposed on the
endpoint 502, e.g.,
in a web browser, or it may be disposed on another component of the system
500, or any
combination of these. The cryptographic library 524 may be installed by an
administrator. In
general, key material 530 from the key ring 518 may be stored in a cache 532
on the endpoint
502 within any suitable memory on the endpoint 502 for use in encryption and
decryption as
contemplated herein. As noted above, an enterprise that systematically uses
coloring and
indications of compromise can be improved through the use of a synchronized or
integrated key
management system as contemplated herein. This system may be still further
improved with the
addition of a heartbeat system that communicates heartbeats from an endpoint
containing health
and status information about the endpoint. A suitable heartbeat system is now
described in
greater detail.
[00176] Fig. 6 illustrates a threat management system using heartbeats. In
general, a
system 600 may include an endpoint 602, a gateway 604, a threat management
system 606, and
an enterprise management system 608 that manages an enterprise including the
endpoint 602,
the gateway 604, and one or more additional endpoints 610. Each of these
components may be
configured with suitable programming to participate in the detection and
remediation of an
advanced persistent threat (APT) or other malware threat as contemplated
herein. Although the
term "gateway" is used for the device between an endpoint and an external
network, it will be
appreciated that this device may also or instead include a switch, router,
firewall, and/or other
network elements, any of which may be included in the "gateway" as that term
is used herein.
[00177] The endpoint 602 may be any of the endpoints described herein, or any
other
device or network asset that might join or participate in an enterprise
network. The endpoint 602
may contain a threat 612 such as an advanced persistent threat, virus, or
similar malware that
resides on the endpoint 602. The threat 612 may have reached the endpoint 602
in a variety of
ways, and may have been placed manually or automatically on the endpoint 602
by a malicious
source. It will be understood that the threat 612 may take any number of forms
and have any
number of components. For example, the threat 612 may include an executable
file that can
execute independently, or the threat 612 may be a macro, plug-in, or the like
that executes
within another application. Similarly, the threat 612 may manifest as one or
more processes or
threads executing on the endpoint 602. The threat 612 may install from a file
on the endpoint
602 or a file remote from the endpoint 602, and the threat 612 may create one
or more other files
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such as data files or the like while executing. Advanced persistent threats
can be particularly
difficult to detect and remediate, and the systems and methods contemplated
herein can
advantageously provide improved sensitivity to such threats, as well as
enabling improved
remediation strategies. However, the systems and methods contemplated herein
may also or
instead be used to detect and remediate other types of malware threats. As
such, in this context
references to a particular type of threat (e.g., an advanced persistent
threat) should be understood
to generally include any type of malware or other threat to an endpoint or
enterprise unless a
more specific threat or threat type is explicitly provided or otherwise clear
from the context.
[00178] The threat 612 may be analyzed by one or more threat countermeasures
on the
endpoint 602 such as a whitelisting filter 614 that approves each item of code
before executing
on the endpoint 602 and prevents execution of non-whitelisted code. The
endpoint 602 may also
include an antivirus engine 616 or other malware detection software that uses
any of a variety of
techniques to identify malicious code by reputation or other characteristics.
A runtime detection
engine 618 may also monitor executing code to identify possible threats. More
generally, any of
a variety of threat detection techniques may be applied to the threat 612
before and during
execution. In general, a threat 612 may evade these and other security
measures and begin
executing as a process 620 on the endpoint 602.
[00179] Network traffic 622 from the process 620 may be monitored and logged
by a
traffic monitor 624 on the endpoint 602. The traffic monitor 624 may, for
example, log a time
and a source of each network request from the endpoint 602. Where the endpoint
602 is within
an enterprise network, the network traffic 622 may pass through the gateway
604 in transit to a
data network such as the Internet. While the gateway 604 may be logically or
physically
positioned between the endpoint 602 and an external data network, it will be
understood that
other configurations are possible. For example, where the endpoint 602 is
associated with an
enterprise network but operating remotely, the endpoint 602 may form a VPN or
other secure
tunnel or the like to the gateway 604 for use of a threat management system
606, enterprise
management system 608, and any other enterprise resources.
[00180] The endpoint 602 may use a heartbeat 626 to periodically and securely
communicate status to the gateway 604. The heartbeat 626 may be created by a
health monitor
628 within the endpoint 602, and may be transmitted to a remote health monitor
630, for
example, at the gateway 604. The health monitor 628 may monitor system health
in a variety of
ways, such as by checking the status of individual software items executing on
the endpoint 602,
checking that antivirus and other security software is up to date (e.g., with
current virus
definition files and so forth) and running correctly, checking the integrity
of cryptographic key
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stores, checking for compliance with enterprise security policies, and
checking any other
hardware or software components of the endpoint 602 as necessary or helpful
for health
monitoring. The health monitor 628 may thus condition the issuance of a
heartbeat 626 on a
satisfactory status of the endpoint 602 according to any suitable criteria,
enterprise polices, and
other evaluation techniques. The remote health monitor 630 may also or instead
be provided at
the threat management facility 650, for example as part of the threat
management system 606 or
the enterprise management system 608.
[00181] The heartbeat 626 may be secured in any suitable manner so that the
health
monitor 630 can reliably confirm the source of the heartbeat 626 and the
status of the endpoint
602. To this end, the heartbeat 626 may be cryptographically signed or secured
using a private
key so that the monitor 630 can authenticate the origin of the heartbeat 626
using a
corresponding public key. In one aspect, the heartbeat 626 may include a
combination of
plaintext information and encrypted information, such as where the status
information for the
endpoint is provided in plaintext while a digital signature for authentication
is cryptographically
secured. In another aspect, all of the information in the heartbeat 626 may be
encrypted.
[00182] In one aspect, a key vault 632 may be provided on the endpoint to
support
cryptographic functions associated with a secure heartbeat. An obfuscated key
vault 632 may
support numerous useful functions, including without limitation, private key
decryption,
asymmetric signing, and validation with a chain of trust to a specific root
validation certificate.
A variety of suitable key management and cryptographic systems are known in
the art and may
be usefully employed to a support the use of a secure heartbeat as
contemplated herein. The
system may support a secure heartbeat in numerous ways. For example, the
system may ensure
that signing and decryption keys can only be used in authorized ways and
inside an intended
Access Control mechanism. The system may use "anti-lifting" techniques to
ensure that a
signing key can only be used when the endpoint is healthy. The system may
ensure that
attacking software cannot, without first reverse-engineering the key vault
632, extract the
original key material. The system may also usefully ensure that an attacker
cannot undetectably
replace the public keys in a root certificate store, either directly or
indirectly, such as in an attack
that tries to cause the code to validate against a different set of root keys
without directly
replacing any keys in the root store.
[00183] A robust heartbeat 626 may usefully provide defensive mechanisms
against
reverse engineering of obfuscated content (e.g., the private key material
stored in key vault 632,
the code used to validate the correct running of the remainder of the systems
as part of the
heartbeat 626 code itself) and any anti-lifting protections to prevent malware
from directly using
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the endpoint 602 (or the health monitor 628 on the endpoint 602) to continue
to send out signed
heartbeat packets (e.g. stating that "all is well" with the endpoint) after
security mechanisms
have been impaired, disabled, or otherwise compromised in any way. Lifting in
this manner by
malicious code can be materially mitigated by providing statistical validation
(e.g., with
checksums of code) of call stacks, calling processes, and core processes.
Likewise, statistical
checks as well as checksum integrations into the cryptographic calculations
may protect against
code changes in the heartbeat 626 code itself
[00184] A variety of useful techniques may be employed to improve security of
the key
vault 632 and the heartbeat 626. For example, the system may use domain
shifting so that
original key material is inferred based on hardware and software properties
readily available to
the key vault 632, and to ensure that key material uses non-standard or
varying algorithms.
Software properties may, for example, include readily determined system values
such as hashes
of nearby code. In another aspect, the keys may be domain shifted in a manner
unique to the
endpoint 602 so that the manner of statistical validation of call stacks and
core software is
unique to the endpoint 602. Further the key vault may be provisioned so that a
public key stored
in the key vault 632 is signed with a certificate (or into a certificate
chain) that can be externally
validated by a network appliance or other trusted third party or directly by
the health monitor
628 or remote health monitor 630.
[00185] The heartbeat 626 may encode any useful status information, and may be
transmitted from the endpoint 602 on any desired schedule including any
periodic, aperiodic,
random, deterministic, or other schedule. Configured in this manner, the
heartbeat 626 can
provide secure, tamper-resistant instrumentation for status of the endpoint
602, and in particular
an indication that the endpoint 602 is online and uncompromised. A delay or
disappearance of
the heartbeat 626 from the endpoint 602 may indicate that the endpoint 602 has
been
compromised; however this may also simply indicate that the endpoint 602 has
been powered
off or intentionally disconnected from the network. Thus, other criteria may
be used in addition
to the disappearance or interruption of the heartbeat 626 to more accurately
detect malicious
software. Some such techniques are described below, but it will be understood
that this may
include any supplemental information that might tend to make an attack on the
endpoint 602
more or less likely. For example, if the heartbeat 626 is interrupted but the
endpoint 602 is still
sourcing network traffic, then an inference might suitably be made that the
endpoint 602 is
compromised.
[00186] The threat management system 606 may, in general, be any of the threat
management systems described herein. The enterprise management system 608
generally
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provides tools and interfaces for administration of the enterprise and various
endpoints 610 and
other resources or assets attached thereto. It will be understood that, the
functions of the threat
management system 606 and the enterprise management system 608 may vary, and
general
threat management and administration functions may be distributed in a variety
of ways between
and among these and other components. This is generally indicated in Fig. 6 as
a threat
management facility 650 that includes the threat management system 606 and the
enterprise
management system 608. It will be understood that either or both of these
system may be
administered by third parties on behalf of the enterprise, or managed
completely within the
enterprise, or some combination of these, all without departing from the scope
of this disclosure.
It will similarly be understood that a reference herein to a threat management
facility 650 is not
intended to imply any particular combination of functions or components, and
shall only be
understood to include such functions or components as explicitly stated in a
particular context,
or as necessary to provide countermeasures for malware (e.g., advanced
persistent threats) as
contemplated herein. It also should be understood that the heartbeat may be
monitored and/or
managed by the threat management system 606, the enterprise management system
608, or
another component of the threat management facility 650.
[00187] The system 600 may include a certificate authority 660 or similar
trust authority
or the like (shown as a "trusted third party" in the figure). In order to
provide a meaningfully
secure heartbeat 626, the heartbeat 626 may be secured with reference to a
trusted authority such
as a certificate authority 660 that can issue cryptographic certificates
allowing other entities to
rely on assertions about identity (e.g., by enabling verification with a
trusted third party), and to
enable cryptographically secure communications. The cryptographic techniques
for creating and
using such certificates and relationships are well known, and are not repeated
here. The
certificate authority 660 may be administered by the enterprise management
system 608 or some
other internal resource of the enterprise, or the certificate authority 660
may be administered by
a trusted third party such as any of a variety of commercially available
certificate authorities or
the like. Thus, the certificate authority 660, or some other similar cloud
service or the like, may
operate as a security broker to register, e.g., endpoints 602, 610, the
gateway 604, the threat
management facility 650, and so forth, and provide cryptographic material for
each of the other
trusting entities to securely communicate with one another.
[00188] Once registered with the certificate authority 660 in this fashion,
the heartbeat
may be used to establish trust between the endpoint 602 and other entities,
and to validate the
source of the heartbeat 626 when it is received. More generally, a heartbeat
626 secured in this
manner may provide an encrypted channel between network entities such as an
endpoint 602
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and the gateway 604 (or a firewall or the like). The nature of the
communication may provide a
technique for validating the source, as well as obfuscating the contents with
encryption. Thus
when, for example, the endpoint 602 provides information about a good/healthy
state or a
bad/compromised state, the recipient may rely on this state information and
act accordingly.
[00189] Fig. 7 shows an architecture for endpoint protection in an enterprise
network
security system. In general, an endpoint may include a processing environment
702, a file
system 706 (such as a data storage system or the like), a threat monitor 720
and a key wrapper
730.
[00190] The processing environment 702 may, for example, be any environment
such as
an operating system or the like suitable for executing one or more processes
704.
[00191] Each process 704 may be an instance of a software application,
computer
program, portion of a computer program or other code executing within the
processing
environment 702. A process 704 may execute, e.g., on a processor, group of
processors, or other
processing circuitry or platform for executing computer-executable code. A
process 704 may
include executable computer code, as well as an allocation of memory, file
descriptors or
handles for data sources and sinks, security attributes such as an owner and
any associated
permissions, and a context including the content of physical memory used by
the process 704. A
process 704 may be or may include one or more threads. More generally, a
process 704 may
include any code executing on an endpoint such as any of the endpoints
described herein.
[00192] The file system 706 may include a data storage system or the like,
e.g., where a
data store including one or more files (e.g., the files 708 shown in the
figure) is included as part
of the data storage system. The file system 706 may be generally associated
with an operating
system that provides the processing environment 702, and serves as an
intermediary between
processes 704 executing in the processing environment 702 and one or more
files 708 accessible
to the endpoint. The file system 706 may provide a directory structure or
other construct to
facilitate organization of the files 708, and the file system 706 generally
supports file functions
such as creating, deleting, opening, closing, reading, writing, and so forth.
[00193] An extension 710 may be included in the file system 706 by modifying
the
operating system kernel. While other programming techniques may be employed to
perform the
functions of an extension 710 as contemplated herein, direct modifications to
or additions to the
operating system permit the extension 710 to operate transparently to the
processing
environment 702 and the processes 704 without requiring any modifications or
adaptations. The
extension 710 may, for example, be implemented as a file system filter (in a
MICROSOFT
WINDOWS environment) or a mount point to a directory (in an APPLE iOS
environment). The
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extension 710 to the files system as contemplated herein performs two
concurrent functions.
First, the extension 710 communicates with a threat monitor 720 in order to
receive updates on
the security status and exposure status of the processes 704 or the endpoint.
Second the
extension 710 communicates with a key wrapper 730 that provides key material
for encrypting
and decrypting data in the files 708. Finally, the extension 710 operates to
conditionally provide
encryption and decryption of the files 708 for the processes 704 based on a
current security or
exposure state, as described in greater detail below.
[00194] The threat monitor 720 may include any suitable threat monitoring,
malware
detection, antivirus program or the like suitable for monitoring and reporting
on a security state
of an endpoint or individual processes 704 executing thereon. This may include
local threat
monitoring using, e.g., behavioral analysis or static analysis. The threat
monitor 720 may also or
instead use reputation to evaluate the security state of processes 704 based
on the processes 704
themselves, source files or executable code for the processes 704, or network
activity initiated
by the processes 704. For example, if a process 704 requests data from a
remote URL that is
known to have a bad reputation, this information may be used to infer a
compromised security
state of the endpoint. While a threat monitor 720 may operate locally, the
threat monitor 720
may also or instead use remote resources such as a gateway carrying traffic to
and from the
endpoint, or a remote threat management facility that provides reputation
information, malware
signatures, policy information and the like for the endpoint and other devices
within an
enterprise such as the enterprise described above.
[00195] The threat monitor 720 may also or instead monitor the health of one
or more
of the system, an endpoint, a process 704, and so forth. The health monitoring
may be used to
provide periodic or aperiodic information from one or more system components
about system
health, security, status, and so forth. Implementations may include using the
health monitoring
for controlling access, e.g., to files 708, to keys 734, to key material for
encrypting and
decrypting individual files 708, and so forth.
[00196] In general, the threat monitor 720 provides monitoring of a security
state and an
exposure state of the endpoint. The security state may, for example, be
'compromised', 'secure',
or some other state or combination of states. This may be based on detections
of known
malware, suspicious activity, policy violations and so forth. The exposure
state may be
'exposed' or 'unexposed', reflecting whether or not a particular process 704
or file 708 has been
exposed to potentially unsafe content. Thus, exposure may not necessarily
represent a specific
threat, but the potential for exposure to unsafe content. This may be tracked
in a variety of ways,
such as by using the coloring system described above with reference to Fig. 5.
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[00197] The key wrapper 730 may contain a key ring 732 with one or more keys
734 for
encrypting and decrypting files 708. The key ring 732 may be cryptographically
protected
within the key wrapper 730 in order to prevent malicious access thereto, and
the key wrapper
730 may communicate with the extension 710 to provide keys 734 for accessing
the files 708 at
appropriate times, depending, for example, on whether processes 704 are secure
or exposed. In
one aspect, the files 708 are stored in a non-volatile memory such as a disk
drive, or in a random
access memory that provides a cache for the disk drive, and the key wrapper
730 may be stored
in a separate physical memory such as a volatile memory accessible to the
operating system and
the extension 710 but not to processes 704 executing in the user space of the
processing
environment 702.
[00198] In one aspect, every document or file on the endpoint may have a
separate key.
This may be, for example, a unique, symmetric key that can be used for
encryption and
decryption of the corresponding file. The key wrapper 730 may control access
to the key
material for encrypting and decrypting individual files, and may be used by
the extension 710 to
control access by individual processes 704 executing on the endpoint. As
described herein, the
extension 710 may generally control access to files 708 based on an exposure
state, a security
state, or other context such as the user of a calling process or the like. In
the event of a severe
compromise, or a detection of a compromise independent of particular
processes, a key
shredding procedure may be invoked to destroy the entire key wrapper 730
immediately and
prevent any further access to the files 708. In such circumstances, the keys
can only be
recovered by the endpoint when a remediation is confirmed. Alternatively, the
files may be
accessed directly and decrypted from a secure, remote resource that can access
the keys 734.
[00199] Fig. 8 shows a method for securing an endpoint. In general, all of the
files
within the file system may be encrypted to place them in a protected state,
and then a file system
extension such as any of the extensions described above may be used to
conditionally grant
access by processes to the encrypted files.
[00200] As shown in step 802, the method 800 may begin with encrypting a
plurality of
files on an endpoint to prevent unauthorized access to the plurality of files.
This may, for
example, include encrypting files using an extension to a file system such as
a file system
interface, file system filter, mount point, or other suitable extension to an
interface between a
user environment for executing processes and a file stored in memory on the
endpoint. An
interface may provide a programmatic or services-oriented interface to a file
system. For
example, the interface may provide a web-based REST interface to a data store
that presents as a
file system. Encryption may be performed for all content on the endpoint when
the endpoint is
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created or initialized, or when the file system extension is added an
operating system for the
endpoint, or at some other useful or convenient time. In one aspect,
encryption may be
performed as a background process over an extended period of time so that the
endpoint can
remain in use during an initial encryption process. In another aspect,
encryption may be
performed when files are accessed for the first time, or the initial
encryption may be scheduled
for a time when the endpoint is not typically in use, e.g., early hours of the
morning.
[00201] As shown in step 804, the method 800 may include receiving a request
to
access one of the files from a process executing on the endpoint. In general,
this includes
receiving an access request at a file system, or at a file system interface,
filter, or mount point for
the file system, or any other extension to file system. With files encrypted
as described above,
the file system may operate in an ordinary fashion and transparently to the
process (or a
computing environment for the process) to provide file access functions such
as opening,
closing, creating, deleting, reading, writing, and so forth, while managing
encryption and
decryption through the file system extension. The file access function may
include an access
request as generally contemplated by step 804, which may initially include a
request to open or
create a file, and may subsequently include read or write operations or other
conventional file
functions.
[00202] As shown in step 806, the method 800 may include decrypting the one of
the
files for the process. In general, this may be performed transparently by the
file system. That is,
the process(es) accessing files that are managed by the file system do not
need any
cryptographic information or other programming overhead. Rather, they simply
initiate requests
to the file system in a conventional manner, and the file system applies an
extension such as any
of those described above to manage cryptographic access to files stored by the
file system
subject to any of the conditions contemplated herein (e.g., an appropriate
security state or
exposure state). The file system extension may in turn conditionally provide
encryption and
decryption functions based on a current security state of the process. In
general, all of the files
managed by the file system may be encrypted, and decrypting a file may include
accessing a
cryptographic key for the files (or for each of the files) using a file
system, filter, mount point, or
other file system extension and applying the cryptographic key to decrypt the
one of the files.
[00203] In one aspect, the file system extension (e.g., file system interface,
filter or
mount point) may be configured to respond to an indication of a severe
compromise (e.g., the
entire endpoint, multiple processes, or a known, severe threat) by deleting
key material stored on
the endpoint to prevent all access to files within the file system. Any
suitable key recovery
techniques may be used to recover the deleted key material once a compromise
has been fully
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resolved. Key recovery may include local key recovery techniques, remote key
recovery
techniques, or some combination of these. This provides a technique for
completely disabling or
protecting an endpoint against further data leakage or damage when a severe
compromise is
detected.
[00204] As shown in step 808, the method 800 may include using the file that
has been
accessed, such as by reading data from the file, writing data to the file,
closing the file, saving
the file, and so forth.
[00205] As shown in step 810, the method 800 may include monitoring a security
state of the process that accessed the file. In general, monitoring may be
performed by code
within the file system extension, or monitoring may be performed by one or
more local or
remote processes for monitoring reputation, integrity, health, security and
the like, any or all of
which may communicate with the file system extension to provide updates on a
security state of
the process or an endpoint executing the process. Monitoring may employ any of
the techniques
contemplated herein. By way of non-limiting examples, this may include
behavior analysis such
as detecting a compromised state of the process based on a behavior of the
process, a behavior
of an associated process, and a behavior of the endpoint. This may also or
instead include static
analysis such as locally monitoring the process with a file scanner that
performs static analysis
on related files such as a file (or files) that the process launches from, or
a file (or files) that get
loaded into the process during execution.
[00206] More generally, monitoring the security state of the process may
include
monitoring observable behaviors for the process. This may include a pattern of
file behavior by
the process such as reading, writing, creating, deleting, and combinations of
the foregoing. This
may also or instead include persistence behavior such as writing to a registry
or other locations
that contain code used at startup to initialize an endpoint by the process
(e.g., writing to a
registry). In another aspect, this may include inter-process communications
such as
communications between processes and other process-related actions such as
creation of a new
process, thread injection, memory injection, and so forth. In another aspect,
this may include
direct detection of exploits based on specific behaviors, or detection of
files loaded into the
process that may contain harmful features such as shared dynamic linked
libraries, user data
files, templates, macros, and so forth.
[00207] Monitoring the security state may also or instead include monitoring
network
behavior such as network traffic associated with the process. For network
traffic, coloring
techniques such as those described above may be used to label network traffic
to facilitate
identification and tracking. For example, monitoring the security state of the
process may
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include adding an application identifier to the network traffic originating
from the process,
wherein the application identifier explicitly identifies an application
associated with the process
and monitoring network traffic from the process at a gateway between the
endpoint and a data
network based on the application identifier. The endpoint may also log
relevant information to
facilitate such monitoring. For example, monitoring may include generating a
log of network
requests by logging network requests and applications making the network
requests. With
network behavior locally logged in this manner, monitoring the security state
may further
include storing an application identifier in the log of network requests,
where the application
identifier explicitly identifies an application associated with a source
process for a network
request, and monitoring network requests from the application at a gateway
between the
endpoint and a data network based on the application identifier.
[00208] As shown in step 812, the security state may be evaluated to determine
whether the security state has become a compromised state. The security state
may be updated
periodically or on a fixed or variable schedule, so that the current security
state is available for
evaluation. The security state may be queried at the time of evaluation. This
evaluation may
occur periodically on some fixed or variable schedule, or in response to other
events, or the
evaluation may be performed or initiated by an external software component
that pushes
notifications to the file system extension when exposures are detected. If the
security state is
'not compromised' (e.g., a 'no' to a compromised inquiry) then the endpoint
point may continue
to operate in the ordinary fashion and the method 800 may return to step 808
where the open file
is used. If the security state is a compromised state (a 'yes' to the
compromised inquiry), then
the method 800 may proceed to step 814 where additional action can be taken.
Evaluation of the
security state may include the application of one or more rules, e.g.,
behavior rules. The rules
may be applied to the process that accessed the file, to an endpoint, or to
another component of
the system. Evaluation of the security state may include a behavioral analysis
or a static analysis.
Evaluation of the security state may also or instead include the use of one or
more reputations of
processes, e.g., based on the processes themselves, source files, executable
code for the
processes, activity initiated by the processes, and the like. Evaluation of
the security state may
include the use of remote resources such as a gateway carrying traffic to and
from the endpoint,
or a remote threat management facility that provides reputation information,
malware signatures,
policy information, and the like. Evaluation of the security state may also or
instead include a
system health status evaluation and the like.
[00209] As shown in step 814, while the executing process is in the
compromised state,
the method 800 may include maintaining access to any open ones of the
plurality of files
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including the file requested in step 804. In general, access may be maintained
by continuing to
provide encryption/decryption for the open files through a file system
extension as described
above, or using any other analogous technique. In this manner, the process may
continue to
execute, preventing a catastrophic or inconvenient termination of an
application or the like for
the user. The user may continue to use a file, save the file, or otherwise
continue with a process
in any suitable manner. This may expose some encrypted files within the file
system to
potentially harmful processes. However, an inference can be made that by the
time a
compromise is detected, the open files have already been potentially affected.
At this point, the
remediation strategy can shift to preventing a further spread of harmful
impact to other files and
data on the endpoint while minimizing impact to the current user.
[00210] As shown in step 816 the method 800 may include including prohibiting
access
to other ones of the plurality of files. In general, access may be prohibited
by withholding
encryption/decryption functions for the other files through a file system
extension as described
above, or using any other analogous technique. Prohibiting access may include
prohibiting
access to all other files managed by the file system, or permitting access to
some files while
prohibiting access to a subset of files that are identified as protected,
confidential, or otherwise
labeled for heightened protection. In this manner, when a compromise is
detected, the
compromised process may continue to execute while being isolated from other
files that the
process has not yet touched.
[00211] As shown in step 818, the method 800 may include providing a
notification to
a user in a display of the endpoint. The notification may indicate a required
remediation step for
the process to resolve the compromised state, and the notification may inform
the user that an
application associated with the process cannot access additional files until
the user completes the
required remediation step. For example, the notification may include a pop-up
window or the
like with text stating: "Process X is compromised. You must close all files
and restart this
process before accessing other content with Process X." The notification may
include a number
of buttons or the like such as "okay", "remediate now," "remediate later," and
so forth.
[00212] As shown in step 820, the method 800 may include initiating a
remediation of
the process. In one aspect, this may include facilitating a restart of the
process, such as in
response to a user input received from the notification described above.
[00213] As shown in step 822, the method 800 may include remediating the
compromise. Where the compromise is dynamic in nature, e.g., based on code
loaded into an
executing process, a restart of the process may be sufficient to fully
remediate the compromised
state. However, additional remediation steps may be required including
registry repair, removal
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or reinstallation of an application, deletion of files or other clean up and
remediation. A variety
of tools are known in the art and may be usefully deployed to attempt
remediation based upon
the nature of the compromised state.
[00214] As shown in step 824, the remediation may be evaluated for success. If
the
remediation is successful, the method 800 may proceed to step 826 where access
is restored by
the process to the plurality of files managed by the file system. The process
may then return to
step 808 where files are used in the ordinary manner and encryption and
decryption services are
transparently provided to the process by the file system extension. If the
remediation is
unsuccessful, then the process may return to step 814 where the process can
continue to access
open files but no other files. In this latter case of unsuccessful
remediation, additional steps may
be taken, such as quarantining an endpoint, permanently disabling the process,
or otherwise
applying heightened restrictions to the endpoint or the process.
[00215] An endpoint such as any of the endpoints described above may be
configured
according to the foregoing method 800 to provide endpoint security. Thus in
one aspect, a
system disclosed herein includes an endpoint with a first memory storing a
plurality of files that
are managed by a file system and encrypted to prevent unauthorized access, as
well as a second
memory that stores key material for decrypting the plurality of files. The
first memory and the
second memory may be separate physical memories such as a non-volatile disk-
based memory
storing the plurality of files and a volatile random access memory storing the
key material. The
endpoint may include a processor and a process executing on the processor. A
file system
executing on the processor may be configured to manage access to the plurality
of files by the
process, and may be further configured to respond to a request from the
process for one of the
files by conditionally decrypting the one of the files based on a security
state of the process. As
described above, the file system may conditionally decrypt files using an
extension to an
operating system of the endpoint such as a file system interface, filter,
mount point, or other
extension.
[00216] The system may include a gateway such as any of the gateways described
above. The gateway may be coupled in a communicating relationship with the
endpoint and
configured to monitor the security state of the process based on network
traffic or other
behavioral observations for the process. The system may also or instead
include a threat
management facility such as any of the threat management facilities described
above coupled in
a communicating relationship with the endpoint and configured to remotely
monitor the security
state of the process based on indications of compromise received from the
endpoint.
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[00217] Fig. 9 shows a method for securing an endpoint. In general, the method
900
may operate in a similar manner to the method described above, with a notable
exception that
the overall method 900 monitors exposure of a process to potentially unsafe
content rather than
detecting compromised states. It will be appreciated that the method 900 of
Fig. 9 may be used
instead of or in addition to the method 800 of Fig. 8. That is the two methods
may be applied
sequentially or in parallel, or some combination of these, by incorporating
suitable code/logic
into a file system extension that controls access to a cryptographically
secured file system.
[00218] As shown in step 902, the method 900 may begin with encrypting a
plurality of
files on an endpoint to prevent unauthorized access to the plurality of files.
This may, for
example, include encrypting files using an extension to a file system such as
a file system
interface, filter, mount point, or other suitable extension to an interface
between a user
environment for executing processes and a files stored in memory on the
endpoint. Encryption
may be performed for all content on the endpoint when the endpoint is created
or initialized, or
when the file system extension is added an operating system for the endpoint,
or at some other
useful or convenient time. In one aspect, encryption may be performed as a
background process
over an extended period of time so that the endpoint can remain in use during
an initial
encryption process. In another aspect, encryption may be performed when files
are accessed for
the first time, or the initial encryption may be scheduled for a time when the
endpoint is not
typically in use, e.g., early hours of the morning.
[00219] As shown in step 904, the method 900 may include receiving a request
to
access one of the files from a process executing on the endpoint. In general,
this includes
receiving an access request at a file system, or at a file system interface,
filter or mount point for
the file system, or any other extension to file system described herein. With
files encrypted as
described above, the file system may operate in an ordinary fashion and
transparently to the
process (or a computing environment for the process) to provide file access
functions such as
opening, closing, creating, deleting, reading, writing, and so forth, while
managing encryption
and decryption through the file system extension. The file access function may
include an access
request as generally contemplated by step 804, which may initially include a
request to open or
create a file, and may subsequently include read or write operations or other
conventional file
functions.
[00220] As shown in step 906, the method 900 may include decrypting the one of
the
files for the process. In general, this may be performed transparently by the
file system. That is,
the process(es) accessing files that are managed by the file system do not
need any
cryptographic information or other programming overhead. Rather, they simply
initiate requests
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to the file system in a conventional manner, and the file system applies an
extension such as any
of those described above to manage cryptographic access to files stored by the
file system
subject to any of the conditions contemplated herein (e.g., an appropriate
security state or
exposure state). The file system extension may in turn conditionally provide
encryption and
decryption functions based on a current security state of the process. In
general, all of the files
managed by the file system may be encrypted, and decrypting a file may include
accessing a
cryptographic key for the files using a file system interface, filter, mount
point, or other file
system extension and applying the cryptographic key to decrypt the one of the
files.
[00221] In one aspect, the file system extension (e.g., file system interface,
filter, or
mount point) may be configured to respond to an indication of a compromise, or
an indication of
a severe compromise (e.g., the entire endpoint, multiple processes, or a
known, severe threat) by
deleting a cryptographic key or other key material stored on the endpoint to
prevent all access to
files within the file system. Any suitable key recovery techniques may be used
to recover the
deleted key material once a compromise has been fully resolved. Key recovery
may include
local key recovery techniques, remote key recovery techniques, or some
combination of these.
This provides a technique for completely disabling or protecting an endpoint
against further data
leakage or damage when a severe compromise is detected.
[00222] As shown in step 908, the method 900 may include using the file that
has been
accessed, such as by reading data from the file, writing data to the file,
closing the file, saving
the file, and so forth.
[00223] As shown in step 910, the method 900 may include monitoring an
exposure
state of the process on the endpoint to potentially unsafe content. In
general, exposure will have
a state of 'exposed' or 'secure' is based on actual or potential exposure of
an executing process
to potentially unsafe content such as risky network locations, files outside
the encrypted file
system, and so forth. A variety of rules may be used to detect exposure.
[00224] In general, monitoring the exposure state of the process to
potentially unsafe
content may include applying a plurality of behavioral rules to determine
whether the exposure
state of the process is either exposed or secure. Under a basic rule set, the
process may be
initially identified as secure, and then identified as exposed based on
contact with content other
than the plurality of files securely managed by the file system. In another
aspect, a process may
be initially categorized as exposed until a source, user, or other aspects of
the process are
authenticated. For example, in some implementations, a process may be
initially identified as
secure, and a process may be identified as exposed when the process makes a
network request to
a URL that has or is assigned a poor reputation or fits a suspicious pattern.
In some
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implementations, a process may be initially identified as secure, and a
process may be identified
as exposed when the process requests or opens a file that is identified as
exposed. In some
implementations, a process may be initially identified as secure, and a
process may be identified
as exposed when another process opens a handle to the process.
[00225] In one aspect, exposure may be measured using a simplified rule set
wherein
(1) the process is initially identified as secure, (2) the process is
identified as exposed when the
process opens a network connection to a Uniform Resource Locator that is not
internal to an
enterprise network of the endpoint and that has a reputation that is poor, (3)
the process is
identified as exposed when the process opens a first file that is identified
as exposed, and (4) the
process is identified as exposed when another exposed process opens a handle
to the process.
The reputation of the Uniform Resource Locator may be obtained from a remote
threat
management facility such as any of the remote threat management facilities
described herein, or
the reputation may be looked up in a local database or the like. Where
exposure of the first file is
used as a basis for determining when the process is exposed, exposure of the
first file may be
determined in a variety of ways. For example, the first file may be labeled or
colored as exposed
using the techniques described above, based on some prior context or activity
for the file. Or the
file may be identified as exposed based on a scan of the file for the presence
of malware or the
like.
[00226] Other conditions or rules may also or instead be used to measure when
a
process is exposed to potentially unsafe content. For example, the method 900
may include
identifying the first file as exposed when at least one of the following
conditions is met: (1) the
first file is not one of the plurality of files; (2) the first file is saved
by a second process that is
identified as exposed; and (3) a source of the first file has a low
reputation.
[00227] As shown in step 912, the process may be evaluated for exposure to
potentially
unsafe content. This evaluation may occur periodically on some fixed or
variable schedule, or in
response to other events, or the evaluation may be performed by an external
software component
that pushes notifications to the file system extension when exposures are
detected. When the
process is not exposed (i.e., the exposure state is `secure'), the process may
return to step 908
and continue to use files within the file system. When the process is exposed,
then the method
900 proceeds to step 914.
[00228] As shown in step 914, when the process is exposed the method 900 may
include restricting access by the process to the files managed by the file
system, more
specifically by controlling access to the files through a file system
interface, filter, mount point,
or other extension to the file system that conditionally decrypts one or more
of the plurality of
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files for the process according to the exposure state of the process. In this
context, restricting
access by the process to the files may include maintaining access to any of
the plurality of files
that have been opened by the process before the process became exposed, and
preventing access
to other ones of the plurality of files, all as generally described above by
way of example in the
method 800 of Fig. 8.
[00229] As shown in step 918, the method 800 may include providing a
notification to a
user in a display of the endpoint. The notification may indicate a required
remediation step for
the process to resolve the exposed state, and the notification may inform the
user that an
application associated with the process cannot access additional files until
the user completes the
required remediation step. For example, the notification may include a pop-up
window or the
like with text stating: "Process X is exposed to potentially unsafe content.
You must close all
files and restart this process before accessing other content with Process X."
The notification
may include a number of buttons or the like such as "okay", "remediate now,"
"remediate later,"
and so forth.
[00230] As shown in step 920, the method 800 may include initiating a
remediation of
the process. In one aspect, this may include facilitating a restart of the
process, such as in
response to a user input received from the notification described above, or
automatically in the
absence of user input.
[00231] As shown in step 922, the method 800 may include remediating the
exposure.
In one aspect, this may include restarting the process. Other steps may
include closing or
deleting the files that caused the exposure, scanning the endpoint for related
content or potential
threats, and so forth. The process may also be scanned after a restart to
determine whether the
exposure has resulted in any instantiation of malware or the like. A variety
of other tools are
known in the art and may be usefully deployed to attempt remediation based
upon the nature of
the exposed state.
[00232] As shown in step 924, the remediation may be evaluated for success. If
the
remediation is successful, the method 800 may proceed to step 926 where access
is restored for
the process to the plurality of files managed by the file system. The process
may then return to
step 908 where files are used in the ordinary manner and encryption and
decryption services are
transparently provided to the process by the file system extension. If the
remediation is
unsuccessful, then the process may return to step 914 where the process can
continue to access
open files but no other files. In this latter case of unsuccessful
remediation, additional steps may
be taken, such as quarantining an endpoint, permanently disabling the process,
or otherwise
applying heightened restrictions to the endpoint or the process.
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[00233] It will be appreciated that the method for evaluating exposure as
described with
respect to Fig. 9 may be used exclusively, or may be used concurrently or
sequentially with the
method for evaluating compromise described with reference to Fig. 8. That is,
a method may
usefully monitor a security state and an exposure state at the same time, and
use either or both of
these states to improve endpoint security as contemplated herein. In another
aspect, both
compromise and exposure may be collectively tracked as two different values to
a single
security state, with rules applied by the file system extension for file
access and remediation
according to value. Thus, while monitoring exposure, the method 900 may also
include
monitoring a security state of the process and restricting access by the
process to the plurality of
files when the security state is compromised. As described above, monitoring
the security state
may include monitoring the security state at a threat management facility or
locally monitoring
the security state with a malware file scanner.
[00234] In another aspect an endpoint such as any of the endpoints described
above may
implement the techniques for exposure monitoring and response as described
above. A
corresponding system may include an endpoint with a processor and a first
memory storing a
plurality of files that are encrypted to prevent unauthorized access. A
process may be executing
on the endpoint, and a file system on the endpoint may be configured to manage
access to the
plurality of files by the process. The file system may include an extension
such as a file system
interface, filter, or a mount point configured to monitor an exposure state of
the process and to
restrict access to the one of the files based on the exposure state of the
process by conditionally
decrypting the one of the files based on the exposure state. The file system
may maintain access
to any of the files that have been opened by the process before the process
became exposed,
while preventing access to other ones of the files. The endpoint may include
an integrity monitor
such as the threat monitor described above configured to evaluate the exposure
state by applying
a plurality of behavioral rules to determine whether the exposure state of the
process is either
exposed or secure, wherein the process is initially identified as secure and
the process is
identified as exposed based on contact with content other than the plurality
of files. The
endpoint may include a remediation component configured to remediate the
process using any of
the techniques described herein and return the process from the exposed state
to the secure state
for unrestricted access to the plurality of files. The remediation component
may include any
software component, either local to the endpoint or remote from the endpoint,
or some
combination of these containing code adapted to delete, uninstall, quarantine,
isolate,
reconfigure, reprogram, monitor or otherwise remediate malicious or
potentially malicious code
on the endpoint.
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[00235] The integrity monitor may be further configured to identify the
process as
exposed according to the plurality of behavioral rules, wherein one, two, or
all three of the
following may be determined: (1) the process is identified as exposed when the
process opens a
network connection to a Uniform Resource Locator that is not internal to an
enterprise network
of the endpoint and that has a reputation that is poor, (2) the process is
identified as exposed
when the process opens a first file that is identified as exposed, and (3) the
process is identified
as exposed when another exposed process opens a handle to the process.
[00236] Fig. 10 shows a system for creating portable encrypted content. In
general, the
system may include a host 1004 such as client or any of the other computing
devices described
above that can be operated by a user to perform various computing tasks. In a
user interface
1005 presented on a display by the host 1004, the user may select a file 1006
that the user
wishes to send to a recipient or otherwise share. The file 1006 may be a file
locally stored on the
host 1004 or a file selected from a remote location such as a web folder,
remote data storage
facility, or other remote resource. The file may include any of the file types
described herein, as
well as multiple file types bundled into a zipped folder or other container
with a multi-file
payload. In another aspect, the user may select multiple files at one time
(and optionally from
multiple locations) for inclusion in a single portable encrypted object. A
user may also supply a
password in the user interface that can be used as described below to locally
unwrap the file
from a container 1014 for portable encrypted content without access to a
remote key server or
other remote resources.
[00237] The host 1004 may provide credentials to an identity service 1010 in
order to
receive a token that can be associated with one or more recipients who can
also authenticate to
the identity service 1010. For each intended recipient, the identity service
1010 may supply an
authentication token uniquely identifying the recipient. The token may, for
example, be signed
or otherwise cryptographically protected in any matter suitable for creating
or maintaining
desired trust relationships among the sender, recipient, and a remote key
server. The identity
service 1010 may, for example, include a dedicated identity service such as
the AWS Identity
and Access Management platform available from Amazon Web Services, Inc. Other
platforms
such as social networking platforms and the like may also or instead be used
to provide unique
tokens for users based on authentication credentials. In another aspect, the
token may be
supplied by a host operating system such as Windows, which can provide an
authentication
token to a user authenticated to the Windows Active Directory.
[00238] In one aspect, multiple identity services 1010 may be used. So, for
example,
where the sender and the recipient are associated with different organizations
or entities, a
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(cryptographic) trust relationship between these entities may be used to
support trans-entity
communications using portable objects as contemplated herein. While numerous
techniques may
be used to implement this type of system, such as by hosting both entities at
the same identity
service, or by providing a way for members of one entity to use (or at least
select from an
identity list of) another entity, they will generally share the property of
either automatically
identifying a permitted recipient from a different entity, or permitting the
sender to select a
recipient from a list of identities that include users not directly associated
with the senders host
organization. All such variations that would be apparent to one of ordinary
skill in the art may
be used to support cross-organizational secure communication of data and files
as contemplated
herein.
[00239] In another aspect, outbound communications may be examined so that any
attachments addressed to other organizations or domains that have a pre-
established
cryptographic trust relationship with the sender domain can be automatically
encrypted using the
techniques described herein. This may, for example, include identifying the
recipient domain,
retrieving an identity token from an identity service for the recipient at the
recipient domain, and
then creating a portable encrypted object as otherwise described herein. In
one aspect, the
password for local decryption may be automatically selected by a gateway or
other intermediate
network element that is monitoring outbound communications. In another aspect,
the sender
may be prompted to provide a password.
[00240] The host 1004 may then present this token to a remote keystore 1012
along
with any other suitable identifying information for the sender and/or
recipient, along with any
digital signatures, hashes or the like. The remote keystore 1012 may be any
suitable remote key
server that can be operated to receive tokens, associate keys with the tokens,
and return the keys
to the host 1004.
[00241] With this information, the file 1006 may be wrapped and distributed as
portable
encrypted content. The container 1014 may include a number of software
components. This
may, for example, include user interface logic 1016 operable to provide a user
interface on a
receiving machine as necessary for a recipient to unwrap the file 1006 from
the container 1014.
For example, the user interface logic 1016 may include tools for various types
of key retrieval,
e.g., by retrieving a token from the identity service 1010 and transmitting
this to the remote
keystore 1012, or by directly presenting suitable credentials to the remote
keystore 1012 to
recover the key, or by receiving a password in a local user interface and
using the password to
recover the key 1024 that is encrypted and wrapped in the container 1014.
Cryptographic tools
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1018 may also be included in the container 1014 so that no additional
cryptographic libraries are
required on a recipient machine.
[00242] An authentication module 1020 may also be encoded into the container
1014 to
control various authentication processes contemplated herein. In general, the
authentication
module 1020 is operable to authenticate a user, such as the recipient of the
container 1014, to the
remote keystore 1012. This may include retrieving an authentication token from
the identity
service 1010, obtaining the authentication token from a local operating system
(e.g., from Active
Directory) or, if an authentication token is already present on the recipient
machine, using this
token to retrieve the key from the remote keystore 1012. The user interface
logic 1016 may also
support direct retrieval of the key from the remote keystore 1012 through
direct entry of valid
keystore credentials such as a usemame and password.
[00243] The file 1006 may be encrypted using the key 1024 (or an encryption
key from
an asymmetric key pair), and as noted above, the key 1024 itself (or the
decryption key from an
asymmetric key pair) may be encrypted and wrapped into the container 1014 for
local recovery
of a file by anyone with the appropriate password 1008. Thus, the password may
be received by
the host 1004 from a user and used to encrypt the key 1024 that was received
from the remote
keystore 1012. This encrypted instance of the key 1024 may be safely included
in the container
1014 in this encrypted form without compromising security of the container
1014, while
providing a file recovery mechanism even if other access information (e.g. the
authentication
token or identity service 1010 credentials) has been lost or changed.
[00244] Fig. 11 illustrates a process 1100 for unwrapping portable encrypted
content. In
this example, a file 1101 is encrypted within a container (the container is
shown as the
unwrapper 1102 in the figure) disposed on a host system 1116. In this example,
federated
authentication is applied such that the container 1102 authenticates using an
authentication
module 1108 to the identity service 1120. The identity service 1120
transparently retrieves a
token 1106 and presents the token 1106 to the keystore 1122 to receive a key
for decrypting the
contained file 1101 with the cryptographic module 1110, for example without
any explicit user
interaction beyond selecting the contained file 1101 for use. A key access
module 1104 may also
or instead be used as shown.
[00245] Fig. 12 illustrates a process 1200 for unwrapping portable encrypted
content. In
this example, a host system 1216 has already authenticated to an identity
service 1220, so the
token 1206 is already present on the host system 1216. In this case, the
authentication module
(not shown) does not need to authenticate to the identity service 1220, and
the key access
module 1204 can directly access the keystore 1222 with the token 1206 to
retrieve a key (e.g.,
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for decrypting the contained file 1201 with the cryptographic module 1210
included in the
container, which is shown as the unwrapper 1202 in the figure), again for
example without any
explicit user interaction beyond selecting the contained file 1201 for use.
[00246] Fig. 13 illustrates a process 1300 for unwrapping portable encrypted
content. In
this example, a user 1330 directly provides a password 1332 for accessing a
file 1301. The key
access module 1309 can use the password 1332 to decrypt a copy of the
decryption key wrapped
in the container on the host system 1316 (the container is shown as the
unwrapper 1302 in the
figure) without access to remote resources such as a remote keystore or a
remote identity
service. The system may further include a cryptographic module 1310 as shown
in the figure.
[00247] Fig. 14 illustrates a process 1400 for unwrapping portable encrypted
content. In
this example, the container (the container is shown as the unwrapper 1402 in
the figure) receives
credentials such as a usemame and a password for directly accessing a remote
keystore 1422,
e.g., in a user interface presented to a recipient of the container on the
host system 1416. The
authentication credentials can be used to obtain a key from a remote keystore
1422. In general,
the user interface may prompt a user for input. Other information, such as
biometric information,
token information, cryptographic information, text or graphic information, and
the like may be
used as part of or incorporated with or without cryptographic operations into
authentication data
that is provided to the keystore 1422 for authentication. More generally, the
user interface may
be presented when the contents of the container (e.g., a file 1401) cannot be
accessed
transparently, and may present one or more options to the user for accessing
the contents using
various techniques such as those described above. For example, the user
interface may present a
number of buttons or other selection options for, e.g., password access,
remote keystore
credentials, identity service credentials, and so forth. The system may
further include a key
access module 1409, a cryptographic module 1410, and an authentication module
1408.
[00248] Fig. 15 shows a flowchart of a process 1500 for creating portable
encrypted
content.
[00249] As shown in step 1502, the method 1500 may begin with receiving a
selection
of a file for encryption from a user. This may include a selection from a
local directory, a web
directory, a remote file store, a file management system, and so forth. This
may include a
manual step within a user interface of specifying a file for encryption as
described herein, or this
may include automatic encryption for any file that is outbound from an
endpoint, e.g., via
electronic mail, text message, ftp file transfer, upload to a remote location,
and so forth. In
another aspect, the creation of a container with the encrypted file may occur
automatically under
predetermined conditions, such as when a file is selected from specific
directories or when a file
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is of a certain type, size, date, author, origin, and so forth. Thus the
creation of containers for
content leaving an endpoint may be automatic, manual, or some combination of
these.
[00250] As shown in step 1504, the method 1500 may include requesting a token
for
the file. This may, for example include an authentication token from a first
computing
environment to which the recipient can authenticate using authentication
credentials. The token
may uniquely identifying a recipient of the file, or a group of authorized
recipients, or some
other group, entity, or combination of the foregoing. The token may be
digitally signed or
otherwise cryptographically processed in a manner that permits verification of
origin. In one
aspect, the computing environment may include an endpoint, e.g., where an
authentication token
is obtained from Active Directory or some other operating system service or
other local resource
or the like. In another aspect, the computing environment may include a remote
identity and
access management system such as the AWS Identity and Access Management system
or a
social networking platform configured to support authentication tokens as
contemplated herein.
[00251] As shown in step 1506, the method 1500 may include receiving the token
from
the first computing environment. In general, the token may be uniquely
associated with an
authenticated entity such as an intended recipient of the container so that
the intended recipient
can subsequently retrieve the token and use this to obtain a decryption key
for the container or
"wrapper."
[00252] As shown in step 1508, the method 1500 may include transmitting the
token to
the remote key server. This may include transmitting other information
necessary or helpful for
verifying the identity of the token sender. The remote key server may
associate the token with an
intended recipient of the file so that, when the token is presented to the key
server, the key
server can in turn provide the corresponding decryption key.
[00253] As shown in step 1510, the method 1500 may include requesting a
cryptographic key associated with the token from the remote key server. The
cryptographic key
may include a symmetric key, or an asymmetric key pair containing an
encryption key and a
decryption key. As used herein, the terms encryption key and decryption key
are intended to
refer to either the same key (e.g., where the keys are symmetric) or different
keys (e.g., where
the keys are asymmetric) unless a more specific meaning is explicitly provided
or otherwise
clear from the context. The request may include any suitable configuration or
parameterization
information that might be required by the remote key server, such as
information to negotiate or
select security protocols, information specifying strength of encryption, the
destination path or
file name for key material, connection information or requirements, and so
forth.
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[00254] As shown in step 1512, the method 1500 may include receiving the
cryptographic key from the remote key server. This may include receiving the
cryptographic key
through a secure connection, or this may include other steps to secure the
key. As noted above,
the cryptographic key may be a symmetric key so that the encryption key and
the decryption key
are the same key, or the cryptographic key may be an asymmetric key pair
including an
encryption key for encrypting data that is different from a decryption key for
decrypting any
data encrypted with the encryption key.
[00255] As shown in step 1514, the method 1500 may include receiving a
password
from the user for local decryption of a file or files in the container. Where
a user manually
selects files for wrapping, a user interface on the host may present a window
or dialogue box for
the user to input a password that can subsequently be used to decrypt the file
from the container.
Where files are automatically wrapped as described above, a default password
may be used, or a
password may be automatically created on a per-file basis (or some other
basis, e.g., per-day,
per-recipient, etc.) and communicated to the sender through some alternative,
secure medium,
e.g. through an instant message, a separate electronic mail, a voice message,
or the like.
[00256] As shown in step 1516, the method 1500 may include encrypting the file
with
the encryption key to create an encrypted file.
[00257] As shown in step 1518, the method 1500 may include encrypting the
decryption
key to create an object that can be decrypted using the password to recover
the decryption key.
Thus the decryption key for decrypting the file from the container can be
wrapped into the
container in order to provide a backup method for extracting the file in the
absence of
authentication.
[00258] As shown in step 1520, the method 1500 may include combining the
encrypted
file, the object containing the decryption key, and application logic
providing a user interface for
accessing the file into a portable encrypted data object such as any of the
containers described
above. Other application logic such as cryptographic libraries, use interface
features, and so
forth may be usefully incorporated into this object to enhance functionality
and ease of use. The
user interface may generally provide a number of different modes for accessing
the file such as
those described above. For example, the user interface may provide a first
mode of accessing the
file by supplying the password to locally decrypt the decryption key and a
second mode of
accessing the file by retrieving the decryption key from the remote key
server.
[00259] The user interface may incorporate programming logic for the various
other
modes of file access and authentication. For example, the user interface may
transparently
decrypt the file without user intervention in appropriate circumstances, such
as when the
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recipient has already authenticated to the first computing environment with
the authentication
credentials. The user interface may also or instead include logic for an
authentication module
that can remotely retrieve the token from the first computing environment
using the
authentication credentials and transmit the token to the remote key server to
retrieve the
decryption key. The user interface may support a further mode of accessing the
file by receiving
the authentication credentials in the user interface and applying the
authentication credentials to
retrieve the token. When the recipient is already authenticated to the first
computing
environment, this may also include transparently decrypting the file for the
recipient
automatically without explicit user interaction.
[00260] The user interface may provide a further mode of accessing the file by
providing the decryption key itself through the user interface. That is, the
user may obtain the
decryption key by other means, and provide this directly to the container
through the user
interface, or by providing a pointer to a locally accessible instance of the
key. The user interface
may also or instead provide a mode of accessing the file by providing user
credentials to the
remote key server. In this embodiment, suitable credentials can be entered by
a user through the
user interface, and the application logic within the container can access the
remote keystore to
retrieve any needed key material for decrypting the file.
[00261] The portable encrypted data object may use a variety of programming
techniques for encapsulating a user interface and cryptography functionality
in a relatively
universal format. For example, the object may include a hypertext markup
language file such as
an HTML5 file (HTML5 is the current version of the Hypertext Markup Language
(HTML)
used for structuring and presenting content on the World Wide Web) containing
encryption and
decryption logic, user interface program code, and so forth. Where the
portable encrypted data
object is realized in this form, additional functions and features may be
added. For example, a
recipient may open and edit the enclosed file ¨ either within the browser
context or within a new
document based on the extracted file -- and then seamlessly add the modified
document back
into the portable encrypted data object either instead of or in addition to
the original file. In
some implementations, the HTML5 file may reference (e.g., use) encryption
functions that are
available on the device, for example, provided by the HTML5 interpreter (e.g.,
browser). In
some implementations, the HTML5 file may include implementation of encryption
functions.
[00262] As shown in step 1522, the method 1500 may optionally include revoking
access to the file. In general, after a container has been distributed, access
to the encrypted file
within the container can be revoked by notifying the key server to modify or
delete an
association of the token or the recipient with the decryption key. While this
prevents federated
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access using remote resources, the file will still generally be accessible by
using the password to
internally recover and apply the decryption key, absent additional steps to
modify the container
itself This may be performed through an application running on the sender's
endpoint, or
through a web interface hosted by the key server. A similar effect may be
achieved by removing
the token for the recipient from a database of the identity service, although
the recipient may still
recover the file using a local copy of the token in some circumstances.
[00263] In another aspect, the container may include logic to verify access
permissions
with the remote keystore even when decrypting locally with the password. While
somewhat less
secure ¨ communications with the keystore may be falsified ¨ this will provide
at least one
additional layer of protection against access by casual users with access to
the password but
revoked permissions on the remote keystore.
[00264] The method described above may be realized in a host device operated
by a
user to create and transmit a portable encrypted data object. Thus in one
aspect there is disclosed
herein an endpoint comprising an interface to a data network, a memory storing
a file, and a
processor. The processor may be configured, for example with computer
executable code, to
create a portable encrypted data object containing the file for secure
distribution over the data
network by performing the steps of receiving a selection of a file for
encryption from a user,
requesting a token uniquely identifying a recipient of the file from a first
computing
environment to which the recipient can authenticate using authentication
credentials, receiving
the token, transmitting the token to a remote key server, requesting an
encryption key associated
with the token from the remote key server, receiving the encryption key from
the remote key
server, receiving a password from the user for local decryption of the file,
encrypting the file
with the encryption key to create an encrypted file, encrypting the encryption
key to create an
object that can be decrypted using the password to recover the first
encryption key, combining
the encrypted file, the object containing the encryption key, and application
logic providing a
user interface for accessing the file into the portable encrypted data object,
wherein the user
interface provides a first mode of accessing the file by supplying the
password to locally decrypt
the encryption key and a second mode of accessing the file by retrieving the
encryption key
from the remote key server.
[00265] Fig. 16 illustrates a method for enhancing perimeter security for
outbound
content. In general, the techniques described above for creating portable
encrypted containers
may be adapted to conditionally (e.g., pursuant to an enterprise security
policy) or
unconditionally secure outbound files and other content as it leaves an
endpoint. In general, this
may be performed manually, e.g., with a user providing a password and
explicitly approving
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each outbound file, or automatically, e.g., with a firewall or the like that
automatically secures
outbound files against unauthorized access. Similarly, the code for detecting
outbound files and
performing wrapping may be implemented in an electronic mail server, proxy,
client or other
location for mail communications, or in any other network device or service
applicable to
outbound communications. For example, Data Leakage Prevention (DLP) tools are
commonly
used to protect against improper exfiltration of sensitive data, and may be
modified to detect and
control outbound files as contemplated herein.
[00266] As shown in step 1602, the method 1600 may include receiving a
communication from a sender for communication to a recipient, the
communication including a
file coupled to the communication as an attachment. This may, for example
include receiving
the communication at an endpoint firewall for the sender (e.g., on the client
device used by the
sender to initiate the communication), at an enterprise gateway or similar
gateway or firewall for
enterprise communications, or at an electronic mail server used by the sender
for outbound
electronic mail. This may also or instead include other security devices
within a data network
configured to monitor traffic and enforce corporate security policies, as well
as hosts, gateways
and the like for specific communications protocols such as text messaging
services and the like.
[00267] The communication may, for example, be an electronic mail message or a
text message, and the file may be any file or similar computing object such as
a word processing
document, a spreadsheet, an image, a video, a presentation document, a
portable document
format document, an application, an executable, a data file, and so forth.
[00268] The communication may instead include a file upload to a remote
resource
such as a social networking platform, a web folder, a file transfer protocol
server, a remote file
directory, a file drop box, and so forth. Thus it should be appreciated that,
as used herein, the
term attachment is also intended to include a file contained within packets of
an outbound
communication such as an ftp file transfer, a file movement to a web directory
or drop box, an
upload to a remote service, and so forth. While the term attachment might more
conventionally
be associated with discrete communications protocols such as electronic mail
or text messaging,
the principles of the invention are intended to apply to any and all outbound
communications
from an endpoint that might exfiltrate files or similar content, and all such
communications may
have an "attachment" as that term is used herein. One of ordinary skill in the
art may readily
adapt the techniques contemplated herein to these and other actions initiated
on an endpoint to
send a file to a recipient or otherwise communicate the file to locations
outside the endpoint.
[00269] In still further embodiments, the techniques described herein may be
adapted to
actions initiated from the endpoint affecting a file transfer between two
other remote locations.
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Thus for example, a user may drag and drop a file from one remote folder to
another remote
folder to initiate a file transfer for one or more files that are never
instantiated on the endpoint.
Under these circumstances, the techniques described above may still be
usefully applied to
ensure that the files placed in the destination folder are wrapped in portable
encrypted
containers. Similarly, if a user offers remote access by recipients to files
stored in a web folder
or the like, the files may be wrapped, either before access or as individual
files are downloaded,
in order to protect against access by unauthorized third parties. These and
other variations will
be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art.
[00270] As shown in step 1604, the method 1600 may include removing the
attachment
from the communication.
[00271] As shown in step 1604, the method 1500 may include encrypting the
file(s) in
the attachment, to provide an encrypted instance of the file(s). As described
above, this may
include securing an encryption key and a corresponding decryption key from a
remote key
server and using the encryption key to encrypt the file. The remote key server
may then
associate the decryption key with the recipient (in response to a
corresponding request from the
sender) so that the decryption key can be retrieved from the remote key server
with a
presentation of suitable credentials by the recipient.
[00272] As shown in step 1606, the method 1600 may include wrapping the
attachment
into a portable encrypted container. As described above, this container may an
object that
contains an encrypted instance of the file, an encrypted instance of a
decryption key to decrypt
the file, and program code providing a user interface for file access. The
user interface may
support multiple modes for accessing the encrypted content of the container.
For example, the
user interface may support a first mode of decryption using remote resources
(e.g., a remote key
server and an identity service). The user interface may also support a second
mode of decryption
based on local receipt of a password for decrypting the decryption key. In
this context, wrapping
the attachment may include receiving a user input of the password for local
decryption of the
file, or wrapping the attachment may include automatically creating the
password for local
decryption of the file. More generally, any or all of the access modes
described above may be
incorporated into the user interface code to support access to the contents of
the container as
desired.
[00273] In general, wrapping as contemplated herein may also include applying
a
security policy such as a policy for exfiltration of files, data and the like.
Thus while wrapping
may include automatic wrapping of all outbound attachments from the sender,
wrapping may
instead include conditionally wrapping the attachment according to a security
protocol
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applicable to the sender. The security protocol may temporarily or
indefinitely specify automatic
wrapping of all outbound attachments from the sender. The security protocol
may also or instead
specify automatic wrapping of predetermined file types from the sender,
automatic wrapping of
files from predetermined origins, or automatic wrapping based on any suitable
objective critieria
for, e.g., a recipient, a recipient domain, a file type, a file location, file
metadata, and so forth.
[00274] As shown in step 1608, the method 1600 may include attaching the
portable
encrypted container to the communication in order to resume the communications
as originally
initiated by the sender. This restores the communication to its original form,
except with the
portable encrypted container in place of the original attachment.
[00275] As shown in step 1610, the method 1600 may include transmitting the
communication and the portable encrypted container to the recipient. This may
include sending
an electronic mail, a text message, a file transfer, or any of the other
communications
contemplated herein.
[00276] As shown in step 1612, the method 1600 may include communicating the
password to the recipient through a second communication medium. This may
include sending
the password in a second, follow-up email or the like. However, it may be more
secure to send
the password using a different communication medium, such as by sending the
password with a
mobile text message (e.g., SMS) when the attachment is sent with an electronic
mail message.
More generally, the second communication may be different from a first
communication
medium bearing the communication and the attachment. The password may also or
instead be
locally stored on the sender's device, e.g., in a password log or the like, or
in a remote, secure
resource accessible to the sender, or the password may be communicated to the
sender for
archival purposes, such as within an electronic mail or text message. In
another aspect, no record
is made of the recovery password so that the password is transitory in nature.
[00277] The foregoing method may be implemented in any of a number of network
devices such as an endpoint, a client device operated by the sender, an
enterprise gateway, an
electronic mail server, and so forth. Thus in one aspect there is disclosed
herein a network
device such as any of the devices or endpoints described herein including a
first interface for
receiving communications, a second interface for sending communications over a
data network,
a memory, and a processor. The processor may be configured by computer
executable code
stored in the memory to secure network communications by performing the steps
of receiving a
communication from a sender through the first interface for communication to a
recipient, the
communication including a file coupled to the communication as an attachment,
removing the
attachment from the communication, wrapping the attachment into a portable
encrypted
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container that contains an encrypted instance of the file, an encrypted
instance of a decryption
key to decrypt the file, and program code providing a user interface that
supports a first mode of
decryption using remote resources and authentication credentials for the
recipient and a second
mode of decryption based on local receipt of a password for decrypting the
decryption key,
attaching the portable encrypted container to the communication, and
transmitting the
communication and the portable encrypted container to the recipient through
the second
interface.
[00278] Fig. 17 shows a method for intermediate encryption of potentially
exposed
content. A variety of techniques are contemplated herein for managing
encryption in order to
secure data on an endpoint, such as the techniques described above with
reference to Fig. 5.
While these techniques may advantageously protect data in various
circumstances, it is also
possible for encrypted data to become exposed, or potentially exposed in
various circumstances,
such as when a process opens an encrypted/protected file before the process is
recognized as
unsafe. Under these circumstances, it may be useful to remove the affected
files from an
otherwise secure environment, without fully decrypting and exposing the data
in the affected
files. In order to achieve this objective, a file system may apply a
temporary, intermediate
encryption state that remains in force until an exposure or other compromising
event can be
remediated, after which the file(s) can be returned to a secure, encrypted
state used for other
files that are not compromised.
[00279] As shown in step 1702, the method 1700 may include providing a first
key to a
process executing on an endpoint, the first key providing access to a
plurality of files on the
endpoint. Using this key, the process may access files within a secure or
protected file area,
which may be a folder, a group of folders, a directory, a detachable storage,
an entire hard drive,
or any other file location or combination of locations. As described above,
this may include
controlling access to key material through a mount point, file system filter,
file system interface,
or other file system extension or the like that applies rules and
conditionally provides
encryption/decryption according to security states and other information. The
first key may more
generally be an encryption or decryption key for access to files within a
secure environment with
access controlled by the file system extension. It will be appreciated that
the term "key," as used
in reference to this figure, may refer to a symmetric key, in which case the
key is the same for
both encryption and decryption, or to an asymmetric key, in which case a key
includes both an
encryption key used to encrypt data and a corresponding decryption key to
decrypt the data.
While the following text does not distinguish between these key types, either
type of key may be
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usefully employed with the systems and methods describe below, and either type
of key is
intended to fall within the scope of a "key" as contemplated herein.
[00280] As shown in step 1704 the method 1700 may include detecting a
potential
security compromise to the endpoint. A wide range of techniques are known in
the art for
detecting actual or potential security compromises, and any such techniques
may be adapted for
use as a detection tool including the various techniques described herein. For
example, detecting
the potential security compromise to the endpoint may include identifying a
compromised state
on the endpoint, such as by identifying malicious software based on static
analysis or identifying
malicious software based on behavioral analysis. Detecting the potential
security compromise to
the endpoint may also or instead include identifying a compromised state of
the process that is
using the file. Detecting the potential security compromise to the endpoint
may also or instead
include detecting an exposure of the process to an unknown data source.
Furthermore, it will be
noted that the description accompanying Fig. 17 refers generally to a
"potential security
compromise," suggesting that the detection may be based, e.g., on exposure or
an elevated but
unconfirmed inference of malicious activity or other circumstances suggesting
a possible threat.
However, the techniques described herein may also or instead be used in
instances of actual,
confirmed security compromises, and the phrase "potential security compromise"
should be
understood in this context to refer to potential and actual security
compromises.
[00281] As shown in step 1706, the method 1700 may include providing a second
key
to the process different than the first key. In general, this second key can
provide security to the
potentially compromised data by protecting the data against further
unauthorized access, while
still preventing the process that is potentially compromised from accessing
additional files or
data that are secured with the first key.
[00282] As shown in step 1708, the method 1700 may include encrypting a first
one of
the plurality of files that is open by the process with the second key.
[00283] As shown in step 1710, the method 1700 may include revoking the first
key
from the process to prevent access to other ones of the plurality of files by
the process. It will be
appreciated that various levels of compromise may be detected and addressed
with the
techniques contemplated herein. In the case of a severe compromise the first
key may be
completely revoked from the endpoint. This may, for example, include deleting
the first key
from the endpoint so that no other files encrypted with the first key can be
accessed, and the
only available file operations become use of files that are already open and
the creation of new
files (for use with the second key). This technique advantageously permits
quick and effective
isolation of all data that is protected by encryption with the first key,
while also permitting
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continued operation of the endpoint, where processes can continue to use any
files that are
currently open with the second key. As an additional measure, the first key
may be physically
removed from the endpoint using, e.g., data shredding techniques such as
overwriting to ensure
that the relevant key material cannot be recovered from physical storage on
the endpoint.
[00284] As shown in step 1712, the method 1700 may include initiating
remediation of
the potential security compromise. Numerous malware remediation techniques are
known in the
art, and may be adapted for remediation as contemplated herein. This may, for
example include
preparatory steps such as storing the first one of the plurality of files
after encryption with the
second key and before initiating remediation so that file(s) can be stored in
a secure, non-volatile
state as necessary or helpful during remediation. Remediation may also include
various types of
user interaction. For example, a pop up, dialogue box, or other user
notification feature may
inform a user of a potential compromise, and notify the user of necessary
steps for remediation,
e.g., a restart of a process, closing of a file, restart of a machine, or
other step or combination of
steps. The dialogue box may also offer to perform these steps for the user, or
notify the user that
no new files can be opened until the remediation is performed.
[00285] As shown in step 1714, the method 1700 may include determining whether
the
remediation is successful. If the remediation is successful, then the method
1700 may proceed to
step 1716 for a return to normal (uncompromised) operations. If the
remediation is unsuccessful,
then the files may be retained in the intermediate encryption state (with the
second key) as
shown in step 1720 until further actions can be taken.
[00286] As shown in step 1716, when a remediation successfully resolves a
compromised or potentially compromised state, the method 1700 may include
returning the first
key to the process. This may include recovering the first key from a remote
key management
system or otherwise retrieving and/or restoring access to the first key by the
process, e.g., view
with a file system extension, interface, filter, mount point, or the like.
[00287] As shown in step 1718, the method 1700 may include transcribing the
first one
of the plurality of files for access using the first key. If the file is in
use by the process and thus
in a plaintext state, this may include encrypting the file with the first key
and storing the file in
this encrypted state. If the file has been closed, e.g., as a result of normal
file operations, as a
precursor to remediation, or for some other reason, then the file may be
decrypted using the
second key and then encrypted using the first key for return to the secure
file system. In either
case, this may include deleting the second key and saving the file that is
encrypted with the first
key, after which the method 1700 may return to normal operation (e.g., step
1702) where the
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(remediated) process has access to the file using the first key and new
compromises or potential
compromises can be detected.
[00288] As shown in step 1720, the method 1700 may include continuing use of
the
second key unless or until the compromised state can be resolved. As shown in
step 1722,
remediation efforts may be repeated, or additional, different remedial
measures may be
attempted where initial remediation efforts are unsuccessful. After various
remediation efforts,
the method 1700 may return to step 1714 where an additional determination may
be made as to
whether the remediation is successful.
[00289] In one aspect, there is disclosed herein a system implementing the
techniques
above to control access by processes to potentially compromised files and
data. The system may
include an endpoint, a first memory on the endpoint storing a first key, a
second memory on the
endpoint storing a plurality of files encrypted by the first key, a process
executing on a processor
on the endpoint, the process using the first key to access a first one of the
plurality of files, and a
security agent executing on the processor and configured to detect a potential
security
compromise to the endpoint using any of the techniques described above. The
processor may in
turn be configured to respond to the potential security compromise by
encrypting the first one of
the plurality of files with a second key different from the first key,
providing access by the
process to the second key, and revoking the first key from the process to
prevent access by the
process to other ones of the plurality of files. As further describe above,
the processor may be
configured to initiate a remediation of the potential security compromise, and
to respond to a
successful remediation of the potential security compromise by returning the
first key to the
process for access to the plurality of files.
[00290] Fig. 18 shows a method for just-in-time encryption of data. Many of
the
techniques described above can be used to secure data on an endpoint by
encrypting files with a
key and controlling access to the key through a mount point, file system
filter, file system
interface, or other file system extension as described above. However, for
various reasons, such
as when a new storage device is attached or when an endpoint is initially
converted to use with
these encryption techniques, there may be files that are not yet encrypted for
data protection. In
these circumstances, it may be useful to provide for just-in-time encryption
of new files when
they are first detected, for example so that a secure process can work with
secure and unsecure
files at the same time (by immediately securing the unsecure files). The
following method 1800
facilitates process execution in this type of hybrid data or file environment.
[00291] As shown in step 1802, the method 1800 may include encrypting a
plurality of
files on an endpoint with a key to provide a plurality of encrypted files.
This may, for example,
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use any of the techniques described herein. In general control of encryption
and decryption for
this group of encrypted files may be controlled through a mount point, file
system filter, file
system interface, or other file system extension as described above.
[00292] As shown in step 1804, the method 1800 may include monitoring a
security
state of the endpoint. A wide range of techniques are known in the art for
monitoring a security
state, e.g., by monitoring for the presence of malware on an endpoint, and any
such techniques
may be adapted for use as a security state monitoring tool as contemplated
herein. For example,
monitoring the security state may include monitoring the security state and
identifying malicious
software or the like with static analysis. Monitoring may also or instead
include monitoring the
security state with behavioral analysis. For a suitably instrumented endpoint,
e.g., an endpoint
that uses coloring as described above, this may also or instead include
monitoring an exposure
of a process to an unknown data source such as an unrecognized file, a URL of
low or unknown
reputation, another process executing on the endpoint that provides data to or
receives data from
the process, and so forth. Monitoring may also or instead include remotely
monitoring a
heartbeat of the endpoint as described herein. Monitoring may also or instead
include
monitoring network traffic originating from the endpoint at a gateway for an
enterprise network
that includes the endpoint. More generally, any techniques for detecting the
presence or use of
malware or the like on an endpoint may be adapted to monitor an endpoint as
contemplated
herein.
[00293] Monitoring the security state of the endpoint may include monitoring
the
endpoint generally, or monitoring specific processes such as a process that is
accessing
encrypted files or a process that is accessing an unrecognized file for the
first time, e.g. a file
that is outside the group of encrypted files described above. In general,
monitoring may be
performed continuously or periodically, and multiple monitoring processes may
be executed
concurrently or sequentially, and may be executed on some predetermined
schedule or in
response to other detected or observed events on the endpoint. Furthermore,
monitoring may be
continued while other steps are performed. That is, when a compromise is
detected as described
below, monitoring may resume while additional, remedial steps are initiated to
address the
detected compromise.
[00294] As shown in step 1806, the method 1800 may include providing a key for
decryption of the files according to the security state determined in step
1804. This may for
example include providing the key to a process executing on the endpoint
whenever the security
state of the endpoint is not compromised and revoking the key from the process
whenever the
security state of the endpoint is compromised. This control of access to the
key and encrypted
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content may be implemented, for example, using a mount point, file system
filter, file system
interface, or other file system extension as described above. Thus the method
1800 may include
providing access to the process by decrypting files with the key using a file
system filter coupled
between the process and a file system of the endpoint, or by decrypting files
with the key at a
mount point coupled between the process and a file system of the endpoint, or
by decrypting
files with the key using a file system interface interposed, for example,
between the endpoint
and a file system.
[00295] If the endpoint becomes severely compromised, for example with malware
such
as ransomware or an advanced persistent threat enabling remote access and
control, then the key
may be revoked, e.g., from the endpoint. This may include complete revocation
so that no
further action can be taken on the encrypted files, or this may include an
incremental revocation
wherein access to open files is maintained but no additional files can be
opened. In another
aspect, shadow copies of open files may be created so that executing processes
can continue to
execute while encrypted files are isolated from further manipulation. In one
aspect, revoking the
key from the endpoint may further include physically removing the key from the
endpoint to
prevent any and all access to encrypted files. The method 1800 may also
include returning the
key to the endpoint if the endpoint is remediated, such as by recovering the
key from a remote
management system.
[00296] As shown in step 1810, the method 1800 may include detecting access to
a new
file by the process. This may, for example, be any file other than one of the
encrypted files that
already been encrypted in step 1802, such as a file copied or moved from a
remote directory but
not yet accessed by any process on the endpoint, or a file on the endpoint
that has not already
been encrypted by a background process responsible for encrypting all of the
files on the
endpoint. Although not illustrated in Fig. 18, it will be appreciated that in
general, where no
access to a new file is detected, the method 1800 may return to step 1802
where background
encryption may be performed, or to step 1804 where the security state of the
endpoint is
monitored.
[00297] As shown in step 1812, the method may include providing a key for
access to
the new file according to the security state detected in step 1804. In
general, this may include
encrypting the new file with the key immediately upon access by the process if
the security state
of the endpoint is not compromised so that the new file can be added to the
encrypted files
created in step 1802. By contrast, if the security state of the endpoint is
compromised, this may
include withholding the key and excluding the new file from the encrypted
files.
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[00298] As shown in step 1814, a number of additional steps may be performed
for a
compromised endpoint. This may, for example, include remedial measures such as
terminating a
process, requesting a user to restart an application, restarting an endpoint,
quarantining processes
or files, and so forth. As described above, the new file, and any other files
opened by a process
may optionally be encrypted with a second key temporarily in order to isolate
the process and
files from other encrypted files on the endpoint. After successful
remediation, these files may be
decrypted as required and then encrypted with the key to add them to the
plurality of encrypted
files created in step 1802.
[00299] An endpoint may be configured to apply the techniques described above
for
just-in-time encryption of new files that are detected on the endpoint. Thus
in one aspect there is
disclosed herein a system including an endpoint, a first memory on the
endpoint storing a key, a
second memory on the endpoint storing a plurality of files encrypted by the
key, a process
executing on a processor on the endpoint, and a security agent executing on
the processor. The
security agent may be configured as generally described above to monitor a
security state of the
endpoint and to detect a potential security compromise of the endpoint,
wherein the processor is
configured to detect an access to a new file other than one of the plurality
of files, and if the
security state of the endpoint is not compromised, to encrypt the new file
with the key
immediately upon access by the process to add the new file to the plurality of
files encrypted by
the key. The system may also include a remote management facility configured
to remotely
monitor the security state of the endpoint based on a heartbeat received from
the endpoint. The
system may also or instead include an enterprise gateway configured to
remotely monitor the
security state of the endpoint based on network traffic originating from the
endpoint.
[00300] Fig. 19 shows a method for key throttling to mitigate unauthorized
file access.
In general, a file system extension such as a file system extension (e.g.,
filter, mount point,
network interface, etc.) as described above or any suitable interface between
a user, operating
system, or device, on the one hand, and a data store on the other hand, may
control file access by
regulating the rate at which files are decrypted for processes, e.g., by
limiting the number of files
that can be decrypted, for example, at one time, at one or more times, over a
predetermined time
period or over some predetermined window, or by limiting the speed or rate at
which decryption
is performed on each of one or more files, or some combination of these, any
of which is
generally referred to herein as "key throttling." For example, when endpoint,
device, or process
activity such as an unusual pattern of file accesses, suggests that an
endpoint is or might be
compromised, this capability may be used to constrain file access until the
security state can be
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determined with greater confidence or, in the instance of a confirmed
compromise, the security
state can be remediated.
[00301] As shown in step 1902, the method 1900 may include encrypting a
plurality of
files on an endpoint to provide a plurality of encrypted files that can be
decrypted with a key.
This may, for example, include encrypting the files using a file system
extension for a file
system as generally described herein, or otherwise placing the files in an
encrypted state.
[00302] As shown in step 1904, the method 1900 may include providing a file
system
for accessing the files. It will be appreciated that, where the file system,
or a file system
extension for the file system, is used to control the encryption process, this
step 1904 may be
initiated before the encryption begins. In general, the file system is used
for accessing the files
with processes executing on the endpoint. As generally described herein, the
file system may
include a file system extension that applies the key to decrypt one of the
files when the file is
requested by one of the processes executing on the endpoint. While these steps
describe a single
key that is used for encryption and decryption, it will be understood that the
"key" in this
context may include an asymmetric key pair where one piece of key material in
the "key" is
used for encryption and another piece of key material is used for decryption.
The key also may
be used to decrypt a key to be used to decrypt a file or files, with one or
more layers of
decryption of keys required.
[00303] As shown in step 1906, the method 1900 may include monitoring file
access.
More specifically, the file system or file system extension may be
instrumented to specifically
monitor the source, quantity, or other parameters of file accesses over time,
in order to detect a
pattern of access to files that causes a potential indication of compromise.
While a pattern of
access to files may provide one useful measure for detecting a compromise that
can be
advantageously addressed with key throttling as contemplated herein¨e.g.,
because the nature
of the compromise may manifest as and rely on rapid access to numerous files
in rapid
succession¨it will be understood that other potential indicators of compromise
for files,
process, or an endpoint in general, may also or instead be used to control
when key throttling is
deployed.
[00304] As shown in step 1908, if there is no indication of compromise, the
method
1900 may return to step 1906 where file monitoring may continue. If an
indication of
compromise is detected, the method 1900 may proceed to step 1910 where
additional actions
may be initiated.
[00305] The pattern used for detecting the indication of compromise may be any
pattern
of file access or other behaviors suggesting malicious activity. For example,
the pattern of
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access to the files may include a communication of the files to a location
remote from the
endpoint, such as would be typical of a malicious data exfiltration process.
In another aspect, the
indication of compromise may include a pattern of access to the files
indicating potentially
malicious automated file access. In this context, automated file access might
be suggested, for
example, by a rate of file accesses that would not be possible by a human user
opening files or
the like, or any other similar pattern suggesting an organization or frequency
of file accesses that
would not be possible by a human user. Such patterns of behavior may be
quantified using any
number of parameters. For example, the indication of compromise may include
access to a
number of files beyond a predetermined threshold within a predetermined time
interval. Thus,
targets or limits for unusually large numbers of file access and/or an
unusually short window for
multiple file accesses may be used alone or in combination to parameterize
potentially malicious
activity. These parameters may be manually set, e.g., by an administrator, or
empirically derived
based on a history of local activity on the endpoint or typical behavior among
a group of
endpoints, users, and so forth. The predetermined threshold for the number of
files may also or
instead specify a type of file. In other words, the threshold may only apply
to word processing
documents, spreadsheet documents, databases, or some other type or combination
of types. The
type of file may, for example, include an application type associated with
such files, a file
extension associated with such files, or any other file data or metadata
useful for characterizing
file types or the related applications.
[00306] The predetermined threshold for the number of files may also or
instead specify
a number of types of files. That is, only certain types of files may count
toward the threshold in
the aggregate. In another aspect, each type may have its own individual
threshold, which may be
used instead of or in addition to an aggregate threshold for all files of a
certain type, or more
generally all files of any type. Similarly, the predetermined threshold may
specify an application
requesting the number of files, e.g., by requiring that only a single
application make all of the
file access requests that count toward a threshold, or that a particular type
of application make
all such requests. Similarly, the predetermined threshold may specify an
attribute of the number
of files that count toward the threshold, e.g., so that only files of a
certain size, age, owner,
creator, type, name, and so forth are counted toward the threshold. In
general, any type of file
metadata may be used to provide a filter for determining whether file access
meets a threshold.
Thus, more subjective criteria, which may be added by or attributable to a
user or process
responsible for or associated with the file, may be applied as an attribute
for this purpose. For
example, the attribute may include a business use of a document (e.g.,
financial, engineering,
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legal, marketing, and so on) or a sensitivity of a document (e.g.,
confidential, sensitive, public,
and so on).
[00307] Still more generally, any attributes, thresholds, filters, criteria,
or the like may
be configured to create rules for determining when a pattern of file access is
potentially
malicious, so that a corresponding indication of compromise may be detected.
As noted above,
these rules may generally seek to detect automated and/or malicious file
access. As further
noted, other criteria or rules for detection of a potential compromise may
also or instead be
applied. The indication of compromise may also or instead be based on a rule
for detecting
automated behavior, which may employ thresholds as discussed herein, or any
other metrics,
behaviors, observable events, and so forth for the endpoint. In another
aspect, the indication of
compromise may be based on other potentially unsafe conditions such as a
detection of a
removable storage drive coupled to the endpoint.
[00308] As shown in step 1910, an exception may be provided to an indication
of
compromise for a trusted process. For example, where a particular process is
known and trusted,
such as a backup process of high reputation, the process may be permitted to
access many files
at high frequency, and an exception may be permitted to the rules for
determining indications of
compromise. Where an exception is appropriate, the method 1900 may return to
step 1906
where file monitoring may continue. Where no exception is appropriate, the
method 1900 may
proceed to 1912 where further action may be taken.
[00309] As shown in step 1912, when a potential indication of compromise has
been
detected, the file system extension that provides access to decrypted file
content may limit a rate
of access to the files, e.g., by regulating the rate at which decryption is
performed or by
restricting the number of files that can be decrypted at one time, or within
some predetermined
window, or otherwise restricting the frequency of rate of responses to
requests from the file
system. It will be appreciated that the rate may be varied dynamically. Thus,
for example, the
rate may be adjusted according to the strength of a particular indication of
compromise. Or the
rate may be slightly reduced (e.g., to a certain percentage below a maximum
allowed) when
there is suspicious behavior without a conviction of malicious behavior. This
may permit
continued monitoring of a developing and potentially malicious pattern of
behavior without
completely suspending file access. Applications that do not access many files
may be able to run
with potentially minimal impact, but applications that do access many files
will be slowed or
even stalled.
[00310] As shown in step 1914, the method 1900 may include any of a number of
additional measures to the potential or actual indication of compromise. For
example, the
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method 1900 may include presenting an interactive user interface element in a
display on the
endpoint requesting a confirmation that a human user initiated an activity
causing the pattern of
access, for example, by requiring user action or interaction, or requiring
authentication, or more
generally providing a notification in a display on the endpoint about the
indication of potential
compromise. This may be particularly advantageous, for example, where a strong
conviction
cannot be reached with respect to the state of compromise, but where some type
of potentially
malicious and/or automated file access or other behavior appears to be
present. This may also or
instead be applicable where the indication of compromise is based on a
suspiciously large
number of file access requests, such as access to a number of files beyond a
predetermined
threshold within a predetermined time interval as discussed herein.
[00311] In another aspect, the additional measures may include dynamically
tuning the
detection rules according to a history of behavior or current conditions.
Thus, for example, the
method 1900 may include adjusting at least one of the predetermined threshold
and the
predetermined time interval described herein according to a pattern of file
access. This may be
particularly useful where a weak conviction of compromise is reached. In such
circumstances,
there may be an elevated indication of compromise based on a large number of
file accesses, but
no other indicia of malicious activity. In such instances, the predetermined
threshold may be
reduced, or the window varied, in order to increase sensitivity while a final
conclusion is
pending. Detection rules may be based at least in part on the time of day,
week, month, year, and
so on. For example, a first behavior may be permitted during the work day, and
another behavior
outside of work hours.
[00312] Other steps may also or instead be taken such as remediation of the
endpoint,
quarantining any offending processes, scanning of affected files, and so
forth. After any
additional measures have been taken, the method 1900 may return to step 1906
where
monitoring of file access may resume.
[00313] In one aspect, there is disclosed herein a system that implements the
above
method 1900. This may, for example, include an endpoint, a first memory on the
endpoint
storing a key, and a second memory on the endpoint storing a plurality of
files that can be
decrypted by the key. The endpoint may include a file system for accessing the
plurality of files,
the file system including a file system extension that applies the key to
decrypt a requested one
of the plurality of files in response to a request from a process executing on
the endpoint. The
endpoint may also include a processor configured, e.g., by computer executable
code stored on
the endpoint and executable by the processor, to monitor the endpoint for an
indication of
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compromise, and to limit a rate of access to the plurality of files by the
file system extension in
response to the indication of compromise.
[00314] The above systems, devices, methods, processes, and the like may be
realized
in hardware, software, or any combination of these suitable for a particular
application. The
hardware may include a general-purpose computer and/or dedicated computing
device. This
includes realization in one or more microprocessors, microcontrollers,
embedded
microcontrollers, programmable digital signal processors or other programmable
devices or
processing circuitry, along with internal and/or external memory. This may
also, or instead,
include one or more application specific integrated circuits, programmable
gate arrays,
programmable array logic components, or any other device or devices that may
be configured to
process electronic signals. It will further be appreciated that a realization
of the processes or
devices described above may include computer-executable code created using a
structured
programming language such as C, an object oriented programming language such
as C++, or
any other high-level or low-level programming language (including assembly
languages,
hardware description languages, and database programming languages and
technologies) that
may be stored, compiled or interpreted to run on one of the above devices, as
well as
heterogeneous combinations of processors, processor architectures, or
combinations of different
hardware and software. In another aspect, the methods may be embodied in
systems that
perform the steps thereof, and may be distributed across devices in a number
of ways. At the
same time, processing may be distributed across devices such as the various
systems described
above, or all of the functionality may be integrated into a dedicated,
standalone device or other
hardware. In another aspect, means for performing the steps associated with
the processes
described above may include any of the hardware and/or software described
above. All such
permutations and combinations are intended to fall within the scope of the
present disclosure.
[00315] Embodiments disclosed herein may include computer program products
comprising computer-executable code or computer-usable code that, when
executing on one or
more computing devices, performs any and/or all of the steps thereof The code
may be stored in
a non-transitory fashion in a computer memory, which may be a memory from
which the
program executes (such as random access memory associated with a processor),
or a storage
device such as a disk drive, flash memory or any other optical,
electromagnetic, magnetic,
infrared or other device or combination of devices. In another aspect, any of
the systems and
methods described above may be embodied in any suitable transmission or
propagation medium
carrying computer-executable code and/or any inputs or outputs from same.
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[00316] The elements described and depicted herein, including in flow charts
and block
diagrams throughout the figures, imply logical boundaries between the
elements. However,
according to software or hardware engineering practices, the depicted elements
and the functions
thereof may be implemented on machines through computer executable media
having a
processor capable of executing program instructions stored thereon as a
monolithic software
structure, as standalone software modules, or as modules that employ external
routines, code,
services, and so forth, or any combination of these, and all such
implementations may be within
the scope of the present disclosure. Examples of such machines may include,
but may not be
limited to, personal digital assistants, laptops, personal computers, mobile
phones, other
handheld computing devices, medical equipment, wired or wireless communication
devices,
transducers, chips, calculators, satellites, tablet PCs, electronic books,
gadgets, electronic
devices, devices having artificial intelligence, computing devices, networking
equipment,
servers, routers and the like. Furthermore, the elements depicted in the flow
chart and block
diagrams or any other logical component may be implemented on a machine
capable of
executing program instructions. Thus, while the foregoing drawings and
descriptions set forth
functional aspects of the disclosed systems, no particular arrangement of
software for
implementing these functional aspects should be inferred from these
descriptions unless
explicitly stated or otherwise clear from the context. Similarly, it may be
appreciated that the
various steps identified and described above may be varied, and that the order
of steps may be
adapted to particular applications of the techniques disclosed herein. All
such variations and
modifications are intended to fall within the scope of this disclosure. As
such, the depiction
and/or description of an order for various steps should not be understood to
require a particular
order of execution for those steps, unless required by a particular
application, or explicitly stated
or otherwise clear from the context. Absent an explicit indication to the
contrary, the disclosed
steps may be modified, supplemented, omitted, and/or re-ordered without
departing from the
scope of this disclosure. Numerous variations, additions, omissions, and other
modifications will
be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art. In addition, the order or
presentation of method
steps in the description and drawings above is not intended to require this
order of performing
the recited steps unless a particular order is expressly required or otherwise
clear from the
context.
[00317] The method steps of the implementations described herein are intended
to
include any suitable method of causing such method steps to be performed,
consistent with the
patentability of the following claims, unless a different meaning is expressly
provided or
otherwise clear from the context. So for example performing the step of X
includes any suitable
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method for causing another party such as a remote user, a remote processing
resource (e.g., a
server or cloud computer) or a machine to perform the step of X. Similarly,
performing steps X,
Y and Z may include any method of directing or controlling any combination of
such other
individuals or resources to perform steps X, Y and Z to obtain the benefit of
such steps. Thus
method steps of the implementations described herein are intended to include
any suitable
method of causing one or more other parties or entities to perform the steps,
consistent with the
patentability of the following claims, unless a different meaning is expressly
provided or
otherwise clear from the context. Such parties or entities need not be under
the direction or
control of any other party or entity, and need not be located within a
particular jurisdiction.
[00318] It will be appreciated that the methods and systems described above
are set
forth by way of example and not of limitation. Numerous variations, additions,
omissions, and
other modifications will be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art. In
addition, the order or
presentation of method steps in the description and drawings above is not
intended to require
this order of performing the recited steps unless a particular order is
expressly required or
otherwise clear from the context. Thus, while particular embodiments have been
shown and
described, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various
changes and modifications in
form and details may be made therein without departing from the spirit and
scope of this
disclosure and are intended to form a part of the invention as defined by the
following claims,
which are to be interpreted in the broadest sense allowable by law.
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